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Large naval surface combatants are potentially held at risk by adversarial anti-access 
aerial denial (A2AD) weapon systems. To mitigate that risk we propose a distributed 
surface force concept, which relies on a cost-effective small surface combatant (SSC) 
capable of augmenting current forces in the 2025–2030 timeframe. We show that 
dispensing offensive and defensive power onto numerous smaller platforms has several 
advantages, including a more resilient force structure, greater number of ships, and fiscal 
cost savings.  
After employing the systems engineering process tailored to the problem to 
understand requirements and alternatives, a single mission SSC adapted to anti-surface 
warfare (ASUW) emerged as the solution. The SSC is conceptually employed in an 
armada composed of existing naval forces, which provide a protective shield against a 
multi-threat enemy force. The Armada is nominally composed of Arleigh Burke-class 
destroyers, littoral combat ships and SSCs. The SSC’s capabilities include eight anti-ship 
cruise missiles with a range of 90 nautical miles, speed greater than 25 knots, and organic 
detection and classification range of at least 60 nautical miles. 
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The United States Defense Department’s fiscal constraints dictate investment in force 
structure which must be cost effective and add major capability to remain relevant for the 
foreseeable future. As stated in the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review:  
We must ensure the that the fleet is capable of operating in every region 
and across the full spectrum of conflict. No new negotiations beyond 32 
Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) will go forward, and the Navy will submit 
alternative proposals to procure a capable and lethal small surface 
combatant. (Hagel 2014) 
This statement makes relevant the system’s engineering analysis (SEA) cohort 20 
team A (SEA-20A) distributed surface force capstone project as an opportunity to 
conduct an unbiased study to provide the Navy with a small surface combatant solution 
well-adapted to its needs. This project’s goal is to deliver a high-level design for a small 
surface combatant (SSC) capable of serving as a credible deterrent to aggression well-
adapted to projecting power inside an anti-area access denial (A2AD) environment.  
The team’s formal tasking statement via the systems engineering analysis chair is 
shown below: 
Design a fleet system of systems and concept of operations for cost 
effective small surface combatants in a range of missions to augment 
naval operations or conduct specified tasking in the 2025–2030 timeframe 
and beyond. Consider requirements for these ships to execute naval 
missions across the kill chain spectrum. Consider new ship requirements, 
flotilla size, operating areas, bandwidth and connectivity, logistics, and 
basing support in forward areas or from CONUS bases. Generate 
requirements for unmanned and manned platforms to be used by flotilla 
ships and ensure each strike platform can execute its own kill chain 
regardless of the EM environment. Specifically, analyze alternatives to 
employ unmanned/manned systems from flotilla ships to support their 
missions, including consideration of a common type aerial platform with a 
configurable payload package. Consider the current LCS fleet structure 
and funded programs as the baseline system of systems and for developing 
concepts of operations. Ensure all systems identified within the solution 
set are at a Technology Readiness Level of 8 or higher. Next, develop 
alternative architectures for platforms, manning, command and control, 
intelligence collection/dissemination and consumption, communication 
 xxiii 
and network connectivity, and operational procedures. Address the costs 
and effectiveness your alternatives. 
Designing the SSC for combat in the South China Sea, Persian Gulf, and Straits of 
Malacca, where possible adversaries employ effective anti-access area denial (A2AD) 
weapon systems, is a challenging task. This assignment is made less difficult by utilizing 
the SEA integrated project team’s broad expertise, which includes United States naval 
officers with expertise in surface warfare, air warfare, and undersea warfare combined 
with Singaporean civilian and military officers. Additionally, the product is enhanced by 
using the system engineering’s (SE) guiding principles.  
The SE process was used to analyze the problem posed in the tasking statement, 
to understand the problems posed in the tasking statement, to understand system 
requirements, to construct alternatives, and to produce recommendations. A tailored SE 
process model was developed, incorporating clear phases with iterative loops shown in 
the Figure 1. This process model contains a logical progression beginning with the initial 








































Through the iterative process of modeling and analysis, a concept of operations 
(CONOPS) employs a SSC flotilla in a heterogeneous squadron the team calls the 
armada. The armada is a scalable concept where capability gaps of a single mission SSC 
are mitigated by the existing force structure. For example, the CONOPS employs an 
armada composed of fifteen SSCs, two Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) equipped with the 
anti-submarine warfare module, and two Arleigh Burke-class destroyers providing air 
defense for the group inside an A2AD environment. This 19-ship formation was capable 
of taking on and defeating an enemy force composed of 10 missile boats, four destroyers, 
two frigates, five submarines, and one aircraft while sustaining only marginal losses.  
The team derived the most important SSC characteristics. These requirements 
include an organic 60 nautical mile detection and classification range capability, eight 90 
nautical mile ASCMs with a minimum salvo size of two, and speed greater than 25 knots. 
Note that the detection and classification range is dependent on possible manned and 
unmanned sensor platforms launched from each SSC. Combat effectiveness did not 
significantly increase above 25 knots, but may provide the SSC a favorable firing 
position prior to engagement. The SSC networking capability was not a significant 
facture due to the close ship proximity resulting from geographic features in the modeling 
scenarios. 
To find these requirements, several scenarios were considered relevant to evaluate 
the effectiveness of the small surface combatant and the associated armada. These 
scenarios include the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, the Strait of Malacca, and 
the Persian Gulf. Of these three scenarios, the Spratly Islands provide the most 
challenging conditions and was selected to provide the tactical situations for the modeling 
and simulation effort. The South China Sea challenges include high merchant and 
commercial traffic density, a combination of shallow and deep waters, a proximity to 
A2AD weapons systems, and a multitude of natural landmasses that inhibit free 
movement.  
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A large number of factors may affect the performance of the SSC in a combat 
engagement. These factors include ship speed, missile capacity and range, sensor range, 
ship draft, fuel capacity, endurance, crew size, and armada group size. In order to 
determine the SSC capabilities that provide the most significance to the armada’s combat 
effectiveness, multiple simulations of each possible factor combination were conducted 
and a regression analysis was performed. To evaluate these SSC factor’s effectiveness of 
in a surface on surface engagement, the simulations were first restricted to just the 
surface combatant portion of the tactical situation. The single most significant factor that 
improved the armada’s combat effectiveness was the SSC’s detection and classification 
range. For the scenario the enemy was assumed to have a 50 nm sensor range. As seen in 
the Figure 2, the armada’s effectiveness improved greatly when the U.S. sensor range 
exceeded that of the adversary. When the U.S. force’s sensor range was approximately 
five nautical miles greater than the enemy’s sensor range, the combat effectiveness 
improved to the point where the average number of U.S. casualties was less than one, 
while all of the enemy combatants were destroyed. From this analysis, the single most 
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To better understand the armada’s effectiveness and risk inside the A2AD 
environment, the full threat envelope was introduced by adding submarines and then 
aircraft to the tactical simulations. Initially, no antisubmarine capabilities are modeled 
within the U.S. armada. The results of this model can be seen in Figure 3. The addition of 
one PLAN submarine engaged in an ASUW role results in a significant loss of U.S. 
warships. Additional PLAN submarines result in a further increase in U.S. warships lost. 
The major takeaway from this analysis is that the armada is vulnerable to submarine 
attack if no ASW capability is included in the force mix. 
 
 
Figure 3. Impact of PLAN submarines with no U.S. ASW capabilities. 
The impact of enemy submarines on the survivability of the armada reveals a 
capability gap that must be addressed. One feasible solution is adding ASW capabilities 
to the armada with the LCS’s ASW mission module. PLAN submarines were again added 
to the scenario one at a time, but in this second iteration, the LCS is equipped with an 
ASW capability. The armada’s survivability is drastically improved as shown in Figure 4. 
While U.S. casualties do increase when the first PLAN submarine is introduced, the 
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Figure 4. Impact of PLAN submarines with some U.S. ASW capabilities. 
As with submarines, PLAN air threat was assessed by adding one aircraft at a 
time to determine the impact on the survivability of an armada without the DDG’s air 
defense capabilities. Aircraft were modeled as H6 bombers with four ASCMs and an 
unlimited number of sorties. The results can be seen in Figure 5. 
 
 
































































These results reveal the devastating impact enemy aircraft have on the armada 
equipped with no air defense. Two dedicated aircraft operating without a threat can 
destroy the armada in fewer than four sorties. Although it describes a worst case 
situation, this simulation does identify a capability gap that may be addressed by adding 
AAW assets to the armada or allocating land-based air assets to provide this protection. 
The preceding analysis shows that a small combatant flotilla is vulnerable when 
enemy submarines and aircraft are in their operating area. The armada concept, or 
deploying with a mixed ship squadron to provide the tactical force some defensive 
capability while still dispersing offensive capabilities, is proposed to employ in a high 
threat environment. 
Despite this work’s simulation focus on the South China Sea, there are potential 
threats from ASCMs and ASBM in various locations throughout the world. Operating 
inside these A2AD threat areas requires a new concept for the logistics train and 
equipment. Establishing a new replenishment method capable of sustaining the fleet 
inside an A2AD environment was created. The new method involves the use of small fuel 
ferries to shuttle fuel from T-AKEs outside the A2AD environment to warships inside the 
A2AD environment. Fuel demand was found to be the most significant logistic 
requirement in both combat evolutions and “peace time” steaming. In order to understand 
and apply this concept the calculations for fuel capacity and burn rate were conducted.  
Fuel capacities for the fuel transports, the fuel ferry and the T-AKE, were 
established and calculated through research into the various classes of ships. While there 
are better ships for refueling due to a higher capacity, they lacked the ability to transport 
dry stores and ammunition in sufficient quantities in addition to fuel. The T-AKE carries 
approximately 900,000 gallon of fuel. The fuel ferry, based on a modified JHSV design, 
carries 210,000 gallons. The capacity of the combatants was estimated as twenty percent 
of total tonnage. With these capacities, the number of logistics ships (T-AKEs and fuel 
ferries) required to support a group of SSCs was established. The example below is 
specifically for an Endurance Patrol, where green represents ships that can be supported 
by four fuel ferries, each with a 210,000 gallons capacity. Yellow represents ships that 
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can only be supported by four T-AKEs with a capacity of 900,000 gallons each and 
combatants requiring refueling when they reach 80% of capacity.  
 
Tonnage Single Ship 2 Ships 4 Ships 6 Ships 8 Ships 10 Ships 12 Ships 14 Ships 16 Ships 
100                   
200                   
300                   
400                   
500                   
600                   
700                   
800                   
900                   
1000                   
1500                   
2000                   
3000                   
4000                   
5000                   
6000                   
Table 1. Combatant ship supportability refueling at 80% capacity. 
One solution to overcoming patrol endurance limitations of a small combatant is 
to change the doctrine that dictates the minimum allowable fuel capacities remaining 
before refueling is required. The example below illustrates the increase in patrol time that 
can be gained by simply allowing the combatant ships to operate to a lower fuel reserve 
level. Using fifty percent capacity as the refueling point, a 1500-ton ship can operate for 
five days before refueling is required. By allowing the ships to operate to a lower fuel 
reserve level (20 percent remaining vice 50 percent remaining), the on station time of the 
combatant can be extended to eight days. This increase in endurance could help to 
significantly reduce the logistics issues presented in an A2AD environment. Figure 6 
contains the fuel endurance versus ship tonnage at 15 knots. 
 xxx 
 
Figure 6. Fuel endurance at 15 knots versus ship tonnage. 
A major component of the tasking statement is to design a cost-effective SSC 
capable of delivering additional capability to augment existing force structure. Using the 
600-ton SSC as the lower bound and the 1500-ton SSC as the upper bound, analogous 
ships were selected and used to develop a linear regression based cost estimation model. 
Assuming the Navy would acquire 45 ships of the final desired tonnage, the model can be 
used to calculate the first unit cost ( 1T ). The final unit cost (assuming 45 ships of each 
tonnage are purchased) can be estimated by implementing an 85 percent learning curve 
into the ship production calculation. The estimated cost of each ship (based on the ship 
production number) can be seen in Figure 7. From the cost analysis, the 600-ton SSC was 
calculated to have a 1T  cost of $313 million and the 45th unit cost was determined to be 
approximately $138 million. For the 1500-ton SSC, the 1T  cost was estimated at $513 
million and unit number 45 was estimated at $227 million. Both the 600-ton and 1500-
ton SSC variants fall below current LCS acquisition cost and can effectively augment the 



































Figure 7. Expected learning curve for the construction of the SSC in FY2014$. 
After using the custom built SE process model to guide the project, the research 
determined an effective solution that meets all of the major requirements of the tasking 
statement. As long as CONOPS, capabilities, sustainment and cost remain balanced with 
the detailed design effort requirements, a single mission SSC can be a viable platform for 
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A. PROJECT TEAM COMPOSITION 
The Systems Engineering Analysis Cohort 20, Team Alpha (SEA-20A) capstone 
project team is comprised of military officers and defense industry professionals from the 
United States and Singapore. Six of the 15 members are students in the Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS) SEA curriculum, seven are Singaporean students in the 
Temasek Defense Systems Institute (TDSI) program, and the remaining two are U.S. 
students that have the honor of completing Master’s degrees from both NPS and through 
TDSI. The six core members from the SEA curriculum began the initial background 
study the summer of 2013, while the TDSI students joined the team in September 2013. 
A list of the team members along with their respective expertise and backgrounds is 
provided in Table 1. 
 
Dr. Gary O. Langford  
(Project Advisor)                                      
Senior Lecturer, Systems 
Engineering Department 
Buss, John 
(Project Manager)                                    
Surface Warfare (USN) 
Foo, Ceying                                     
Armour Officer (SAF) 
Ng, Yeow Chong                                     
Satellites (ST) 
Goff, John                                     
Surface Warfare (USN) 
Tan, Min Yan                                     
Satellites (ST) 
Jurgensen, Sean                                     
Surface Warfare (USN) 
Teo, Hui Fen                                     
Ship Construction (ST) 
Ling, Yu Xian                                     
Information Assurance (DSTA) 
Thompson, Chrisman                                     
Surface Warfare (USN) 
Magbanua, Rico                                     
Aviation (USN) 
Toh, Wei Quan                                     
Armour Officer (SAF) 
Moss, Andrew                                     
Surface Warfare (USN) 
Wall, Damien                                     
Submarine Warfare (USN) 
Moyer, Kyle 
Surface Warfare (USN) 
 
Wee, Toon Joo                                     
Information Exploitation (DSO) 
Table 1.   SEA-20A project team personnel composition. 
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The team member’s experience and perspectives from both the operational and 
academic arena are vast and varied. The Singaporeans offer skills cultivated from both 
their military and defense industry experience, while the U.S. naval officers bring a wide 
range of knowledge from the aviation, surface, and subsurface communities. Both the 
Singaporean and U.S. students have previous and current academic experience in a 
variety of engineering disciplines, and some of the U.S. officers have completed the 
tactical, operational, and strategic training of Joint Professional Military Education. The 
collaboration of the team’s diverse personnel, coupled with insights provided by subject 
matter experts (SME) from the fleet and NPS, allowed the team to conduct a study that 
will help guide decision makers in developing the future naval force structure in a domain 
that requires distribution, innovation, efficiency, and technological superiority. 
B. TASKING STATEMENT 
1. Initial Tasking Statement 
The following tasking statement was delivered to the team in September 2013. It 
was broad and encompassed the general guidelines our sponsor desired as an end state of 
the project. 
Design a fleet system of systems and concept of operations for cost 
effective small surface combatants in a range of missions to augment 
naval operations or conduct specified tasking in the 2025–2030 timeframe 
and beyond. Consider requirements for these ships to execute naval 
missions across the kill chain spectrum. Consider new ship requirements, 
flotilla size, operating areas, bandwidth and connectivity, logistics, and 
basing support in forward areas or from CONUS bases. Generate 
requirements for unmanned and manned aircraft to be used by these ships, 
ensuring each strike platform can execute its own kill chain regardless of 
the EM environment. Specifically, analyze alternatives to employ 
unmanned air systems from these ships to support their missions, 
including consideration of a common type aerial platform with a 
configurable payload package. Consider the current LCS fleet structure 
and funded programs as the baseline system of systems and for developing 
concepts of operations. Then develop alternative architectures for 
platforms, manning, command and control, intelligence 
collection/dissemination and consumption, communication and network 
connectivity, and operational procedures. Address the costs and 
effectiveness your alternatives (Eagle 2013). 
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The team took the initial tasking statement and broke it down into specific 
requirements including scope, mission, vision, goal and objectives as discussed in 
Chapter I Sections C and D. From this perspective of focusing on the holistic view of 
process and end-state, we developed a refined tasking statement for this project’s sponsor 
and stakeholders.  
2. Tasking Statement Development 
The initial tasking statement was the starting point for the project development 
work. For a system’s approach to identifying and solving problems, evolution of the 
provided tasking statement is required to open up solution space concurrently as the team 
was forming the necessary background knowledge required to start developing possible 
solutions. The initial tasking requires the small surface combatant to use unmanned air 
systems to support the mission set by enhancing command and control (C2) capability 
and over-the-horizon (OTH) targeting and sensor suites. This requirement excludes 
current capable manned aircraft and alternative manned/unmanned subsurface, surface or 
air vehicles. As a self-imposed constraint, applicable systems must be technology 
readiness level (TRL) 8 or higher. In not considering systems below a TRL 8, the system 
has the potential to be fielding in a short timeframe, while minimizing cost associated 
with research and development. 
3. Evolved Tasking Statement 
The team developed a new tasking statement providing a holistic view of the 
problem. In order to arrive at the new statement, the team utilized steps of problem 
analysis though a system’s engineering perspective, which generates feedback through 
progress reviews, stakeholder meetings, and lessons learned. The following is the revised 
tasking statement approved by the project advisors and briefed during the first and second 
initial progress reviews: 
Design a fleet system of systems and concept of operations for cost 
effective small surface combatants in a range of missions to augment 
naval operations or conduct specified tasking in the 2025–2030 timeframe 
and beyond. Consider requirements for these ships to execute naval 
missions across the kill chain spectrum. Consider new ship requirements, 
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flotilla size, operating areas, bandwidth and connectivity, logistics, and 
basing support in forward areas or from CONUS bases. Generate 
requirements for unmanned and manned platforms to be used by flotilla 
ships and ensure each strike platform can execute its own kill chain 
regardless of the EM environment. Specifically, analyze alternatives to 
employ unmanned/manned systems from flotilla ships to support their 
missions, including consideration of a common type aerial platform with a 
configurable payload package. Consider the current LCS fleet structure 
and funded programs as the baseline system of systems and for developing 
concepts of operations. Ensure all systems identified within the solution 
set can be fielded in the given timeframe. Next, develop alternative 
architectures for platforms, manning, command and control, intelligence 
collection/dissemination and consumption, communication and network 
connectivity, and operational procedures. Address the costs and 
effectiveness your alternatives. 
C. SCOPE 
Operational planning involves all phases from shaping the problem to supporting 
civil authority’s security issues. A detailed discussion of operational phases is provided in 
Chapter III Section C.2. This study focuses on Phase II (combat: seize initiative) 
operations. The broad range of possible operations a SSC could be capable of conducting 
requires boundary conditions (i.e., no anti-submarine warfare (ASW) or anti-air warfare 
(AAW) capabilities) to be set in order to move forward with the analysis of the problem. 
For these reasons, the other operational phases and their associated mission sets were not 
considered. Other phases will be referred to in the discussion, but they were not 
developed with detailed modeling results, and therefore should be considered in the 
context for future development and supplementary to Phase II operations discussed in this 
report. 
D. MISSION, VISION, GOALS, AND OBJECTIVES 
Mission 
The following is the team’s mission statement: Utilize the diverse knowledge, 
research ability, and analytical capabilities of the SEA project team to evolve a resilient, 
forward-deployed, small surface combatant concept to serve as a credible deterrent to 
potential attacks in the 2025–2030 timeframe. 
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Vision 
Reduce risk and cost while increasing effectiveness through technology and asset 
distribution. 
Goals 
• Explore varying force compositions and characteristics (such as weapon 
and sensor range and salvo size) using combat simulation models 
• Identify SSC key performance parameters 
• Develop a concept of operations for the distributed surface force 
Objectives 
• Recommend a specific capability set and platform requirements for further 
development during the Total Ship Systems Engineering Course being 
offered during the fall of 2014 at the Naval Postgraduate School. 
• Deliver a detailed life cycle cost estimate (LCCE) for the selected 
alternative. Include in the cost report alternative modifications to existing 
designs and the associated cost with modifying current platforms. 
Compare the small surface combatant cost with a new frigate acquisition 
cost. 
• Recommend a Concept of Operations (CONOPS) that describes how to 
employ the SSCs to aid in multi-threat scenario operations. Include a 
description in the CONOPS of how the SSC can be logistically supported 
in a high threat environment. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
To develop a complete understanding of the maritime status, both worldwide and 
within the United States, substantial background research is required to put the problem 
in context. If a solution set is developed that does not integrate well with the Navy’s five 
and 30-year shipbuilding plans (O'Rourke 2014b), does not take into account the White 
House Guidance on 21st century global leadership (Obama and Panetta 2012) and the 
United States Combatant Commander posture statements to Congress for 2014 (Locklear 
2014; Jacoby 2014; Kelly 2014; Austin 2014) in the context of the Unified Command 
Plan and Combatant Commands overview by the Congressional Research Service 
(Feickert 2013), the solution will not be considered relevant or sufficient. Additionally, 
potential adversaries are not static. Their capabilities and limitations must be projected to 
the 2025–2030 timeframe, with the additional knowledge of both physical and human 
geography that is currently happening and projected to continue. 
A design of a system or a system of systems for a specific scenario or outcome is 
undesirable. Rather, this study seeks to develop a system of systems that can be employed 
in different scenarios. An effort was made to collect as much of the current and projected 
information as possible from open-source reference material about the U.S. Navy status. 
The following background information on weapons, situation, and location provide 
context into where the findings in this report were drawn from. 
A. CURRENT PROJECTIONS OF 2025–2030 FORCE COMPOSITION 
The Navy’s goal as of January 2013 is to maintain a fleet of 306 ships, which was 
a reduction from the previous total of 313 (Department of the Navy N8 Department 
2013). This 306-ship plan includes 12 SSBNs, 48 SSNs, 11 aircraft carriers, 88 cruisers 
and destroyers, 52 Littoral Combat Ships (LCS), 33 amphibious ships, 29 logistics and 
resupply ships, and Joint High Speed Vessels (JHSVs), and 23 other ships including 
command and support vessels (O'Rourke 2014b). Additionally, the number of LCS ships 
that are to be built has become a contentious subject, with indications that they may be 
cut in total production to 32 (Cavas 2014). Regardless of the outcome of LCS, the U.S. 
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Navy is projecting itself to operate with primarily multi-mission and high-cost ships in 
the 2025–2030 timeframe. The LCS will undoubtedly provide assistance in mine warfare, 
anti-submarine warfare, and surface warfare (LaGrone 2013). Although highly capable 
and technologically superior ships are a large part of maintaining sea dominance, the U.S. 
Navy needs to consider ship designs and a concept that distributes sensors and weapon 
reach into areas that are not accessible or are too risky to utilize the high-end force. 
B. CURRENT SURFACE TO SURFACE MISSILE TECHNOLOGY 
Since the end of the Cold War, the world has undergone a dramatic shift in 
military missions and priorities. The United States finds itself in a situation with an 
outdated surface-to-surface or anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM) engagement capability 
against a possible competitor. For example, as China continues its economic and military 
expansion this ASCM deficiency has moved to the forefront of military decision makers 
concerns as they evaluate the current and future threats. The primary issue is that “The 
Navy has not prioritized defeating enemy warships at sea since the collapse of the Soviet 
Union.” (Majumdar 2014). The lack of emphasis on surface-to-surface engagements 
means both weapon potency and current fleet experience in deploying these weapons is 
called into question.  
The U.S. would be limited to the dated Harpoon anti-ship missile if this 
engagement were to happen today. Originally developed in the 1970s, “the Harpoon 
missile provides the Navy and the Air Force with a common missile for air, ship, and 
submarine launches” (Federation of American Scientists 2014a). Although state of the art 
when originally deployed, the last modification to the Harpoon design occurred in 1982 
with the Block 1C (Federation of American Scientists 2014a). Since the cold war, many 
nations have had the time to develop superior anti-ship weapons. The result has been a 
lessening of the comparative advantage in power projection than the U.S. has enjoyed 
historically. The Harpoon is an outmoded missile with an insufficient range and 
inadequate survivability for today’s open-ocean and littoral battle spaces. The United 
States must consider new technology to bridge the gap between its Navy and those of its 
competitors. The Navy’s deficiency in the ability to address these opponents could create 
 8 
a significant threat to American security. At a minimum, lack of an effective ASCM 
restricts high-end multi-mission ships’ employment to environments where the U.S. 
enjoys air superiority, as the U.S. possesses no weapon system that holds an adversary’s 
surface combatants at risk. 
The United States requires a deployable surface-to-surface missile to engage the 
enemy in a littoral combat scenario. Merely modifying or improving the Harpoon is not a 
viable option, even in the short term. Experts agree the Harpoon missile “does not have 
the range or survivability to defeat emerging surface threats” (Majumdar 2014). 
Additionally, the U.S. Navy has strongly reduced the number of Harpoon missiles 
deployed each year; the Navy’s ability to effectively implement Harpoon in battle is 
diminished as compared to the 1980s fleet. 
To address this surface missile deficiency the U.S. Navy gave authorization to 
begin increment two of the Offensive Anti-Surface Warfare (OASuW) program, which is 
a continuation of the Defense Advanced Projects Research Agency’s (DARPA) Long 
Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM) (Majumdar 2014). An illustration of LRASM is 
shown in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1.  LRASM anti-ship missile (from Lockheed Martin 2014). 
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It is important to note that LRASM is not a long-term solution. The missile “is 
merely a stopgap for the Navy until it can develop a more comprehensive solution in the 
form of OASuW Increment Two—which will be used by aircraft, surface warships, and 
possibly submarines.” (Majumdar 2014). The “stopgap” concept makes sense from a cost 
effectiveness standpoint and is in-line with classic U.S. missile technology acquisitions. 
Lockheed estimates the cost of LRASM at about $2 Million (Aviation Week 2013) each, 
and for that price the Navy gets an anti-ship missile that offers a long-range (500 nm) 
(Defense Industry Daily 2014a) precision strike capability that can be fired out of the 
existing VLS system currently on Aegis cruiser or destroyer (CRUDES) ships.  
LRASM is not the only viable missile technology available. Kongsberg’s naval 
strike missile (NSM) is another potential option. The NSM is a lightweight (1000 
pounds) and long range (130 nm) weapon (Defense Industry Daily 2014b). Stealth is the 
key feature of the NSM and was a major consideration throughout its design. To ensure 
difficulty for early warning radar systems and electronic support measures (ESM), the 
missile was designed to not include onboard radar. Additionally, the missile utilizes 
imaging infrared (IIR) and travels at a speed under supersonic (Defense Industry Daily 
2014b). A potential barrier to the U.S. Navy purchasing NSM is that it is a new and 
unproven system and currently made by an overseas supplier (Norway). 
In addition to NSM, Kongsberg also makes the helicopter launched Penguin anti-
ship missile that is designed to operate in both littoral and open-ocean environments. The 
Penguin may also be useful in further missile technology studies especially since it is 
capable of littoral missions (Kongsberg Defence Systems 2013). A picture of the Penguin 
anti-ship missile is provided in Figure 2. 
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 Figure 2.  The Penguin anti-ship missile fired from a helicopter (from 
Penguin Place Post 8). 
 Other possible solutions include Mantra BAE Dynamics Alenia’s (MBDA) 
Storm Shadow/Scalp and the Taurus kinetic energy penetrator destructor (KEPD) 350. 
Like the Penguin, these missiles are currently only air launched, but the Storm 
Shadow/Scalp missile offers long-range accuracy. The Storm Shadow/Scalp utilizes mid-
course guidance through global positioning system (GPS) and an autonomous terminal 
guidance with an (IIR) seeker (Matra British Aerospace Dynamics Aerospatiale (MBDA) 
Missile Systems 2013). Images of the Storm Shadow and the Taurus KEPD are displayed 
in Figure 3 and Figure 4, respectively. 
 
 
Figure 3.  Picture of the Storm Shadow missile (from Deagel 2005). 
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 Figure 4.  Picture of the Taurus KEPD 350 MR (from Saab Group 2010). 
The KEPD offers high precision in a long-range (300 km), lightweight (1400kg) 
(Saab Group 2010), all-weather weapon, which can conduct precision strikes on a variety 
of targets. 
This list is not all-inclusive; there are a myriad of possibilities, especially in the 
long term since increment 2 is merely a stopgap. Given the high level of performance 
(either during operation or testing), any of these alternatives would meet or exceed the 
surface-to-surface missile need. This report does not provide a specific solution; rather 
the purpose is to demonstrate the solution space in order to give the end decision maker 
enough information to determine the best solution. 
C. EXISTING SMALL SURFACE COMBATANTS 
Before recommending a specific platform and its associated capabilities as a 
solution, a broad study of existing small surface combatants (SSC) currently in use or 
planning to be built in the near future is warranted. The inventory of existing small 
surface combatants was constrained to those having less than or equal the displacement 
of either LCS variant. 
This section provides an inventory of current or near-future SSC, the associated 
capabilities and unique characteristics of similar ships built in the United States, and 
designs that could be available from the international market. The small SSC can be 
easily broken into two groups; multi-role and single-mission. A quick comparison chart 
of the characteristics of these small combatants is provided for reference in Table 2. 
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 Vessels Speed (kts.) Length (m) Displacement (tons) 
Multi-role 
LCS-1 Freedom Class 45 116 3,089 
LCS-2 Independence Class 45 127 2,790 
Meko CSL 40 108 2,750 
VISBY Corvette class 40 73 640 
Gowind Combat corvette 28 107 2730 
Single 
Mission 
Ambassador Class 41 61 500 
Skjold SES 45 47 275 
Table 2.   Existing small surface combatant comparisons (after Saunders 2013). 
The two variants of LCS are displayed in Figure 5. Both ship classes are multi-
role (surface, anti-submarine, mine counter-measure, and irregular warfare) capable small 
surface combatants. As described in the tasking statement, the study analyzed a 
comparison of the two variants of the LCS.  
 
Figure 5.  The Freedom class LCS (left) and Independence class LCS (right) 
(from Defense Tech 2010). 
Both LCS ships are comparatively armed and are capable of being equipped with 
modular mission modules, but the ship designs are very different. The Freedom class has 
a steel mono-hull and aluminum superstructure whereas the Independence class has an 
all-aluminum trimaran design. Both platforms are designed to perform the same mission 
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capability with the “plug and play” modular concept. This concept allows the LCS to 
adapt to the changing threat scenarios against mine counter-measure (MCM), anti-
submarine warfare (ASW) and anti-surface warfare (ASW) with a focus on capabilities 
suited for the littoral region. However, since the completion of the LCS variant, the 
design has been greatly scrutinized for its mission fit, design requirements and the cost 
overruns of the acquisition program. The criticism is primarily based the modular concept 
feasibility, and problems associated quick turnaround time, lean manning, survivability 
and lethality of the LCS.  
Three alternate multi-role SSC platforms are the MEhrzweck-KOmbination 
(MEKO) Combat Ship for the Littorals (CSL), Visby Class and Gowind combat corvette, 
which are illustrated in Figure 6. 
  
Figure 6.  Images of the MEKO (left), Gowind (middle), and Visby (right) 
ship classes.1 
These ships are designed and built in foreign shipyards. Of the three alternatives, 
the Meko CSL is still in the design phase while the other two vessels are already 
commissioned. The Meko CSL specifications are very similar to those of the USN LCS. 
The uniqueness of the Meko design is its proven modularity with an interchangeable 
“plug-and-play” concept (Thomas 2007). The Meko Modular concept is shown in Figure 
7.  
1 (From Pakistan Defense 2010; Defense Industry Daily 2014c; Wallpapers 2013). 
 14 
                                                 
 
Figure 7.  Pictorial description of the modular concept by Meko (from 
Hauschildt and Sichermann 2012). 
The Visby class and Gowind combat corvette designs minimize radar cross -
section, and include ASUW missiles and point defense system. Both travel at high speeds 
greater than 30 knots. Plans exist for the Visby class to be upgraded and to incorporate an 
AAW system later in its life cycle (Naval Technology 2014a). Additionally, the Visby is 
equipped with a sonar system capable of detecting submarines in shallow water and is 
constructed of an all-composite design to reduce weight (Naval Technology 2014d). 
This study looked into the Norwegian Skjold surface effect ship (SES) corvette 
and the U.S. designed and built Ambassador MK III class missile boat. The Skjold class 
SES can travel up to 45 knots in rough seas and up to 60 knots in a calm sea state (Naval 
Technology 2014c). The low drag, freeboard design, and special radar absorbent material 
coating prevents SES from being easily detected. The Skjold Class SES is equipped with 
SSM and SAM missile and soft kill systems (Naval Technology 2014c).  
The Ambassador MK III has a unique surface effect hull design. The ship design 
incorporates a “V” shape wave-piercing monohull and enables a 41 knots speed in calm 
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seas. The vessel is armed with ASUW missiles and point defense anti-air warfare (AAW) 
systems shown in (Naval Technology 2014a). 
 
Figure 8.  Images of the Ambassador class SSC (left) and the Skjold SES 
(right) (from Naval Technology 2014a). 
Much like the discussion on current missile technology, the existing SSC list is 
also not all-inclusive. The final decision is based on several key constraints and factors 
which include cost, performance, timeline and even political aspects. Foreign overseas 
companies construct many of the ships discussed above, which creates a series of 
challenges in itself including the crew’s equipment familiarity, the ability for the 
manufacturer to meet the high standards of a U.S. warship and contracting requirements 
for the Department of Defense (DOD). Still further considerations involve the inevitable 
integration of the final ship design with the proper missile system. This report does not 
provide a specific solution; rather the purpose is to illustrate the solution space to give the 
end decision makers adequate information to make well-informed decisions. 
D. UNMANNED TECHNOLOGY 
In developing the SSC, we looked to leverage unmanned technology as a sensor 
platform extension, overhead data relay in a multi-threat domain, or kinetic weapons. A 
SSC may reduce manpower and increase platform time on station by utilizing an 
unmanned platform for these simple functions. These unmanned vehicles can be launched 
from the distributed surface force or an external source. 
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Employment of air, surface, and underwater systems supplements the distributed 
surface concept by reducing the vulnerability of a surface unit in providing a layered-
defense technique of detecting and classifying targets before entering weapons range. 
Additionally, unmanned systems add to the distribution, and can go into threat zones (i.e., 
DF-21 range) with less risk of an adversary using a high tech weapon on low-tech 
unmanned systems. 
As a sensor extension platform, unmanned technology can dramatically increase 
situational awareness of the distributed surface force while improving targeting accuracy. 
Extending sensor range allows a ship to take advantage of its full weapon range and 
enhance chance of a successful first strike. An example of an unmanned sensor extension 
platform is the MQ-8B Firescout, shown in Figure 9. 
Figure 9.  Picture of the MQ-8B Firescout (from Northrup Grumman 2014). 
An unmanned vehicle may function as a satellite replacement in an electro-
magnetic (EM) denied spectrum. Unmanned technology could serve as an acceptable 
communications relay platform if a potential adversary denied satellite communication to 
the distributed surface force. One example of a communication relay platform is an 
Aerostat. The Navy is currently experimenting with this technology on ships. The 
Aerostat concept is shown in Figure 10. 
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 Figure 10.  Aerostat operating from USNS SWIFT (HSV 2) (from Wasserbly 
2013). 
Unmanned systems will benefit the SSC concept as they may provide a low-risk 
and cost extension of sensors and possible weapon range that supports the distributed 
surface force idea. 
E. DISTRIBUTED SURFACE FORCE / ARMADA CONCEPT 
The distributed surface concept relies on the dispersion of offensive combat 
power and sensors throughout units in a group to create a resilient and survivable 
offensive system. Each unit may be less capable as an independent unit, but be extremely 
effective when integrated with the distributed surface force due to dispersed offensive 
and sensor capability. The team markets the distributed surface concept as the armada, or 
a combination of SSC ships and other U.S. Navy assets, to further reinforce the notion 
that the force’s strength remains with the group rather than the individual ship.  
Each ship should be primarily designed to fight one mission to reduce cost 
(although the individual armada ships may have different missions) and should operate in 
a multi-threat environment by a systems-of-systems networked defense. By making each 
ship cost effective, more ships can be fielded in a shorter amount of time if needed. The 
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distribution over multiple platforms makes the armada more survivable and decreases the 
significance of losing an asset. System of systems network defense can be found in more 
detail in Chapter IV Section D.1, but in short means protecting armada ships from air and 
undersea threats with other platforms, asset distribution, and layered defense which 
eliminates single points of failure. This single mission strategy will allow the U.S. to 
acquire more ships at a lower cost and deliver a more resilient ASUW capability in the 
2025–2030 timeframe. 
F. ANTI-ACCESS AERIAL DENIAL WEAPON SYSTEMS 
Potential adversaries are developing advanced weapons systems that may be 
capable of denying the United States access to maritime areas in the future. These 
weapon systems, which affect the U.S. Navy’s ability to project power, are grouped 
under the term anti-area access denial (A2AD) (Krepinevich, Work and Watts 2003). The 
systems include diesel submarines, anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), sea mines, anti-
ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs) and fast attack craft. One example is the Chinese DF-21 
ASBM, which is capable of targeting an U.S. aircraft carrier (United States Naval 
Institute 2009). Another example is the proliferation of affordable air independent 
propulsion (AIP) diesel submarines throughout the world. These AIP diesel submarines 
are capable of operating submerged in shallow water areas and are difficult to find.  
A2AD systems have the ability to hold the U.S. Navy at risk by exposing vessels 
to a high likelihood of damage in a surface conflict. Most of these weapons are less 
expensive than the potential U.S. Navy targets. The distributed surface force aims to 
reverse that trend by focusing on cost-effective SSCs, which can access A2AD areas with 
less risk and increase the difficulty for an adversary to locate, target, and conduct 
offensive operations toward friendly forces.  
G. LITTORAL/COASTAL OPERATIONS 
The maritime battle space has expanded from deep-water Mahanian battles to 
parts of the maritime domain where maneuverability could be limited due to geographic 
features or water depth. In the littoral or coastal domain, a series of a small force-on-force 
battles could be the dominant engagement type. 
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According to the U.S. Navy, littoral “as it applies to naval operations… is not 
restricted to the limited oceanographic definition encompassing the world’s coastal 
regions. Rather, it includes that portion of the world’s land masses adjacent to the oceans 
with direct control of and vulnerable to the striking power of sea-based forces” (United 
States Navy 1994).  
A generic example of the cross-section of a littoral zone is depicted in Figure 11. 
This illustration highlights the difficulties that deeper draft high-value units have 
navigating littoral areas, which severely limits their access capability. However, there is 
no clear line or definition where littoral starts or stops around the world. Water draft, 
tides, shipwrecks, territorial waters, archipelagic lanes, straits, economic exclusion zones 
(EEZ), and internal waters make up an elaborate series of criteria defining where ships 
can operate both physically and by international law. That being said, the SSC needs the 
capability to push as far into all of these areas when needed. 
 
Figure 11.  Littoral zone example (from Allen 2012). 
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III. APPLICATION OF THE SYSTEMS ENGINEERING PROCESS 
The systems engineering process was used to analyze the problem posed in the 
tasking statement. This project’s scope did not align with traditional systems engineering 
process models, so we developed a tailored process model. The modified model is based 
on the ‘Waterfall’ process model. The overall design resembles a ‘Waterfall’ process 
model; however there is an iterative loop for each phase rather than a return path to the 
beginning. Additionally, the steps do not correlate to the traditional models. 
A. SYSTEMS ENGINEERING PROCESS 
The systems engineering process began with an attempt to fit this project in the 
traditional systems engineering model. The initial process model is shown in Figure 12. 
 
Figure 12.  Sample systems engineering “V” process model (from Langford 
2009). 
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The ultimate goal of the project is to develop a set of requirements and 
capabilities for the proposed system. The existing traditional model’s application did not 
fit the scope due to this work having no requirement for detailed design. As described in 
the next section, a tailored SE process model was developed which focuses on the first 
half of the ‘V’ model and provides specifics to milestones to be achieved prior to entering 
each phase. 
B. SEA-20A SYSTEMS ENGINEERING PROCESS MODEL 
A SE process model was developed, incorporating clear phases with iterative 
loops shown in Figure 13. This process model contains a logical progression that leads to 
a system recommendation at the end of the SE Process. The process begins with the 
initial tasking statement that was presented to the team. This tasking statement enters the 
main component of the process. This component consists of three main phases (Problem 
Exploration, System Definition, and Modeling & Analysis). Each of these three phases 
has three sub-phases connected by a rotational cycle. The output of one phase becomes 
the input to the next phase; however, an iterative loop back to the previous phase is also 
available as shown with the feedback arrow. This feedback allows continuous refinement 
the original problem, if needed. The dotted lines around the phases denote open 
information flow into each phase. The process model is not a closed-loop process, so 




































RECOMMENDATION   
Figure 13.  SEA-20A revised systems engineering process diagram.
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1. Problem Exploration Phase 
The first step of the SEA-20A systems engineering process model was to analyze 
the initial tasking statement during the problem exploration phase. While exploring the 
problem given in the initial tasking statement and conducting applicable background 
research, the team looked at potential stakeholders and the influence each stakeholder 
might have on forming the initial problem statement. After identifying various 
stakeholders, the team performed a needs analysis. Threat scenario analysis was 
conducted to scope the problem, and three scenarios were created that were 
representative of potential threats. After investigating the background information on the 
problem, looking at particular problems presented by various threats, and exploring 
stakeholder groups, the initial problem statement was formed. As the understanding of 
the problem grew, each of the tasks within the problem exploration was revisited and 
traceability ensured back to the initial requirements. Major discoveries in the problem 
exploration phase include littoral operating environment challenges, operation in an 
A2AD environment, and specific needs analysis for potential stakeholders. The trade 
space analysis, which provides problem exploration phase background and system 
definition phase justification, is contained in Supplemental D. 
2. System Definition Phase 
After forming the initial requirements, the system definition phase of the SE 
process model was undertaken. During this phase, the team studied the causal 
relationship between stated requirements and capabilities of the small combatant ship. A 
rotational research cycle was conducted between capabilities and requirements to ensure 
the system definition was correctly understood and communicated through component 
selection. The rotational research cycle consisted of an iterative process in which system 
requirements were compared to current capabilities to identify capability gaps used to 
refine system requirements. This analysis refined the requirement for an effective 
surface-to-surface weapon and for a defensive network incorporating existing surface and 
air platforms to perform the sea denial mission. Boundaries discovered during this 
analysis included the engagement range, tonnage of each ship, draft, capability of 
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operating in an A2AD environment, and capability of operating with various types of 
units and assets. Some boundary conditions discovered during this analysis include 
relationships between cost and capability, size and seaworthiness, autonomy and 
interoperability. 
The project was scoped to develop high-level system of systems design 
specifically capable of operating in an A2AD environment and a CONOPS for its 
employment. Results that are required from the modeling and analysis phase are system 
recommendations based on analysis of the engagements in the model. At this point in the 
SE process, the initial set of capabilities that helped develop the modeling and analysis 
phase of the project were defined. 
3. Modeling and Analysis Phase 
The modeling and analysis phase of the SE process is dependent on the 
component selection derived in the system definition phase. Evaluation of component 
selection was modeled and tests conducted to determine if the system of systems is 
effective based on the requirements defined in Chapter III Section C.5. After analyzing 
the results, system refinement was accomplished using iterative feedback paths to 
previous SE phases. In doing so, the refinement allowed tasks to be revisited and thus 
provide further insight and a better understanding of the problem. For example early 
discoveries in the modeling phase led to the requirement for a “system of systems” 
approach to defending the distributed surface force to survive in a multi-threat 
environment. Additionally, the need for an air defense platform was established and 
included in an iteration of the model. Finally, after iterations of the SE phases and sub-
phase tasks, a system recommendation was determined as an output presented in Chapter 
VII. Major discoveries in this SE phase included the creation of a robust logistical 
network to meet fuel demand requirements to support missions that lasted more than 10 
days and the need for off-ship sensor platforms to extend targeting range of surface 
combatants.  
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C. NEEDS ANALYSIS 
Needs analysis allows an open-minded and unbiased approach to solving the 
problem at hand. By studying the problem and not driving straight at an answer, the 
solution space is expanded as alternatives eliminated by stakeholders are included back 
into possible solutions. Needs analysis begins with the establishment of stakeholder 
wants or desires; from this the establishment of what capability or design is actually 
needed. Needs analysis is completed using stakeholder analysis, scenario analysis, 
problem definition, and identification of capabilities which all lead to the requirements 
generation.  
1. Stakeholder Analysis 
The development phase of the system engineering process enabled the team to 
derive potential stakeholders. The initial list of possible stakeholders is in Table 3. This 
list is not exhaustive, but rather a selection of organizations that could exert influence 
over the project or be influenced by the results. 
  
Sponsor (OPNAV N91) US Taxpayers Potential Adversaries 
Department of Defense NPS Research (CRUSER) Foreign Military Sales 
Shipbuilders(contractors) OPNAV N8/N9I/N95/N98 Commercial Shipping 
NAVSEA US State Department United Nations 
Lobby Groups Naval Warfare 
Development Command 
US Pacific Command 
US Congress US Fleet Forces US Naval Personnel 
Secretary of Defense Global Economy US Central Command 
Table 3.   Potential stakeholders for the distributed surface force concept. 
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The team used the list as a guide and determined the three most significant 
stakeholders in the project and further decomposed their needs to provide context into the 
problem presented in the tasking statement. The key stakeholders are those with the most 
influence in determining the next generation small surface combatant (SSC), whose needs 
capture the majority of needs of all stakeholders. The key stakeholders are described in 
Table 4. Primitive needs were developed based on views of the stakeholder and effective 
needs were the teams’ translation of the perceived needs to actual needs. 
 
Stakeholder Primitive Need Effective Need 
Naval Sea Systems 
Command 
(NAVSEA) 
Follow-on LCS design with 
more cost effective 
additional capability as 
compared to baseline LCS 
design 
Field a next generation 
ASUW weapon which can 
be utilized by current 
platforms and be 
incorporated into a 
modified LCS or new ship 
design 
US Pacific Command 
(PACOM) 
Forward deployed forces 
that can project force while 
serving as a credible 
deterrence to conflict 
Larger number of ships 
deployed to PACOM AOR 
with capabilities that allow 
the ships to operate in a 
A2AD environment 
Office of the Chief of Naval 
Operations (OPNAV) N91 
 
Develop a warship within 
the fiscal boundaries of the 
current budget that delivers 
capabilities that augment 
current force structure 
Determine capabilities of 
the next surface combatant 
to meet the needs of 2025–
2030 
Table 4.   Key stakeholder analysis. 
Understanding stakeholders’ perceived and effective needs can lead to a better 
understanding of the problem. By including this research in the SE process model, the 
needs of different stakeholders can be balanced with the perceived problem, which can 
lead to a better solution. Analysis of the stakeholders, and the needs presented by each 
revealed the key needs and contributed to problem definition. Ensuring specific needs are 
satisfied when making recommendations is also important, and those needs were 
considered by the SEA project team throughout the process. 
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2. Scenario Analysis 
An analysis of the most likely scenarios the small combatant ship would 
encounter in the 2025–2030 timeframe was conducted. The exploration resulted in 
determining three scenarios in mission Phase II (seize initiative) in which the SSC would 
be operating. These scenarios contain different opposing force compositions that employ 
varying levels of sophistication in A2AD weapons. Since the South China Sea model had 
the most formidable opposition force, the force that produced the best results was in this 
model was used in the other models. These scenarios are discussed in more detail in 
Chapter V Section A. 
The study concentrated on Phase II operations. Other phases of operations, which 
are listed below, were considered but deemed out of scope (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2011). 
Potential impact to each mission phase is explained below.  
• Phase 0:  Shape-provide positive influence by partner nation engagements, 
ensuring freedom of navigation, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, 
and counter-piracy operations. 
• Phase I:  Deter-present credible surface threat forward deployed to 
potential conflict zones to decrease probability of armed conflict. 
• Phase II:  Seize Initiative-conduct dynamic offensive and defensive 
ASUW operations while halting enemy advance. 
• Phase III:  Dominate-contribute to joint force task force securing sea lanes 
of communication inside a theater of operation while denying the enemy 
use of the sea. 
• Phase IV:  Stabilize-protect economic exclusion zone, assist with 
humanitarian relief and provide maritime security in territorial waters. 
• Phase V:  Enable Civil Authority-support security concerns of civil 
governments. 
Although the this study concentrates on Phase II, the team assumes the SSC will 
be employed throughout all phases and the role of SSC in other phases has been 
identified as an area of future exploration found in Chapter VII. 
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3. Problem Definition 
The first attempt at shaping a problem statement came after studying stakeholders 
and the A2AD threat scenarios from the worldwide analysis. Three separate assumptions 
were evident and are explained below. 
• Potential adversaries and their associated A2AD weapons have the 
potential to hold high-value units at risk. 
• The projected 2025–2030 U.S. Navy Fleet does not have an effective 
counter to advanced A2AD weapons. 
• The existing Harpoon missile does not have the range or survivability 
characteristics necessary to counter the growing A2AD threat and 
therefore the fleet cannot counter or deter the possible A2AD threat in the 
2025–2030 timeframe. 
 High-value units (HVU) are susceptible to new and emerging weapons such as 
anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBM), advanced diesel submarines, and advanced anti-ship 
cruise missiles (ASCMs). The loss of a HVU such as a CVN would be catastrophic, and 
therefore these vessels require expensive escorts. Employment of HVUs in an A2AD 
environment places those ships at risk of being lost from attack. The loss of just one high 
value unit will impact U.S. strategy and dramatically weaken the military force available 
for a conflict (United States Naval Institute 2009). If potential adversaries deny the 
United States the use of a CVN in a high risk A2AD environment, there is no current ship 
or weapon in the U.S. arsenal that can replace the sea control mission that a carrier strike 
group (CSG) is capable of. Directed energy weapons offer promise to blanket protection 
from adversarial ASBMs and ASCMs but current projections do not estimate laser 
weapons being effective against these fast moving threats until past the 2025–2030 
timeframe (O'Rourke 2014a). 
Advanced and emerging anti-access area denial (A2AD) weapons can push back 
existing U.S. fleet to beyond the effective operational range. The problem is at those 
long-transit distances the Navy will not be able to project a sufficient amount of force to 
be effective in shaping the battlespace, let alone in prevailing in an engagement. Having 
the ability to operate in the littorals, as described in Chapter IV, affords better flexibility 
of force employment in any of the threat scenarios the team analyzed. With a majority of 
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U.S. sea power concentrated into a CSG, dispersing that offensive sea power into a group 
of surface combatants would add resiliency to the U.S. forces in an A2AD environment. 
4. Identification of Capability Gaps 
The problem exploration phase revealed four major gaps in capability and 
technology:  Logistics, offensive ASUW weapons, defensive networks in both air and 
undersea domains, and a resilient command and control network capable of functioning 
in the absence of overhead satellite coverage. 
Previous coursework in an NPS class titled Joint Campaign Analysis uncovered a 
logistical dependency on large and minimally armed logistics ships to sustain a U.S. 
Navy fleet at sea. These large logistics ships, such as the Lewis and Clarke class (T-
AKE) are extremely vulnerable to attack from multiple A2AD weapons and are ill-suited 
for a multi-threat hostile environment. Current logistics force structure lacks a method or 
platform for sustaining a naval fleet at sea without T-AKE size ships and the team has 
identified this critical weakness as a capability gap. 
The team has judged the U.S. Navy lack of modern ASUW weapons to be a 
capability gap. The Harpoon missile has been outpaced by development of potential 
adversarial ASUW missiles such as the SS-N-27 SIZZLER (O'Rourke 2014a). Potential 
adversaries employ missiles with a longer range that are designed to defeat U.S. Navy 
defensive weapons.  
With the growing program maturity of the LCS sea frame and associated mission 
packages, the team generated ideas on how to employ LCS in a multi-threat environment 
within the confines of current projected capabilities. The LCS must be equipped with the 
ASW mission package; otherwise the armada must include another asset with ASW 
capability. In addition, the LCS’s point air defense system combined with electro-
magnetic countermeasures does not create a robust layered defensive network and is not 
very well suited for an AOR with the characteristics of the 7th Fleet (Freedberg 2012). 
Considering the LCS as part of the system of systems solution requires a robust AAW 
and USW area defense capability, which the team judged to be an additional capability 
gap.  
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As referenced in Appendix A, the NPS class Joint Command, Control, 
Communications, Computers and Intelligence (JC4I) course determined a capability gap 
in operating in an electromagnetic spectrum-denied environment. As potential adversaries 
have demonstrated the capability to use anti-satellite weapons, the U.S. Navy needs to be 
prepared to operate without satellite GPS and communications. (The Washington Times 
2007). As a result, traditional forces would lose their primary means of navigation, 
communication, and information sharing. Operating in an electromagnetic-denied 
environment is deemed to be a capability gap based on conclusions during the teams’ 
research in the problem exploration phase and from the JC4I course conclusions.  
5. Requirements Generation 
The requirements generation SE development phase is derived from the problem 
exploration phase of the SEA-20A systems engineering process and further refined 
during the system definition and modeling and analysis phases. Six general requirements 
were discovered through analyzing the problem, and the modeling results.  
a. Anti-Ship Cruise Missile Over the Horizon Advancement 
Requirement statement 1.0: The system shall be capable of striking intermediate 
and long-range surface targets. This requirement is directly related to the ASUW 
capability gap, which needs to be addressed by next generation weapons. For the purpose 
of this work, the intermediate range is defined to be the distance to the horizon, relative to 
the firing platform, while long range includes distance over the horizon. The system 
referred to in this requirement is the ship.  
b. Anti-Area Access Denial (A2AD) Resilience 
Requirement statement 2.0: The system shall be capable of operating in an A2AD 
and electromagnetic spectrum-denied environment. This requirement ensures the ship 
possesses the requisite capability to operate in an electromagnetic spectrum-denied 
scenario, which addresses a key capability gap, combined with operations inside the 
A2AD threat environment.  
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c. Distribution of Assets, Sensors, and Weapons 
Requirement statement 3.0: The offensive combat power shall be dispersed among 
the small surface combatant group and unmanned vehicles. A fundamental component of 
survivability is related to the ASUW capability creating a resilient fighting force with 
ability to sustain potential losses without major degradation to combat power. This 
requirement is derived from effective needs of stakeholders and provided tasking. 
d. Forward-Deployable 
Requirement Statement 4.0: The system shall be forward deployable with 
sufficient logistic capability to conduct offensive surface operations. The forward 
deployed element of the requirement is rooted in the effective need of PACOM with 
forces in the theater of conflict when needed. The logistics aspect of this requirement was 
derived during the problem exploration phase of the SE process when the team tried to 
apply traditional navy replenishment at-sea (RAS) platforms. This requirement addresses 
the A2AD logistics network capability gap. 
e. Cost-Benefit Advantage in Operational Scenarios 
Requirement Statement 5.0: The system shall be designed to ensure cost does not 
prohibit employment in a high-risk environment. This requirement is derived from two 
separate entities, one being the cost-effective aspect of the tasking statement and the other 
being the effective need of Pacific Command (PACOM) to operate in an A2AD 
environment. The core principle of the concept is distribution with no high-value assets, 
and the individual units shall be designed so the loss of any one has minimal impact in 
force effectiveness, loss of life, and monetary cost. This requirement illustrates the 
contrast between operating an armada and a CVN inside an A2AD environment.  
f. System of Systems Approach 
Requirement Statement 6.0: Each small surface combatant shall be interoperable 
and be employed as a system of systems. During the modeling and analysis phase, the 
team discovered a multi-threat environment requires a robust network of ASW sensors 
and AAW defensive platforms. In the distributed force concept, the addition and 
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subtraction of units, drones, and other assets shall be seamless to fit the mission set. This 
single mission concept is a translation away from the multi-mission concept of the Aegis 
ships or the modular concept of a single LCS. The flexibility of the system of systems is 
derived from the ability to structure the system for low cost and seamlessly integrated for 
the mission at hand with the ability to scale up or down by adjusting the composition of 
the armada to meet the threat presented. 
D. FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS 
Functional analysis aids in increasing the understanding of a system by 
conducting a broad functional decomposition by which to understand the underlying 
activities occurring inside the system. 
1. Decomposition 
A functional decomposition seeks to draw out additional stakeholders or 
requirements by categorizing the functions a system will perform. This process is 
accomplished by identifying the components that make each function. 
a. Top Level 
The distributed surface force function is “to prevail in an A2AD environment.” 
This will be accomplished by dispersing capability over a group of ships. A view is 
shown in Figure 14. 
 
 
Figure 14.  Top-level functional decomposition. 
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The top-level design is further broken down into the detailed design in the next 
section. 
b. Detailed 
(1) Function 1.1 is “to sense.” This function defines the vessel’s systems; 
utilizing both organic and off-vessel sensors, shall detect, locate, and track seaborne 
contacts. Information provided to system operators at a minimum shall include: 
• For radar: course, speed, and bearing (both true and relative) 
• For electronic warfare equipment: frequency, bearing, and signal strength   
Under Function 1.1 we have three sub-functions: “to detect,” “to classify,” and 
“to track.” Details for these sub-functions will be explained below and are shown in 
Figure 15. 
 
Figure 15.  “To sense” sub-functional decomposition. 
Function 1.1.1 is “to detect.” This function defines that the system automatically 
receive inputs actively from own-ship and passively from off-ship radar, providing 
feedback to sensor operator. 
Function 1.1.2 is “to classify.” This function defines the radar system that 
provides raw radar data to the signal processing system and sensor operator to assist in 
classification. An electronic warfare system will assist the operator in classifying contacts 
through the use of database and pairing likely vessels through emitted frequencies.   
 34 
Function 1.1.3 is “to track.” This function defines organic radar system’s 
Automatic Radar Plotting Aid (ARPA), which actively tracks the history of detected 
radar contacts and provides closest point of approach (CPA). Off-ship assets may provide 
contact position and, if capable, video images of contacts to aid operators in 
classification. 
(2) Function 1.2 is “to engage.”  This function defines the action in three sub-
functions specific to a firing sequence. The system, after the target is acquired and 
classified as hostile, produces a fire-control solution. The fire-control solution is 
established from the radar system and operator inputs. The weapon system shall engage 
with missile or main gun to intercept the target of interest. Additional means to engage 
contacts will be through crew-served weapons such as machine guns, grenade launchers, 
and small arms. The operators using on and off-ship sensors will assess weapon 
effectiveness. A breakdown of function 1.2 is shown in Figure 16. 
  
Figure 16.  “To engage” sub-functional decomposition 
Function 1.2.1 is “to target.” This function defines that the radar and off-ship 
sensors shall provide track data to the sensor operator in order to establish a fire control 
solution on the target of interest. Fire-control solutions will provide a fine bearing 
resolution on the target of interest. This information will be provided to the weapon prior 
to engagement.  
Function 1.2.2 is “to launch weapon.”  This function defines the act of the weapon 
leaving the ship and specifically pertains to missiles, and primarily surface-to-surface 
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missiles. The function may also apply to main gins, machine guns, and defensive 
missiles. After a fire-control solution is received from the radar system, the weapon will 
launch and fly towards the contact of interest. Target location is updated to the weapon 
for the longest duration possible. 
Function 1.2.3 is “to conduct battle damage assessment (BDA).” This function 
defines the ability of sensors to accurately report lost contacts due to combat. BDA may 
pertain to on and off-ship sensors including electronics and the human eye. 
 
 
Figure 17.  “To move” sub-functional decomposition. 
Function 1.3 is “to move.” This function defines the ability of the vessel to travel 
under the control of the crew. 
  
Function 1.3.1 is “to transit.” This function defines how the vessel operates from 
its initial starting point to a designated location. 
 
 Function 1.3.2 is “to maneuver.” This function defines the ability of the vessel to 
avoid static and moving obstacles such as ships, islands, and navigational aids. The 
maneuvering will be done through operator interaction. 
 
Function 1.3.3 is “to navigate.” This function defines the ability for a vessel to 
know its current and projected location and plan to transit to new locations. 
Function 1.4 is “to communicate.” This function defines the transmitting and 
receiving of data or voice information required to conduct the operations of sensing, 
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engaging, and moving. These communications must be effective in both network optional 
warfare environments and network centric environments. A breakdown of Function 1.4 is 
shown in Figure 18. 
 
Figure 18.  “To communicate” sub-functional decomposition. 
Function 1.4.1 is “to transmit.” This function defines actively sending signals 
from the vessel these signals may be data or voice signals. This information may be sent 
via radio, light, visual cues, and lasers.  
Function 1.4.2 is “to receive.” This function defines actively or passively 
obtaining radio, laser, or other electronic information and conversion to pictorial, data, or 
voice information. Radio, light, visual cues, and lasers must be receivable by the system. 
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IV. SEA COMBAT CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS FOR THE 
SMALL SURFACE COMBATANT 
This section will address the concept of operations (CONOPS) for the small 
surface combatant (SSC). The motivation for developing the CONOPS is to provide a 
theoretical guide of employing the small surface combatant at the 2025–2030 timeframe. 
The CONOPS will also help guide modeling and system design with regards to 
translating this work’s vision and recommendations into a detailed ship design.  
A. OVERVIEW 
The concept of operations was developed to provide the initial foundation for 
employment in the full spectrum of Phase II (seize the initiative or offensive) operations. 
The SSC CONOPS provides a roadmap of how to successfully employ the ships in 
different environments against a multitude of threats from all domains. Concepts 
presented in the CONOPS were influenced and informed by analysis consolidated from 
other sections of this paper. Three different force compositions are presented in the 
CONOPS. An independent deployment consists of a single SSC. A Flotilla is group of 
more than one SSC. The armada is a force composed of SSCs mixed with other 
platforms. Additional details for each force composition are provided in the following 
sections. 
B. SCOPE 
As previously discussed, the focus of the CONOPS and the SSC research is Phase 
II operations, which are defined in Chapter III Section C.2. Although the SSC will be 
able to contribute in other phases, the emphasis of the analysis is on initial combatant 
operations. An expansion on an example set of missions the SSC might be expected to 





Primary Missions Secondary Missions 
Power Projection Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance 
Sea Lines of Communication Patrol High-Value Unit Escort 
Deterrence through Presence Defend Seaport of Debarkation 
Table 5.   Examples of Phase II missions. 
C. PURPOSE 
Rather than design a multi-mission next generation frigate replacement, the 
project team identified an opportunity to explore a cost-effective, single-mission design 
of a small surface combatant. The SSC’s strength lies in a distributed offensive combat 
power dispersed effectively among multiple ships. The SSC’s offensive combat power is 
comprised of ASCMs. The project team proposes dispersing the number of ASCMs 
employed in a sea battle onto multiple surface combatants instead of one capital ship 
thereby increasing the resilience and survivability of the fleet’s offensive combat power. 
An individual ship’s survivability against ASUW missile attack will depend on the 
inherent low-radar cross-section of a small ship and EM countermeasures.  
D. FOUR PILLARS OF THE SMALL SURFACE COMBATANT CONCEPT 
Each of the four SSC pillars are a major foundational concept designed to provide 
foundational background to develop the new platform.  
1. System of Systems (Armada) Concept  
The CONOPS employs the SSC as a system within a larger fleet of different 
platforms, creating a system of systems where the capabilities of each complement the 
overall combat effectiveness of the fleet. The system of systems as a whole is defined to 
be the armada. The armada represents a formidable force capable of defeating an 
opposing force at sea. The strength in the armada is utilization of existing force structure, 
combined with the new SSC, to integrate into a force that can deter aggression and 
project power in any region.  
In 2025–2030, the U.S. naval force structure will feature a large number of 
Arleigh Burke-class destroyers and approximately 30 LCSs. Assuming that a third of the 
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modular-designed LCSs will be equipped with ASW modules and the other two-thirds 
will be equipped with either the MCM or SUW module, the SSC will forego redundant 
force structure capability to save cost. The same philosophy applies to AAW capability, 
where large numbers of Arleigh Burke class destroyers are sufficient for air defense. 
Given this programmed force structure for 2025, the team envisioned employing the SSC 
in a force composed of ASW-capable LCSs and AAW-focused DDGs alongside multiple 
dedicated ASUW SSCs. Manned and unmanned sensor platforms such as the MQ-8B 
Firescout could be used to increase the ISR capability of the force. The P-8 Poseidon 
maritime patrol aircraft could replace or complement the ASW capability of the ASW-
equipped LCS. The system of systems approach has the goal of allowing the U.S. Navy 
to expand its fleet size, but at a lower cost than building multi-mission ships.   
One system the SSC is not inherently designed to work with is the aircraft carrier. 
Short-duration protection missions such as a strait escort are envisioned, but the SSC will 
not be well suited for extended blue-water carrier strike group (CSG) operations. The 
SSC could be considered an external system to the CSG system capable of interacting 
with but not belonging to the CSG. Sustained operations at sea for prolonged periods, as 
is normal operating procedure for a CSG, would stress the ship and crew beyond its 
designed capabilities and will not be considered a core capability of the ship. 
2. Forward Basing 
In order to execute the SSC’s primary missions, it is essential the vessel be 
forward deployed in a regional theater, such as the South China Sea (SCS) or southwest 
Asia. As with the LCS, multiple SSCs are to be forward deployed to allow for rapid 
employment in response to a quickly developing situation. In a Phase II scenario, where 
an adversary has achieved strategic surprise with naval forces, forward-based surface 
forces will be able to respond to changing strategic situations faster than forces based in 
continental bases in the United States. In addition, this study’s logistical research shows 
the SSC will have less endurance than an Arleigh Burke class destroyer. The research 
pointed to fuel capacity as the limiting factor of a SSC. We calculate a 1500-ton SSC will 
have approximately eight days of endurance if the ship is patrolling at a speed of 15 knots 
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before it reaches 20 percent fuel level. Transoceanic voyage at high speed in response to 
a situation is not a capability the SSC is designed to possess. Thus, forward basing 
complements a ship with endurance in days not weeks.  
3. Cost Effectiveness 
The motive for building a new follow-on ship class to the LCS is to invest in a 
force structure that increases the fleet size to meet peacetime demands while increasing 
the Navy’s offensive combat power. This project team has defined cost effectiveness as 
delivering additional capability to the force at a unit cost less than that of the LCS. In 
addition, the loss through combat attrition of one SSC does not constitute a mission kill 
as the combat power of the group is based on resiliency of multiple SSCs operating in a 
group.  
The ship’s design should strike a balance between manpower and automation. 
Manpower will be objectively set at the LCS core crew level, with the threshold 
manpower numbers arriving through additional investment in automation. Decreased 
maintenance requirements of installed systems on the SSC shall be a priority of the 
design, so as not to cause the manpower numbers to rise in order to support maintenance 
requirements. Manpower, in the form of ship’s crew, will be considered as the optimal 
number to operate at sea during combat operations and is set at prior manning levels 
established for U.S. Navy PHMs at 25 personnel.  
4. Sustainment 
A2AD weapon systems have the ability to place at risk large replenishment ships 
that traditionally sustain the fleet at sea. Current sustainment methods do not have the 
flexibility to adapt successfully to the A2AD environment. Alternative methods of 
sustaining the armada must be established or the armada must leave the threat area to 
resupply. One method to connect the supplies between large replenishment ships and 
high threat areas is to employ a vessel such as Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV). If the 
JHSV cargo area was optimized to carry fuel instead of bulk cargo, the JHSV could be 
utilized as a high-speed shuttle ship from the replenishment ship to the armada. Other 
options for a fuel ferry include converting LCS’s modular mission zone into a fuel 
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storage area. LCS is better adapted to combat than the current JHSV due to the LCS’s 
self-defense capabilities. In the absence of at-sea replenishment, a robust shore supply 
network may be feasible provided local nations were willing to support U.S. forces 
operating out of host nation ports. Using ports as resupply networks will decrease on-
station time, but decreased on-station time may be mitigated by maintaining a reserve 
force in port and simply rotating from on-station to in-port. This rotation method is a 
higher cost alternative because twice as many units need to be forward deployed, but may 
be feasible due to the low cost associated with SSCs and savings from not utilizing JHSV 
and LCS as shuttle ships. 
Fuel conservation is included as a major policy of sustainment in the effort to 
decrease the demand on supplying ships. Using organic sensor platforms to perform 
scouting ISR functions should lessen the fuel burned on each ship. In addition, the design 
of the propulsion plant and hull form should incorporate features to decrease fuel burn. 
Doctrine changes, such as allowing the ships to burn down to 20 percent total fuel 
remaining as a standard operating procedure will increase time on station and utilization 
of each asset. 
Rotational crewing will aid in sustaining the SSC at sea. Rotating crews when 
fatigue levels get too high will offset the fatigue level of a crew. Rather than externally 
scheduling the rotation of crews, at-sea or in-port rotations will increase the units’ overall 
combat effectiveness. Additional manpower cost is offset by higher utilization of each 
platform. 
E. TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT 
Depending on the threats presented in any tactical employment scenario, the SSC 
gives flexibility to the decision maker by being scalable from the single unit up to a 
flotilla or armada. Each ship will possess the organic capability to conduct the full detect 
to engage sequence. The organic sensors are a combination of own-ship and unmanned or 
manned sensor platforms to extend ISR range. To ensure the SSC’s maximum 
effectiveness in a multi-threat environment, the following capability parameters were 
discovered through analysis: organic sensor range to 60 nm, 90 nm missile ASUW 
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missile range, 25 knot maximum vessel speed, missile capacity of eight missiles and a 
salvo size of at least two missiles per engagement. 
1. Independent Deployment 
Although not ideal, situations may arise where only one SSC is able to respond 
and will have to engage an enemy’s ship or ships in ASUW combat. Since each SSC 
possesses sensors and weapons capable of executing the entire detect to engage sequence 
it will be able to engage in a small-scale surface engagement. Ambush and hit and run 
tactics will increase the small surface combatant’s survivability from the engagement. 
Tactics that stress firing first and not letting an enemy determine a firing solution will 
increase survivability. Having a sensor capability that allows detection and classification 
beyond the enemy’s capability will aid in these offensive tactics. Finally, the ships’ 
ASUW weapon will need to be effective and capable of inflicting a kill against enemy 
combatants with the first salvo. 
2. Flotilla Deployment 
A group of multiple SSC will form a flotilla to engage in surface-to-surface 
combat. If undersea and air domains are controlled by other units, the flotilla will mass 
the combat power of the small surface combatants. By massing the combat power, the 
flotilla can launch an overwhelming surface strike of ASUW missiles. A flotilla’s 
vulnerability in this situation is protection from enemy missile salvos. The flotilla will 
rely only on EM countermeasures and a small ship’s radar cross-section to avoid 
detection at over-the-horizon distances. However, a flotilla will serve as a major deterrent 
to potential adversaries using surface forces in offensive roles and will project power 
from a presence standpoint.  
3. Armada Deployment 
An armada deployment provides the group with capabilities to contest air, sea and 
undersea domains. The armada increases the SSC’s survivability by employing Arleigh 
Burke-class destroyers in an air- and missile-defense role. The armada utilizes the LCS 
 44 
equipped with the ASW module to protect the ships in the armada from undersea attack. 
This concept is illustrated in more detail in Figure 19. 
 
 
Figure 19.  Operational view-1 for armada depicting the system of systems 
approach. 
In Figure 19, we depict the armada operating in a multi-threat environment where 
the threats are from surface, air and undersea adversary platforms. Communication flow 
between the systems relies on line of sight means. The five ships in the center of the 
diagram are the SSCs. One of the SSCs is launching an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), 
which will be the means to extend organic sensor range in order to optimally perform the 
“detect to engage” sequence. Also shown is an unmanned surface vehicle (USV), which 
will assist with extending organic sensor range. Both the USV and UAV are assumed to 
be organic to the SSC. 
The LCS in the bottom left corner is conducting ASW to mitigate undersea 
threats. Although not an organic member of the armada, BLUE force submarines may 
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operate in the area to aid in securing the undersea domain. P-8s and MH-60Rs may also 
be temporary members of the armada in order to further prosecute ASW threats. The P-8 
and MH-60R are the source of the sonobuoys shown in Figure 19. A DDG functions as 
the armada’s AAW component by intercepting an incoming enemy missile. The MQ-8B 
is launched from the LCS and will increase ISR of the group and the information will be 
distributed.  
The number of platforms other than the SSC can be scaled up or down to meet the 
threat scenario. For example, if the air domain is highly contested more DDGs can be 
added to the group to boost the AAW capability. As stated previously, increasing the 
number of ships in the group adds to overall resiliency of the combat power and 
survivability of the overall group.  
F. OPTIMAL CAPABILITIES OF THE ARMADA CONCEPT 
To ensure the armada’s maximum effectiveness while operating in a multi-threat 
environment, the following parameters for the small surface combatant were determined 
through analysis: organic sensor range at 60 nm, ASUW missile range of 90 nm, 25 knot 
maximum vessel speed, missile capacity of eight missiles and a salvo size of at least two 
missiles per engagement. 
G. OPERATING ENVIRONMENTS  
Whether the SSC is independently deploying, part of a flotilla or a component of 
the armada, the SSC may find itself in several different operating environments. Each 
operating environment contains challenges that distinguish the environment from other 
areas, but some challenges will overlap all environments. 
1. Anti-Area Access Denial Environments 
Any environment where an adversary seeks to deny friendly forces use of a 
maritime area through threats of attack from weapon systems could be considered an 
A2AD environment. These weapons seek to disrupt the U.S. ability to freely navigate 
international waters and project power while disrupting normal operations in A2AD 
environments. The weapon systems encountered in A2AD environments vary in 
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complexity from naval sea mines to anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs). Current U.S. 
force structure depends on aircraft carriers to project power and ASBMs are designed to 
hold aircraft carriers at risk within the A2AD zone. A more common threat is an ASCM 
launched from aircraft, ships, shore batteries or submarines, which are in the inventory of 
most of the world’s militaries. ASCMs can be employed to force withdrawal from a 
maritime region or even to deny its use by any surface maritime force. Advanced diesel 
electric submarines are becoming more common in the inventory of potential adversaries. 
Diesel electric submarines are difficult to find and have the ability to deal a crippling 
blow to friendly ships without much warning. 
Also included in the A2AD weapon systems are adversarial systems designed to 
deny friendly forces use of the full range of the electro-magnetic (EM) spectrum. Current 
U.S. forces depend on network and communications through various means. Without 
GPS position finding or satellite-based network capabilities, U.S. forces will not be 
capable of operating at their designed strength. All of the above threats are included in 
the A2AD environment which may share geographic characteristics with the following 
two zones. 
2. Littoral Zones, Coastal Regions and Strait Transits 
Challenges associated with the littoral zones, coastal regions and strait transits 
typically are water depth, proximity to land, high surface contact density, and possible 
attack from shore-based ASUW missile batteries. Asymmetric threats from non-state 
actors are a major concern in littoral, coastal and straits. Contact density and proximity to 
land can challenge the “detect to engage” sequence as operators try to distinguish targets 
from radar clutter. If attacked in these areas, threat warnings may not provide the operator 
with much reaction time to respond to incoming threats. These areas provide some of the 
highest risk to U.S. Navy ships due to the unique challenges faced in these zones. 
The SSC will have a draft comparable to LCS and will have access to the same 
water-space. The destroyer must remain in deeper water since it has a deeper draft, while 
extending the AAW shield over the armada. Detecting and classifying surface targets will 
be aided through organic UAVs and USVs employed by the group. The formation of 
 47 
ships shall remain in relatively close position to aid in mutual defense of the group. If 
naval sea mines are present or suspected, operations in the areas will be suspended until 
the area can be cleared of mines. 
3. Blue Water 
Blue-water operations for an independent deployed SSC, flotilla group or armada 
are not outside the scope of possible operating environments. Although distance from 
land excludes frequent port visits for resupply, traditional replenishment methods can be 
utilized in blue-water areas. The traditional replenishment method is dependent on the 
assumption that the replenishment ships can be protected and are not under direct threat 
of attack. Endurance of the small surface combatant might be the limiting factor to blue-
water operations. In addition, sea state might exclude the SSC from operating with larger 
surface combatants. However, the U.S. Navy has planned and executed blue-water 
operations frequently in the past and operating in blue water should be less challenging 
from a threat perspective than the littoral, coastal and strait areas.  
H. COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS, COMPUTERS AND 
INTELLIGENCE 
In a normal environment, command, control, communications, computers and 
intelligence (C4I) will be through standard satellite communication (SATCOM): ultra-
high frequency (UHF), super-high frequency (SHF) and high frequency (HF) channels. 
These channels present the optimal configuration of the command, control, 
communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) network to enable communications 
between ships and to any external nodes. To be prepared for any adversarial interference 
with the EM spectrum or operating with emission control (EMCON) measures in place to 
reduce vulnerability, the SSC and the platforms operating with the SSC need to be 
prepared to use alternative means to communicate. Line of sight (LOS) communications 
and local area network (LAN) are more difficult for an adversary to interfere with and 
will become the C4I network path in the EM denied or EMCON environment. By having 
C4I flexibility the small surface combatant and the interacting platforms will still retain 
communications capability in any environment. 
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I. MAJOR RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH SMALL SURFACE COMBATANT 
As the SSC matures from high-level concept to initial design several high risk 
factors have been identified which may threaten the SSC’s effectiveness as a viable 
platform for the U.S. Navy. 
(1) Cost Controls. If the SSC becomes too expensive to risk in a high-threat 
environment then the feasibility of this concept is lost. The SSC concept is designed to 
employ in a high-risk environment by forming the armada, which is capable of engaging 
potential adversaries in air, sea and undersea domains. Cost may prohibit the SSC 
employment if the ship design is subjected to mission creep by adding additional 
capabilities other than ASUW. If modularity or additional capability adds to the list of 
requirements provided in this study, then the SSC may lose appeal as a possible 
acquisition program due to cost escalation.  
(2) Obsolescence. Major technological breakthroughs in the area of directed 
energy weapons, rail-guns, hypersonic ASCMs or ASBMs capable of targeting a SSC 
could render the design of the small surface combatant obsolete. A small platform 
inherently will have a small reserve weight capacity for future upgrades and may not be 
capable of sustaining several iterative designs or major midlife upgrades. Decreasing the 
ship’s service life will aid in keeping the SSC from becoming obsolete, but may not be 
economically feasible.  
(3) Endurance. A SSC will not have the endurance of a larger ship such as a 
DDG. Alternative logistical CONOPS will aid in sustaining the ship at sea, but it most 
likely will not be able to sustain prolonged operations with a carrier strike group or at sea. 
Operational planners will need to account for logistics requirements associated with a 
smaller combatant in order to mitigate the risk associated. The SSC cannot be shifted into 
the logistical model that larger surface combatants follow because that model will not fit 
the unique requirements associated with a smaller combatant. Increasing endurance 
during the design of the ship will increase size, ultimately driving up cost unless 
mitigating design features such as efficient hull forms or propulsion systems are 
incorporated into the design.  
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J. CONOPS TAKEAWAYS 
Adding the SSC platform into the U.S. fleet will cause a paradigm shift in the way 
surface combatants are employed. By combining existing platforms alongside SSC into 
the armada, the fighting force would become more capable and resilient as a whole. The 
armada concept mitigates platform weaknesses by optimizing the group with platforms 
that are strong in every domain. The armada concept does not replace the power of a 
CSG; rather, the concept provides a low-risk offensive power-projection alternative, 
which can operate in the A2AD environment to deter aggression and inflict heavy 
casualties on an adversary. 
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V. MODELING 
A. SCENARIO DEVELOPMENT 
Modeling is performed to determine the optimum force structure, investigate the 
required capabilities which affect force effectiveness, and validate the proposed 
distributed surface force concept. The model scenario provides the context and defines 
the operational environment for the proposed force structure and design. The main aim is 
to enable proposed force structure and design strength and weakness discovery as well as 
to ascertain the opportunities and threats which the opponent may present to U.S. forces 
in each operational scenario, and to translate the results to a presentable format. 
1. Considerations for Design of Model Scenarios 
The considerations for the design of the model scenarios take the Who-What-
When-Where-Why approach to set the context of the model scenario.  
a. Potential Conflict Areas (Where and Why) 
The U.S. military has begun to rebalance focus towards Asia-Pacific and Middle 
East areas as this region presents the highest concentration of U.S. interest and emerging 
threats. In the Asia-Pacific, U.S. economic and security interests in the region will 
continue to be threatened by adversaries like North Korea in the northeast region, and 
also the increased military aspirations of China in the East and South China Seas. 
Territorial disputes by China with neighboring countries in the East and South China Sea 
region will continue to cause suspicion and increase regional tension. 
In the Middle East, political instability in various countries continues to 
encourage the growth of extremist organizations and rogue governments. These 
organizations and governments will center their naval activities in the Persian Gulf, 
which will have significant impact on U.S. interests in Gulf States like Kuwait, Bahrain, 
and Oman. 
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The model scenario areas of operations were centered on the Asia-Pacific and 
Middle East regions, which have been assessed to be the most likely areas where future 
naval conflicts will happen (Hagel 2014).  
b. Adversary Strategies (Who and How) 
This section provides the future adversary strategy estimate to create a basis for 
the model development, as well as scenario considerations. The future USN force will 
face adversaries who will employ asymmetric strategies and tactics to evade USN 
strengths and exploit weaknesses by: 
• employing A2AD strategies to threaten the U.S. military power projection 
ability in the air, land, and sea domains, 
• utilizing low-cost technology to achieve overmatch and cause maximum 
destruction, 
• leveraging long-range, high-precision weapons such as ASBM/ASCMs for 
standoff encounters and to reduce inland strike range of carrier strike 
groups (CSG) and surface action groups (SAG), 
• inhibiting freedom of information and communication by denying as well 
as disrupting the use of the electromagnetic (EM) spectrum, 
• employing asymmetrical tactics utilizing manned and unmanned systems 
to achieve surprise and confusion and erode morale, 
• dispersing and concealing Naval assets to reduce signature, 
• increasing lethality as well as survivability for each naval platform, and 
• evolving quickly to prevent predictability and elude response. 
c.  Scenario Imperatives (How) 
In order to design the system with potential strategies of the future adversaries in 
mind, we evaluated the flotilla with varying capabilities under several threat scenarios, 
which provide insights for the following: 
• concept of operations and capabilities to counter A2AD threats, 
• impact of the adversary’s long range ASBMs and ASCMs, 
• impact of the adversary’s asymmetrical tactics, 
• impact of maritime environment operation near potential conflict areas, 
and 
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• implications for USN’s role in sea-based strike and targeting operations. 
2. Selected Area of Operations 
The following areas of operation will provide context for the modeling effort to 
allow for realization of the targeted scenario imperatives. 
a. Scenario One: Spratly Islands 
The Spratly Islands has always been perceived as a resource rich region. With 
minimal exploration of the region, the estimates of the resources reserves remain high 
with the estimated amount of oil to be at least 28 billion barrels and approximately 900 
trillion cubic feet of natural gas. In addition, the Spratly Islands region also boasts one of 
the busiest commercial shipping lanes and most productive fishing grounds in the world 
(Central Intelligence Agency 2014).  
The Spratly Islands consist of dozens of uninhabited rocky outcrops, atolls, 
sandbanks and reefs, such as the Scarborough Shoal. These islands are of strategic 
importance to many countries, and have been contested by many nations throughout 
history. China, Vietnam, and the Philippines have recently emerged as competitors and 
potential combatants with interest in this region (Central Intelligence Agency 2014). 
The recent People’s Republic of China claim on the Spratly Island region backed 
by aggressive behaviour has disturbed the power balance in the region. Although the U.S. 
has always officially supported the peaceful rise of China as a global power, the 
aggressive stance by China has no doubt threatened the U.S. economic interest and the 
interests of allies. 
In addition, the Spratly Islands lie in the southwest portion of the South China Sea 
(SCS) in between the U.S. and the Asiatic region. With the pivot of its focus to Asia, the 
U.S. military forces require allies and military bases in this area. This national strategic 
need further elevates the importance of the Spratly Islands region to the U.S. (Hagel 
2014). 
With the ever-growing military prowess and political aggression of the regional 
powers, the ability to counter external influence is vital so that the U.S. Navy is able to 
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defend and protect its interest in the region in the foreseeable future. Hence, the Spratly 
Islands region is chosen as one of the operational scenarios locations in which to model a 
distributed surface force concept. 
b. Scenario Two: Malaysian Civil War/Strait of Malacca Closure  
Three main factors are used to develop the sequence of events that lead to this 
scenario. These factors include geographical and geopolitical realities, China’s intentions 
as a regional hegemon, and China’s existing and potentially emerging capabilities in the 
region. 
The Strait of Malacca (SOM) is bordered by the littoral states of Indonesia, 
Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore. It connects the Indian Ocean to the SCS. The SOM is 
3.5 kilometers wide at its narrowest location at the Singapore Strait. It serves as an 
important as well as busy transit route for the world’s energy and trade (United States 
Energy Information Administration 2012). Due to the SOM’s depth, speed and 
maneuverability of large capital assets are limited. In addition, proximity to land makes 
potential naval assets susceptible to shore-based anti-access area denial assets such as 
anti-ship missiles and naval mines. 
The SOM serve as important sea lines of communication (SLOC) for China. Over 
90 percent by volume and 80 percent by value of PRC’s foreign trade travels through the 
SOM. Also, 90 percent of China’s imported energy transits through the SOM (Office of 
Naval Intelligence 2009). This strait is a chokepoint that the PLAN recognizes as a 
strategic vulnerability and the PLAN has always been uneasy over the activities carried 
out by the U.S. and its allies in the area (Vavro 2008). China’s intentions of projecting 
greater influence and being a larger stakeholder in the security of the Strait of Malacca 
was manifested in 2006 when then President Hu Jintao summarized China’s maritime 
security as China’s “Malacca Dilemma.” The Chinese thrust into the Indian Ocean by 
establishing diplomatic ties for base access in Gwadar port of Pakistan, naval bases in 
Myanmar and the Kra Isthmus in Thailand can be regarded as a strategic move to 
increase her strategic depth and power projection if necessary into the critical strait 
(Vavro 2012). 
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As for capabilities, the South Sea fleet headquartered in Zhanjiang is responsible 
for China’s maritime security in the SCS and the Strait of Malacca. Operating out of 
Zhanjiang, the PLAN’s upgraded Luyang II DDGs are capable of launching newly 
developed YJ-62 ASCM (approximately 120nm) for over-the-horizon (OTH) targeting 
and strike operations. Houbei-class guided-missile patrol craft (PTG) provides 
alternatives to operate in the confined and shallow depths of the Strait of Malacca. The 
Houbei class of PTGs is capable of launching ASCMs (approx. 50nm). The operational 
employment of the Houbei class PTGs can be based on swarming tactics to overwhelm 
the opponent’s sensors and create confusion. For the straits, the PLAN will most likely 
deploy small quiet diesel-electric submarines for surface force advanced screening and 
interdiction operations. The People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) has airbases 
located in Hainan Island which have operational range that covers the entire SOM (Office 
of Naval Intelligence 2009). PLAAF air assets with a networked sensor suite can increase 
the land-based and sea-based ASM overall operational range.  
The following are the Straits of Malacca scenario narratives: 
• China regards the SOM as a strategic vulnerability as she is heavily 
dependent on it for imported energy and goods. 
• In the year 2025, Taiwanese nationalists were elected and subsequently 
declared independence from China and rejected the “one China” policy. 
• China is subsequently forced into unlimited conflict with Taiwan and in 
the effort to stabilize the region, which draws the U.S. and her allies into 
the conflict. 
• With the Chinese East Sea fleet being tied down in the East China Sea, the 
Chinese South fleet was tasked establish sea control in the SOM to secure 
SLOCs and sustain ongoing operations in the East China Sea.  
This unilateral action by China to establish sea control in the Strait of Malacca has 
compelled the USN and her allies to engage the Chinese force in the strait and conduct 
sea denial operations against the PLAN. 
c. Scenario Three: Persian Gulf 
The Persian Gulf is another foreseeable theater of operations for the SSC force. 
Much like the SCS, the Persian Gulf is an area rich in natural resources with multiple 
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nations vying for control. Iran’s seemingly excessive claims of territorial waters seek to 
close off the region and serve as an excuse to question any vessels transiting to or from 
the region (Alexander 2014). This situation has heightened tensions and provides the 
potential for future conflict as demand for these resources continues to grow. 
Iran’s claims require frequent execution of freedom of navigation operations to 
ensure the Strait of Hormuz stays open. (Alexander 2014). Another current mission the 
U.S. performs in the area is defense of oil platforms (Montgomery 2009). This defense 
activity can be difficult for current platforms because of the shallow water depth and deep 
draft of the ships. Any assets in the area are within range of Iranian shore-based missile 
batteries (CNN Wire Staff 2012). Additionally, the Iranian Navy and Revolutionary 
Guard have numerous small combatants that employ swarm tactics to pose threats to the 
much more capable but less maneuverable ships the U.S. Navy currently uses in the area 
(Williams 2013). The SSC addresses the listed issues that the U.S. Navy’s current force 
structure faces in that operational environment. 
d. Baseline Model 
To focus modeling effort and resources, it was necessary to select a single 
scenario for the baseline model. The team chose the Spratly Islands as the baseline model 
development scenario based on the following considerations. 
• Given the reasons highlighted in Chapter V Section A.2.a, naval conflict 
in the seas surrounding the Spratly Islands is the most probable. As seen in 
Figure 20, the following countries have territorial claims to parts of the 
Spratly Islands: China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and the 
Philippines (Rodis 2011). 
• Due to its proximity to mainland China, PLA assets would be able to 
sustain operations and exert dominance over the countries who also claim 
ownership. In addition, the seas surrounding the Spratly Islands are within 
range of PLA’s ASCMs and ASBM (Office of Secretary of Defense 
2013). 
• The Spratly Islands area of operations consists of very little land area as 
most of it is covered by sea. This focus on maritime operations assists in 
simplifying the model and ensures any insights arising are due to the 
battle’s naval component. 
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Figure 20.  Spratly Islands’ geography including potential adversaries (after 
Rodis 2011). 
After accounting for these considerations, the Spratly Islands were assessed to be 
the most suitable scenario for the model development. 
B. OPERATIONAL FORCE EMPLOYMENT MODEL 
The goal of the quantitative analysis was to determine the SSC characteristics 
required to both maximize the survivability and combat effectiveness of the units. 
1. Model Requirements 
The analysis approach shall be capable of accepting various inputs (within a 
prescribed set of limits) for offensive and defensive capabilities. It was beneficial to 
possess the capability to quickly change these input values, as a range of input parameters 
to analyze the effectiveness of the system through modeling were required. The model 
shall be capable of varying the following input parameters: speed, sensor range, missile 
range, radar cross section, offensive weapon battery size, offensive weapon fire rate, 
evasion capability, and force size.  
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The analysis shall generate the desired outputs listed in Table 6. The most 
significant output required was the number of units killed during each combat 
engagement. A breakdown of the individual unit types lost and the timeline of casualties 
was included. 
(1) Required Inputs (2) Required Outputs 
(3) Individual Unit Entities (4) Adjustable Model Stopping Conditions 
(5) Variable Speed 
(6) Graphical Representation of Individual Units 
and Actions 
(7) Variable Sensor Range (8) Duration of Engagement Output 
(9) Variable Weapons 
Range (10) Number of Friendly Force Casualties 
(11) Variable Probability of 
Hit (12) Number of Enemy Force Casualties 
(13) Variable Salvo Size (14) Time Casualties Occur 
(15) Variable Fire Rate 
 Table 6.   Summary list of model requirements. 
The main analysis tool shall provide a visual depiction of events unfolding. 
Observing the events as they unfold will provide valuable insight on the engagement 
dynamics as the scenario develops. 
2. Analysis Options 
After reviewing the requirements and comparing the options, it was determined 
that discrete event simulation (DES) met all analysis requirements. DES has great 
generality and has potential to capture the desired details of naval combat (e.g., duration 
of engagement, own and adversary unit casualties, and time of detection). The main 
shortcoming of using computer simulation was that particular instances of simulation 
models can be large, time-consuming to construct, and require significant computer 
runtimes to achieve desired statistical accuracies. 
Several DES tools exist that meet the desired analysis criteria. The two selected 
are described below, along with their particular strengths and weaknesses. 
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a. Map Aware Non-Uniform Automata 
The first step in the modeling process was to determine the capabilities necessary 
to achieve the requirements defined during the SE process. These capabilities can be 
identified by performing multiple simulation runs, where many possible combinations of 
parameterized capabilities are evaluated to determine those parameters that are the most 
significant. One modeling tool that can be used to aid in the DOE analysis is Map Aware 
Non-Uniform Automata (MANA). MANA is an agent-based, time stepped, stochastic, 
map aware modeling tool (McIntosh, et al. 2007).  
The first benefit of the MANA model is map awareness, meaning that the agents 
in the model move and react according to a specific preset decision process. Some 
modeling tools allow individual agents to move from point to point following specific 
waypoint guidance. MANA allows for similar guidance, yet the capability to alter 
individual squads based on the environment adds a touch of realism to the outcome. More 
specifically, each squad follows the predetermined path with a varying level of 
randomness, which simulates the friction of real life units in the battle space. 
Additionally, units can only travel over specific environments, allowing the designer of 
the scenario to add realistic land masses and shoal waters that inhibit travel. Units can 
also be programmed to maintain minimum and maximum distances from other units 
allowing the designer to evaluate the concept of operations and standard operating 
procedures that may be employed in the future fleet. 
Another feature of MANA is the model’s non-uniform aspect. Each individual 
unit or squad can be programmed with specific characteristics and limitations. This 
ability allows the user to alter each squad’s capabilities and specific features 
independently of the group, which will later become invaluable in the analysis.  
Finally, MANA operates each individual unit as a separate and individually 
complex entity. This attribute means that each unit will operate according to a specific set 
of loosely defined guidelines, but slight differences in the environment or conditions of 
two identical units can result in drastically different behavioral actions. Again, this 
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variability accounts for some friction in the battle space, and provides a more realistic 
behavioral outcome for individual units in combat.  
There are many advantages of using MANA as the major modeling tool for this 
project. The user interface is intuitive (changing specific capabilities does not require 
advance programming knowledge), and significant resources are available to aid the user 
when specific knowledge gaps occur. Another advantage is the ease with which accurate 
and realistic threat regions can be constructed. Overlaying global satellite data images 
and manipulating the terrain to reflect these images can be completed relatively quickly 
and intuitively. This rapid manipulation capability is particularly important if the user 
intends on evaluating specific forces in multiple threat regions. Finally, the model is 
time-stepped, which allows the user to expeditiously run multiple scenarios in a given 
time frame. 
There are some disadvantages to using MANA. Most specifically, targeting is 
limiting to agent versus agent. This limitation means that offensive units must target 
specific enemy units to engage rather than shooting in the general direction of an 
incoming fleet. Changes in technology have made this limitation more significant, as 
advanced missile systems under consideration utilize individual targeting technologies 
(shoot a missile down a general bearing and allow the missile to conduct the targeting 
based on priority characterization). While this capability would increase the effectiveness 
of an offensive unit, the inability to achieve this targeting capability level does not 
invalidate the model results because current weapon systems do not possess this 
capability. The other major disadvantage to this modeling program is the absence of 
robust command and control capability. Although the units are capable of communicating 
with each other to prevent fratricide, no capability exists to control the individual unit 
actions from a central command unit. As the concept of operations shows, this capability 
is central to the swarming concept of a small flotilla force. 
Despite its shortfalls, MANA remains the model of choice to model the 
operational scenarios in this study as the modeling program meets all requirements listed 
in Chapter V Section B.1. 
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b. COMBAT XXI 
COMBAT XXI is a simulation tool for evaluating weapons systems and tactics. It 
is a modeling program designed for high-resolution, entity level combat simulations, 
producing stochastic results based on discrete events. COMBAT XXI is capable of 
providing high-fidelity results of campaign-level engagements (TRADOC Analysis 
Center 2011). Designed for combat simulation in a joint battle space with ground forces, 
air mobile forces, future forces, logistics and casualty handling, considerable effort was 
required to modify COMBAT XXI’s capability to model naval engagements. 
Programming skills are required in order to build a model. Because of the time 
investment required to make COMBAT XXI capable of modeling a naval engagement, 
only the force composition that produced the best results using the MANA model were 
tested. The preliminary work with the COMBAT XXI model produced results similar to 
those of the MANA model as shown in Appendix C. 
3. Input and Output Parameters 
As discussed previously, multiple simulation runs are required to determine the 
most significant factors affecting the battle outcome. Many variables can change, and 
determining which variables to evaluate is critical to scoping the model to one that can be 
achieved in the project’s time horizon. Some of these factors include, but are not limited 
to, speed, missile capacity and range, sensor range, ship draft, fuel capacity, endurance, 
crew size, and armada group size. Based on the simulation program chosen for this 
analysis (MANA) and the desire to identify the armada system’s key capabilities, the 
primary input parameters were force structure, unit network capability, missile range, 
sensor range, and salvo size. These parameters are discussed in more detail in the Chapter 
V Section C.3. 
The MANA simulation program is capable of providing thousands of outputs 
including battle duration, engagement time, number of shots fired and hit, and attrition 
rates and times. Ultimately, the armada force structure’s goal is to provide a credible (if 
not necessarily survivable) deterrence capability. In other words, if the chosen armada 
force structure is capable of inflicting substantial casualties to the adversary, the 
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adversary may avoid the conflict. The primary output used for most of the analysis is 
specific unit attrition rates. To provide a single factor of analysis, a comparison of the 





=   (1) 
Some discussion is included that addresses the battle duration primarily for 
logistics rather than combat purposes. 
C. INITIAL TRIAL RUNS 
1. Purpose 
As discussed in Chapter V Section A, evaluating the force structure in the Spratly 
Islands provides a worst-case scenario. Thus, determining the capability requirements to 
carry out combat operations effectively in this region should provide adequate 
capabilities for effective combat in any other realistic region. This idea is discussed in 
significantly more detail in Chapter V Section F. Once the capability requirements are 
determined, they can be applied to other scenarios to determine the force effectiveness in 
different threat scenarios. Another purpose of this initial model version is to determine 
any underlying issues that may prevent identifying the key capabilities required for 
success. 
2. Initial Force Structure 
The Spratly Islands are a group of islands (about five square kilometers in total 
land mass) that lie in the South China Sea about two-thirds the distance from southern 
Vietnam to the southern Philippines. Ownership of the islands is highly contested, as 
much for their political value as for the economic value they can provide (Central 
Intelligence Agency 2014).  
In this scenario, the Chinese intend on occupying all of the islands by laying 
physical claim to all of the territories. Several regional countries have asked for U.S. 
support in preventing the People’s Republic Army Navy (PLAN) from reaching their 
destination. The initial force structure for each side can be found in Table 7. 
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Table 7.   The initial force used for the combat model. 
On the initial model run, only 10 small combatant ships were evaluated as a small 
run in order to determine any underlying issues. One of the main objectives of the armada 
concept is to create an affordable small combatant that, when combined with other ships, 
provides an effective and survivable system of ships. Air and undersea defense must be 
provided by external entities. This reliance makes the small surface combatant a system, 
and the flotilla concept a system of systems (SoS). Two Arleigh Burke class destroyers 
provide the air defense, as well as limited anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities. 
Two Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) are modeled to be equipped with the ASW mission 
module, making them the primary providers of ASW capabilities. These LCSs also 
provide the primary platform for deployment of unmanned vehicles, which deliver 
external sensor capabilities. One submarine is assumed to be in the area providing 
undersea support to the flotilla group. Finally, four unmanned aircraft are assumed to be 
in the area providing ISR and sensor support to the flotilla.  
The RED forces are primarily composed of 10 Houbei-class PTGs. Although 
there may be some question regarding their endurance, they do provide a feasible and 
capable surface-to-surface engagement capability. Four Luyang-class (or equivalent) 
destroyers, two Jiangkai-class frigates, five local-area submarines, and one air-to-surface 
missile capable aircraft comprise the rest of the PLAN battle group. 
A visual context for the first model run of MANA is provided in Figure 21.  
U.S. Forces: 10 Small Surface Combatants PLAN Forces: 10 Missile Boats
2 Destroyers 4 Destroyers
2 Littoral Combat Ships 2 Frigates
1 Submarine 5 Submarines
4 Aircraft 1 Aircraft
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Figure 21.  Screenshot of MANA model used for the initial trial run. 
As shown in Figure 21, the PLAN forces (in red) start at the map’s north end. 
This starting position represents forces from the PLAN South Sea Fleet deployed from 
Zhanjiang. A terrain map of the SCS is directly overlaid into the program, forcing the 
units to navigate around the islands and adding realism to the results. The green units 
scattered throughout the battle space represent commercial shipping and fishing vessels 
that would normally exist in the region. The green units have no offensive combat 
capabilities, and serve as distractors from the actual combat picture (a very low 
probability of detection and targeting may occur). Per the scenario, the PLAN forces 
travel south with the purpose of occupying the Spratly Islands. The U.S. forces loiter 
around the Spratly Islands and engage the PLAN forces when the U.S. forces are within 
weapons range (rules of engagement are not considered for this scenario).  
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3. Capability Variable Assumptions 
As stated earlier, the capabilities that require evaluation include force structure, 
unit network capability, missile range, sensor range, and salvo size. These capabilities are 
discussed in more detail below. Although at least 30 simulations runs for each variable 
set are typically required for result data analysis (Ross 2009), only 10 runs were 
performed during this initial model trial for each variable set. The reduced number of 
runs might diminish the value of the results for analytical purposes such as drawing 
statistical inference, but is adequate to gain initial insights into the model design and 
required capabilities. 
(1) Force Structure 
The force structure is the number of individual ships in each flotilla group. 
Because the small SSC is by design a single-mission offensive platform, multiple SSCs 
and support units are required to provide both offensive and defensive capabilities. Two 
DDGs and two LCSs are included in all trial runs to provide this support. During this 
analysis portion, only 10 small combatant ships were evaluated. A more robust set of ship 
combinations were evaluated in subsequent model iterations, described in Chapter V 
Section D. 
(2) Unit Network Capability 
Unit network capability (a variable) defines the ability of each ship within the 
flotilla group to communicate with all other assets. From a real world perspective, this 
variable models the robustness of communications systems and the necessity to 
communicate in adverse environments. The two possible states for unit network 
capability are “on” and “off.” These states are respectively identified as one and zero in 
the result summary sheets. When network capability is “on,” units are assumed to be able 
to communicate by relaying targeting and engagement information to all other units 
within communication range. The method with which communication occurs is not 
specified, nor is it important (for this modeling) how it occurs. An in-depth analysis of 
communication methods, performed by the Joint C4I Capstone class on the NPS campus, 
can be found in Appendix A. When network capability is off, units cannot relay targeting 
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and engagement information to other units. This inability to communicate is meant to 
simulate an EM-denied environment in which no alternative communication capabilities 
are effectively employed. In the “off” condition, multiple ships may engage an enemy 
target if within sensor and weapons range. 
(3) Missile Range 
Missile range is the effective range of the missile being deployed from all U.S. 
combatant ships. The missile range is more a function of the missile type than the ship 
itself. For this model, two missile ranges were evaluated. On the low end, a 60 nm range 
is evaluated. This range was chosen because it roughly reflects the anti-ship missile range 
of U.S. Navy warships. More specifically, this range is similar to that of the Harpoon 
missile (Boeing 2014). The other alternative considered is a 90 nm range. This range is 
meant to simulate the range of alternative missiles either currently deployed or being 
designed. In particular, this range closely reflects the low end of the effective range of the 
naval strike missile (Naval Technology 2014b), and will adequately represent a minimum 
capability of the LRASM currently in development by the U.S. Navy (Defense Industry 
Daily 2014a). 
(4) Sensor Range 
Sensor range is defined as the effective detection and classification range that the 
SSC is capable of achieving through either organic or inorganic sensor networks. With 
respect to the model, the method with which this extended sensor range is achieved is less 
important than the fact that it can be achieved. The first sensor range scenario assumes 
that the detection range of the SSC’s sensor network is 30 nautical miles (or 60,000 
yards), and the range at which the network can positively classify a target and obtain a 
usable firing solution is 15 nautical miles (or 30,000 yards). These ranges are comparable 
to radar systems that exist on most modern naval combatants, making it the minimum 
expected SSC capability. 
The next sensor range scenario assumes that the detection range is 45 nautical 
miles (or 90,000 yards), and a classification range (with all of the capabilities with 
respect to identification and solution development as described above) of 22.5 nautical 
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miles (or 45,000 yards). These sensor ranges are based less on any existing capabilities or 
planned systems, but serves mostly as a method of extending the range to evaluate the 
result’s significance. 
The last sensor range combination is a detection range of 90 nautical miles (or 
180,000 yards), and a classification range of 45 nautical miles (or 90,000 yards). These 
ranges are outside the realm of feasibility for todays (or for that matter, the near term 
futures) shipboard radar systems. An external sensor system must be used to achieve 
these extended ranges. One possibility to achieve these ranges is to utilize existing 
unmanned platforms with inherent communications capabilities, such as unmanned aerial 
systems (UAS). Deploying a UAS from a platform, like the LCS, is already within the 
capabilities of today’s Navy (United States Navy Fact File 2013c). External sensors do 
not, however, have to be limited to this traditional thought. Use of unmanned surface or 
subsurface vessels can extend significantly extend the ship’s sensor range, as can rapidly 
deployable lighter-than-air devices and space-based technology. This study does not 
focus on the how (determining what required capabilities are more important is the goal).  
(5) Salvo Size 
The last major variable that this model evaluates is the numerical missile salvo 
size for the SSC. One base SSC design assumption is that it can rapidly deploy missiles, 
and also rapidly rearm and reengage in combat. The first variation of the model evaluates 
launching two missiles per salvo. The other variation evaluates launching four missiles 
per salvo. These two variations are based on minimizing the cost of the fire control 
system, as well as using canister stored and launched missile delivery systems on the 
small surface combatant. Should the analysis prove that varying the salvo size has a 
significant impact, a more detailed analysis will be conducted. 
4. Limitations and Assumptions 
Some limitations and assumptions are required to allow for modeling and 
simulation. These limitations and assumptions will remain the same throughout the 
modeling process to ensure comparable results are obtained. 
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a. Limitations 
The limitations of the model are largely attributed to the limitations of the MANA 
program itself as well as the need to keep the model simple, yet realistic enough to draw 
relevant insights. The limitations of the model are listed below.  
• The ships are not able to sail in battle formations, and elaborate set piece 
ship maneuvers cannot be modeled. Instead, the maximum distance 
between friendly forces is dictated by individual weights.  
• The ship’s sailing route is set using waypoints. The ships are not able to 
adapt to new situations and set new destination waypoints during the 
model simulation.  
• Only tactical battles between the ships are modeled. Operational 
maneuvers such as power projection and sea basing are not modeled 
(Phase 0 staging and shaping operations).  
• Flight path and trajectory of ASCMs are not modeled. The effective 
missile interception was modeled crudely by the probability of hit.  
• Effect of command and control cannot be studied, as each unit is modeled 
to act independently of the group. This independence meant that 
degradation to a unit’s combat effectiveness due to impairment of 
command and control and leadership functions cannot be successfully 
modeled using MANA. 
b. Assumptions 
The following assumptions are made for MANA modeling. 
• Ship design, force structure, and capability requirements were generated 
based on a single tactical battle outcome. 
• Campaign level scenarios were not developed. 
• A single missile hit, regardless where it hits a ship, constitutes a “mission 
kill.” In modern missile combat, the lethality of modern warhead would 
cause considerable reduction in mission effectiveness, even if the ship did 
not sink. 
• The various missile probabilities of hit are summarized in Table 8 for U.S. 
capabilities and Table 9 for the PLAN. The probabilities of hit  are 
rationalized with historical data from post-1982 missile combat (Schulte 
1994). Based on historical data, 0.981hitp =  for defenseless targets while 
0.630hitp =  for defendable targets. The value  was selected in 
taking into consideration that historical victims are smaller ships. 
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Deviations from baseline are due to assumptions that advanced guidance 
and tracking systems in the missile would contribute to higher . 
USN WEAPON TYPE Phit 








SCS Missile 0.85 
SUB Torpedoes 0.85 
UAS N/A N/A 
P-8 Torpedoes 0.85 
Table 8.   Assumed USN capabilities for modeling. 
PLAN WEAPON TYPE Phit 




PTG Missile 0.75 
SUB Torpedoes 0.85 
UAS N/A N/A 
Table 9.   Assumed PLAN capabilities for modeling. 
• For ships that are hit, forward maintenance as well as port maintenance 
is irrelevant in the tactical battle outcome as these activities take a 
longer time than compared to the battle duration.  
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• Direct fire weapons such as naval guns and small arms fires are not 
modeled.  
• Soft kill, hard kill and other missile countermeasures are not 
individually modeled, which keeps the model simple enough to gain 
insights on the impact of a missile battle. All of these capabilities are 
combined into the probability of hit metric. 
5. Initial Results 
After running the scenario using varying capabilities, a result summary was 
compiled in Table 10. 
 






























1 10 0 60 2 30 15 20.5 10.8 
2 10 0 60 2 45 22.5 20.7 9.3 
3 10 0 60 2 60 30 20.9 8.7 
4 10 0 60 4 30 15 20.6 10.6 
5 10 0 60 4 45 22.5 21.1 6.1 
6 10 0 60 4 60 30 8.7 3.2 
7 10 0 90 2 30 15 5.9 1.3 
8 10 0 90 2 45 22.5 6.5 1.5 
9 10 0 90 2 60 30 5 1.7 
10 10 0 90 4 30 15 6.7 3.3 
11 10 0 90 4 45 22.5 6.9 2.9 
12 10 0 90 4 60 30 4.9 3 
13 10 1 60 2 30 15 13.8 7.0 
14 10 1 60 2 45 22.5 13.5 5.7 
15 10 1 60 2 60 30 10.5 9.1 
16 10 1 60 4 30 15 13.6 5.2 
17 10 1 60 4 45 22.5 12.2 5.8 
18 10 1 60 4 60 30 12.6 9.2 
19 10 1 90 2 30 15 6.7 1.2 
20 10 1 90 2 45 22.5 5.6 1.5 
21 10 1 90 2 60 30 5.6 1.3 
22 10 1 90 4 30 15 7.0 1.7 
23 10 1 90 4 45 22.5 3.5 1.2 
24 10 1 90 4 60 30 5.1 1.2 
Table 10.   Summary of the original MANA trial runs. 
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The raw data in Table 10 was broken down by individual capability 
characteristics and then a regression analysis was performed. Each run in the table 
represents a different combination of the capabilities. In this initial data series, only 10 
ships were analyzed (data series used for follow-on analysis can be found in Appendix 
C). The run number in the left hand column of Table 10 represents the combination of 
capabilities in the corresponding row. Each of the run combinations were evaluated 30 
times (as discussed in Chapter V Section C.3.), and the average number of BLUE and 
RED casualties are calculated and reported in the “BLUE Casualties” and “RED 
Casualties” columns.  
6. Analysis of Results 
A regression analysis can help to identify the most significant variables following 
the initial trial runs. A complete analysis for each variable is found in Appendix C, and a 
result summary is found in Table 11. Four univariate models were used to analyze the 
data. In these models, the casualty ratio was used as the dependent variable. The primary 
method with which the regression results will be analyzed is by comparing the 2R  and 
F  significance values. The 2R  value, or coefficient of determination, provides an 
indication of how close a particular data set correlates to a given statistical model. A 2R  
value of one describes a data set that is a perfect fit to a statistical model. The F  
significance value provides a probability that any correlation between the data and the 
statistical model occurs by chance. A lower number generally signifies a more relevant 
variable. 
 






Missile Range 0.002 0.370
Salvo Size 0.320 0.045
Detection Range 0.421 0.030
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From the data in Table 11, the missile range variable appears to be more 
statistically significant than the other variables. The assessment of missile range is based 
on the 2R  value of 0.370 (which is nearly an order of magnitude higher than all other 
variables) and a F  significance of 0.002. Graphical data evaluation was conducted to 
produce some additional insight. This graphical representation can be seen in Figure 22. 
 
Figure 22.  Plot of casualties versus MANA scenario number. 
When analyzing Figure 22, some variables (or combination of variables) appear to 
influence the outcome of the engagement. Closer inspection provides a little more insight. 
In particular, runs 1–6 and 13–18 are runs in which the missile range is 60 nm, while runs 
7–12 and 19–24 are runs in which the missile range is extended to 90 nm. A clear 
decrease in the number of U.S. casualties occurs when the missile range is extended. 
Similarly, runs 1–12 occur when networking is off, while runs 13–24 occur when some 
networking capability exists. On examination, it appears that the average number of U.S. 
casualties decreases when some form of networking exists within the group system. 




















(# of assets lost)
Red Casualties
(# of assets lost)
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which a reduced number of U.S. casualties occur can be visually correlated to the 
extended missile range and, to a lesser extent, the presence of networking. This decrease 
in casualties may be explained by the increase in effective sensor range experienced by 
individual flotilla ships that would be provided through networking capability. More 
result context is provided in Figure 23. 
 
Figure 23.  Graph of casualties versus networking and missile range. 
To further expand on the impact of missile range and networking, the average 
U.S. and RED casualties for the runs in which the networking and missile ranges varied 
was calculated. The results can be seen from analyzing Figure 23. In addition to the 
average U.S. and PLAN casualties, the 95 percent confidence interval used for the data 
set is also displayed to provide statistical relevancy to the data. As expected, the number 
of U.S. casualties decreases when networking is applied and when the missile range is 
extended. Not so intuitively, however, is that the number of PLAN casualties also 
decreases. This reduction in PLAN casualties requires additional consideration and is the 
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result of this initial model’s stopping criteria, which will be discussed in the following 
section. 
7. Issues Encountered 
Several issues become immediately apparent with the first model run results. For 
starters, the number of U.S. casualties decreases as the individual variables improve. This 
decrease in U.S. casualties is desired, as decreasing casualties can generally be 
categorized as an improvement in efficiency and effectiveness. A simultaneous decrease 
in PLAN casualties as these variables improve, however, raises questions about the 
effectiveness of the U.S. force capability improvements. An in-depth model and result 
evaluation reveal the following issues: the model run time is insufficient to gain all of the 
pertinent insights, e.g., overall attrition rates and time of engagement, combined with few 
surface on surface engagements occurrences during the duration of the battle. The 
reasons for these issues will be elaborated next. 
a. Model Run Time 
The stopping conditions for the model (the conditions that end the simulation 
should they occur) are: 
• all U.S. ships are eliminated, 
• all PLAN ships are eliminated, 
• any PLAN ship reaches the Spratly Island objective, or 
• any PLAN capital ship (a DDG for this model) is destroyed. 
The first two of these stopping conditions make intuitive sense, as the purpose of 
the flotilla group in this scenario is to deny access to the Spratly Islands to the PLAN. 
The last condition is implemented as a deterrent threat. If the PLA understands that the 
flotilla force is capable of inflicting a serious blow to the PLAN fleet, the possibility 
alone may deter them from initiating such action. The “destruction of any PLAN DDG” 
stopping condition ends the conflict “early,” preventing analysis of attrition rates for the 
overall battle. As the U.S. sensor ranges and missile ranges are extended in the model, the 
likelihood of a PLAN DDG being eliminated earlier in the scenario, thus ending the 
scenario more rapidly, increases. 
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b. Minimal Surface on Surface Engagements  
 As stated in Chapter V Section C.2, the PLA force consists of a combination of 
air, surface, and undersea assets. The main goal of the model was to determine the 
effectiveness of a small combatant ship flotilla, with the understanding that its desired 
single mission capability would leave it vulnerable to other domains of warfare. Minimal 
ASW and AAW capabilities exist in defense of the flotilla group. Another goal of the 
model was to determine the defensive capabilities the small surface combatant and other 
support ships must have to increase the survivability and mission effectiveness of the 
overall armada. Without this additional support, however, the majority of U.S. casualties 
occur from PLA submarines and air assets before any surface combat can occur. The 
effectiveness of the PLA air and subsurface assets provide incredible insight, but does 
very little for evaluating the effectiveness of a surface combatant against enemy surface 
combatants. 
D. REVISED SPRATLY ISLAND RUNS 
Several issues are identified in the original model setup. Some modifications are 
required to ensure the relevant data can be obtained. 
1. Modification to Model 
The initial model produces very minimal surface combatant versus surface 
combatant engagements. Instead, the majority of the U.S. ships killed are the result of 
engagement by PLAN air and subsurface threats, which occur well before the surface 
ships close within weapons range of each other. The object of the model is to determine 
the required capabilities of a surface combatant; thus, all submarines and enemy air 
forces are removed from subsequent models. While this exclusion of forces is certain to 
bring up some questions about the relevance of the results (as it is reasonable to assume 
that air and subsurface components would certainly exist in this scenario), it will provide 
a base capabilities requirement for a surface combatant in a surface warfare engagement 
by isolating the variables associated with surface combat. A method of addressing the air 
and undersea threats will be required as a system of systems process. 
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Another notable result from the original model is that the scenario typically ends 
prior to any relevant data being obtained. During the scenarios in which surface on 
surface engagements do occur (most notably when the sensor and missile ranges are at 
the assumed maximum), the stopping condition of one DDG being eliminated is usually 
satisfied early on. While this early termination does provide valuable insight, it prevents 
obtaining a complete picture of a full-scale assault. If the idea of the SSC is provide a 
credible threat, then understanding the entire sequence of events and outcomes is 
important. Removing the stopping condition of one PLAN DDG killed is a way forward 
in achieving this evaluation. A screenshot of the revised MANA model is displayed in 
Figure 24. 
 
Figure 24.  Revised MANA model scenario image. 
 Aside from less units involved in combat, all other aspects remain the same. 15 
SSCs are depicted in Figure 24, but the actual number varies with the different scenarios. 
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2. Model Results 
Runs 1–48 of the revised Spratly Island scenario allow us to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the SSC without any networking capability. Runs 49–96 evaluate the 
effectiveness of the SSC with limited networking capability applied. These results can be 
found in Appendix C. The raw data is broken down by individual capability 
characteristics and a regression analysis is performed. We accomplished four univariate 
regressions, each with response variable given by casualty ratio. 
3. Analysis of Results 
Regression analysis of the results obtain in Chapter V Section D.2 was again 
conducted to determine the most significant variables. The full regression analysis can be 
found in Appendix C. A summary of these results can be found in Table 12. Again, as 
explained prior to the previous regression analysis, a higher 2R  value and a lower F  
significance are good indicators of a variable that is significant and relevant. 
 
Variable F Significance  
Number of Ships 0.972 0.000 
Networking 0.695 0.002 
Missile Range 0.899 0.000 
Salvo Size 0.917 0.000 
Sensor Range 0.000 0.732 
Table 12.   Summary of the regression analysis. 
 The only factor that provided any real relevance to the overall outcome of the 
engagement was the sensor detection/classification range. An initial evaluation of the raw 
data shows that a significant improvement in the casualty ratio occurs when the sensor 
detection range is extended beyond 45 nm. A graph of these results can be seen in Figure 
25, which is sufficient to observe the correlation regarding the impact of sensor range on 
the armada efficiency. 
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Figure 25.  Graph of average casualty ratio versus sensor detection range. 
 As seen in Figure 25, a rapid increase in the casualty ratio occurs when the sensor 
range is extended beyond the 45 nm range. Increasing force efficiency with longer attack 
ranges is not a new concept. The magnitude of this increase, however, is made very clear 
when looking at these model outputs. The significance of this range is that the last data 
point of 60 nm is further than the range the enemy is capable of achieving. The biggest 
takeaway from this analysis is that the ability to fire effectively first at an adversary is far 
more important than any other single factor. 
4. Optimal Force Structure and Capabilities 
From the analysis, it becomes clear that the most significant factors in 
maximizing efficiency of the force are sensor range and missile range, with all other 
factors contributing very little to the outcome of the engagement. From this insight, a 
force structure and capabilities requirements recommendation can be made. This force 
structure with given capabilities is capable of achieving mission success in each modeled 
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surface-to-surface missiles. Each missile should have an effective range of at least 90 nm 
(this is a minimum, but the range should correlate to the maximum sensor range). The 
ship should be capable of firing two missiles per salvo. The ship should be capable of 
obtaining a minimum speed of 25 knots. The minimum detection range of the sensor 
system should be 60 nm, and the minimum classification range should be 30 nm. As 
described in Chapter V Section D.3, longer ranges may be achieved using external sensor 
systems, and increased detection and classification ranges only enhance the combatant 
ship performance. Finally, a robust networking system is not required. More specifically, 
the ability to share targeting information is not needed, but communicating with possible 
external sensor systems is required. 
5. Refinement of Sensor Range evaluation 
After determining the force structure and capabilities in Chapter V Section D.4, a 
more detailed analysis of the impact on sensor range to the casualty ratio can be 
conducted. This evaluation is conducted with only the optimal force structure and 
capabilities, as evaluation of smaller range increments for all possible variable 
combinations would take a substantial amount of time and manpower. 
As identified in Figure 26, some significant increase in effectiveness of the flotilla 
group occurs somewhere between a 45 and 60 nm sensor range. To determine where this 
transition occurs, the force structure and capabilities were evaluated at 1.5 nm sensor 




Figure 26.  Refined casualty ratio versus sensor range plot. 
A large U.S. force efficiency increase occurs when the U.S. sensor range is 
extended beyond 55 nm. A less significant increase in efficiency can be noted when the 
U.S. sensor range is extended beyond 50 nm. One assumption made during the modeling 
process was that the PLAN sensor detection range was 50 nm. As the U.S. sensor range is 
extended beyond that of the adversary, the effectiveness of the flotilla rapidly increases. 
The major takeaway from this observation is that extending the sensor range beyond that 
of the adversary has significant impacts on the outcome of the battle. 
E. REINTRODUCTION OF UNDERSEA AND AIR DOMAINS 
In all previous model runs subsequent to the initial trials, PLAN submarines and 
aircraft are removed to determine the SSC effectiveness in a surface-on-surface 
engagement. This is assumption is highly optimistic, however, and some analysis must be 
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1. PLAN Submarines with Minimal U.S. ASW Capabilities 
The first scenario that requires analysis is one in which PLAN submarines are 
introduced with no effective U.S. anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capability. In such a 
scenario, it is assumed that no additional ASW assets are allocated to the armada, and 
only those ASW capabilities inherent to the original force structure are present. 
To maximize the value of data gained from this modified scenario, the best force 
structure and capabilities (as determined from in Chapter V Section D.4) are used. PLAN 
submarines are introduced to the simulation one at a time to determine the impact on the 
recommended force structure. The results of this analysis can be found in Figure 27. 
 
Figure 27.  U.S. casualties versus added PLAN submarines (no ASW 
capabilities). 
 The first data point in Figure 27 represents the average number of U.S. units lost 
when no PLAN submarines were present. In this scenario, the armada is assumed to have 
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percent probability of detecting the PLAN submarines (regardless of the actions of the 
submarines). The addition of PLAN submarines results in an expected increase in U.S. 
forces lost. At four submarines, the number of U.S. forces lost remains constant, with 
nearly every unit being killed and the PLAN forces reaching their Spratly Island 
objective. 
 The results from this scenario are expected, and it is entirely feasible to expect 
PLAN submarine forces to be engaged in this combat scenario. The major takeaway from 
these trials is that the armada cannot survive in the Spratly Island combat scenario if 
PLAN submarines are engaged without some additional ASW capability. Evaluation of 
the scenario with some ASW capability may provide additional insight into the scenario. 
2. PLAN Submarines with Additional U.S. ASW Capabilities 
The second scenario that requires analysis is one in which PLAN submarines are 
introduced and additional effective U.S. ASW capabilities are present. This ASW 
capability can be obtained from inorganic ASW air assets, organic ASW sensors, or 
additional assets in the system (such as the ASW mission package on the LCS).  
The best force structure and capabilities (as determined from Chapter V Section 
D.4) are used. PLAN submarines are again introduced one at a time to the simulation to 
determine the impact on the recommended force structure. The results of this analysis can 
be found in Figure 28. 
 82 
  
Figure 28.  U.S. casualties versus added PLAN submarines (ASW 
capabilities). 
The first data point represents the average number of U.S. casualties observed 
when no submarines are present. In this scenario, the armada is assumed to have some 
ASW capability. Initially, the PLAN submarines have the same low probability of 
detection (5 percent) as in the previous model. After the submarine engages, however, the 
probability of detection is increased to 70 percent and the submarine becomes vulnerable 
to attack. The addition of one submarine results in the average number of U.S. casualties 
increasing notably. Further increasing the number of submarines, however, does not 
result in significantly larger casualties. This result is not intuitive and may require further 
analysis. 
The results observed from this scenario are insightful, as they show the necessity 
of additional ASW capabilities within the armada system. This capability can be inherent 
to the small surface combatant or contained on additional external units. Either way, it is 


































3. PLAN Aircraft 
The next scenario that requires analysis is one in which PLAN offensive aircraft 
are introduced and no additional AAW capabilities are present. The best force structure 
and capabilities are again used. Offensive PLAN aircraft are introduced one at a time. 
The results of this analysis can be found in Figure 29.  
 
 
Figure 29.  U.S. casualties versus number PLAN aircraft. 
 The first data point represents the average number of U.S. casualties observed 
when no PLAN aircraft are modeled. The addition of the first aircraft results in very 
significant increases in U.S. casualties. The addition of an additional aircraft results in 
complete destruction of the U.S. forces. 
 The major takeaway from this analysis is that the SSC is susceptible to enemy air 




























F. ADDITIONAL SCENARIOS 
 The best force structure size and capabilities are proven to be effective in the 
Spratly Island scenario. An analysis of the same force’s effectiveness can be conducted in 
other threat areas to determine force interoperability in other regions. 
1. Strait of Malacca 
This scenario aims to determine how the proposed force structure and design will 
operate in narrow waterway. Typically, straits are flanked on both sides by land. This 
proximity to land presents additional complications, such as land launched ASCMs and 
small arms, which are not specifically addressed in this analysis. In order to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the SSC and the armada as a whole in a surface-on-surface engagement, 
some assumptions must be made. 
a. Scenario Assumptions 
To focus the derived force structure and capability performance in the Strait of 
Malacca scenario, the model had the following overarching assumptions. 
• The land masses near the SOM are assumed to be sovereign and neither 
the U.S. military nor the PLA forces have additional assets deployed 
which are able to affect the naval battle outcome.  
• The littoral states in the SOM do not provide any form of military support 
or interference for either the U.S. military or the PLA.  
• The USN and PLAN forces are engaged in a force on force engagement in 
the SOM. Neither side had the relative advantage of being pre-deployed in 
the area.  
• The airspace above the SOM is available for use for both USN and PLAN. 
With the assumptions listed above, the modeling effort has ensured that the 
application of the baseline model to the SOM scenario is fair and realistic. The model 
isolates the other operational complexities associated with a strait environment. The 
assumptions attempt to simplify and focus the effort to determine how forces operating in 
close proximity in a confined waterway perform. 
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b. Model Results 
Similar to all other scenarios run, the Strait of Malacca model scenario was run 30 
times with the same force structure and capabilities. The raw data can be seen in 
Appendix C. The results obtained during this scenario were very similar to those obtained 
during the Spratly Island scenario. Specifically, in nearly every scenario, all PLAN forces 
were destroyed while nearly no U.S. casualties occurred. In the worst run of the 30, three 
U.S. SSCs were lost. These results help to validate the idea that the optimal force 
structure is capable of operating in multiple threat environments effectively. 
2. Persian Gulf Scenario 
Another likely theater in which the SSC may be employed is the Persian Gulf. 
Operation in the region will present many of the same complications that operation in a 
strait presents. Several assumptions must again be made to ensure the relevant data is 
obtained. 
a. Scenario Assumptions 
The optimal force structure and capabilities for the U.S. forces were used, and the 
opposing forces were modified to better approximate the force structure of likely enemies 
in the area. These RED forces consist of small combatants, frigates and corvettes, and 
were modeled in large numbers, as it is likely that the enemy would attempt to swarm the 
allied forces during this scenario. The RED force was composed of 10 frigates and 20 
corvettes. This force structure is based on one-third of the current Iranian fleet, assuming 
they are the most capable adversary in the region.  
b. Model Results  
Similar to all other scenarios run, the Persian Gulf model scenario was run 30 
times with the same force structure and capabilities. The raw data can be seen in 
Appendix C. Based on the geography of the region (very wide and open with little natural 
impediments), very little restriction in maneuverability was encountered. The average 
number of U.S. casualties incurred was less than one (similar to previous scenario 
results), while the average number of enemy casualties was approximately 25.  
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3. Analysis of Results 
It has already been identified that the flotilla must be capable of engaging the 
enemy forces first. The additional scenario simulations support that with longer effective 
targeting and engagement range, the flotilla forces are highly dominant. Even 
outnumbered, the armada generally sank most of the enemy forces with minimal loss. 
These results reinforce the concept that the best force structure and capabilities (identified 
in the Spratly Island scenario) are sufficient to engage a credible threat in the Strait of 
Malacca and the Persian Gulf. 
G. COMBAT MODELING SUMMARY 
Modeling is an invaluable tool in evaluating capabilities and combat 
effectiveness. For this analysis, modeling and simulation was used to identify significant 
capabilities requirements for the individual SSCs, to identify a desired number of SSCs, 
and to discover the support ships required to augment the flotilla within the armada 
system of systems concept. 
First, the model helped to identify the importance of firing effectively first. To 
ensure this capability is achieved, the SSC must have a sensor range of at least 60 nm. 
This capability may be achieved by deployment of external sensor systems, such as 
unmanned vehicles, manned aircraft, or space systems. While achieving this relatively 
long sensor range does not require any organic sensor capability (the external sensor may 
be launched from a separate platform with the ability to communicate the data to the 
SSC), providing the SSC with the ability to organically deploy the sensors will increase 
each unit’s flexibility and interoperability.  
Second, the SSC must be able to deploy a missile with the capability of 
effectively engaging an enemy combatant at the maximum range the sensor system. The 
results of this model indicate that the missile should be capable of effectively engaging a 
target out to 90 nm. Realistically, any effective range greater than that of the sensor used 
to target the enemy is overkill, and would most likely result in an increase in cost with no 
corresponding increase in capability. However, we include the excess range to ensure we 
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are able to capitalize on any further sensor enhancement, either organic to the ship or off-
board. 
Third, the SSC should be capable of launching two missiles per salvo. No 
increase in effectiveness of the combatant was noted when salvo size was increased, so 
investing money in this larger salvo size capability will not produce any substantial 
increase in effectiveness of the combatant. 
As far as capabilities are concerned, the last major takeaway is that networking 
within the individual combatants is not required. As long as all SSC are capable of 
receiving targeting information from their associated external sensors, relaying that 
targeting data to other ships in the armada does not significantly improve the system 
effectiveness. 
To obtain the most return on investment, the flotilla should consist of 15 SSCs. 
Any more than 15 ships provide minimal increase in efficiency or effectiveness of the 
flotilla for the threat presented in the Spratly Island scenario. 
Finally, the armada must consist of ships that can provide anti-submarine and 
anti-air warfare capabilities. Adding these capabilities to the SSC would unnecessarily 
increase the size and cost of the ships. The small surface combatant must operate within 
the armada system of systems to provide the maximum offensive capability with 
maximum survivability.  
H. LOGISTICS MODEL 
The methods used to provide logistic support to ships of today’s U.S. Navy are 
adequate for open-ocean and unopposed environments. However, future conflicts may 
bring with it the need to operate deeper in regions blanketed by anti-access area denial 
(A2AD) systems. This need to operate in contested areas introduces substantial risk, 
however, as logistics ships may become attractive targets for these area denial systems. 
Ships such as the Lewis and Clark-class T-AKE and Supply-class T-AOE currently 
provide significant refueling capability. However, these logistic ships’ larger size and 
slower speed can make them vulnerable to detection and engagement by long-range 
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ASCM and ballistic missiles. One method of reducing the risk is to introduce the concept 
of the intermediate fuel ferry.2 
The fuel ferry concept is premised on a large traditional logistics ship, such as a 
T-AKE, to transport the fuel and supplies from the central supply point to an area outside 
A2AD effective range. Once outside A2AD range, the fuel and supplies are transferred to 
a small logistics ship (the intermediate fuel ferry). This much smaller logistics ship is 
faster, making it difficult to detect and engage by distant area denial systems. The smaller 
logistics ship transports the fuel and materials into the A2AD environment, introducing 
substantially less risk to the cargo and ultimately the mission. This concept can be 
visualized in Figure 30. 
 
 
Figure 30.  Fuel ferry concept. 
2A fuel ferry is envisioned as a vessel similar to the Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV) which has been 
designed to carry fuel in addition to cargo. It should have some stealth characteristics and would have a fuel 
capacity of 210,000 gallons of fuel. 
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In Figure 30, the T-AKE brings the cargo (fuel and materials) from an established 
supply depot significantly outside the A2AD boundary. Guam is the primary supply 
depot used for all problem analysis, but several other depots are available (e.g., Australia, 
Singapore, Philippines). Prior to entering the effective range of the A2AD system, a 
portion of the load is transferred from the T-AKE to the small logistics ship (up to the 
capacity of the smaller ship). The small logistics ship approaches the designated UNREP 
point inside the A2AD region, taking care to blend in with the surrounding commercial 
and fishing vessels. The small logistics ship then transfers the available cargo to warships 
operating within the A2AD range. Once the transfer is complete, the logistic ship travels 
back outside of the A2AD range and repeats the process. 
The need for a stealthy intermediary fuel platform to transfer fuel between the T-
AKE and the combatants is vital for the fuel ferry concept to succeed. The ability to 
blend in with the surrounding environment greatly reduces the risk of detection and 
engagement. This blending capability may be achieved through decisive maneuvering 
and navigational tactics, effective electronic warfare, and a minimally projected radar 
cross section. Speed of the fuel ferries will also be instrumental in minimizing any 
exposure of the ferry to the A2AD danger since the ability to quickly egress the area after 
completing the fueling operations may be an essential risk reduction tactic. The Joint 
High Speed Vessel (JHSV), a modified Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), or an entirely new 
class of ship could meet the small logistic ship requirements. An illustration of this 
concept is shown in Figure 31. 
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Figure 31.  The SEA-20A logistics visual depiction of the concept (after 
Google 2014).  
1. Background 
Military logistics have been in existence as long as there have been standing 
armies, as early as 700 BC with the Assyrians (Antill 2001). Alexander the Great used 
the sea to transport supplies to fuel his conquest into India. As ships converted from sail 
to steam, the need for ability to fuel the ships was apparent. As coal gave way to fuel oil, 
the Navy began refueling at sea training. During World War II, extensive use of refueling 
and resupplying at sea allowed the U.S. Navy to operate away in areas away from 
friendly ports such as the Western Pacific and the North Atlantic. This at-sea refueling 
and resupply capability enabled significant reach and more importantly staying power for 
these ships (Antill 2001). Current naval ships and aircraft require continuous, 
coordinated, and strategically located logistic support as they conduct deployments 
worldwide. Therefore, it is prudent to explore how logistics may affect all operational 
levels.  
2. Model Selection 
Various modeling tools were used to gain insight into the armada logistics 
requirements. Some of the tools and techniques considered include queuing theory, 
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discrete event simulation, and optimization. The Simulation Modeling framework based 
on Intelligent Objects (SIMIO) package was selected due to the modeling team’s access 
to professors with SIMIO experience, and ease of displaying the model and results. Also, 
SIMIO provides for the assignment of probabilistic or deterministic values to various 
aspects of the supply chain. Some of these variables include in modeling are ship speed, 
fuel transfer time, fuel capacity, and fuel usage (burn) rate. 
The SIMIO software allows the user to not only set the distances of each transit 
leg, but also overlay the legs onto a map image to promote a complete understanding of 
the operational scenario. The software also allows for the user to conduct multiple 
simulations in a single experiment, and to generate output data that can be exported and 
displayed in Excel. SIMIO automatically creates data that is often useful in analyzing 
issues with current supply assets and operations (Kelton, et al. 2011). For example, the 
SIMIO modeling software provides idle times, quantity of goods transported with the 
supply chain, and the number of times the various vehicles (T-AKE, JHSV, and 
combatant) travel on a particular path. 
An issue faced with SIMIO was the need for significant computer memory and 
processing time. This need was particularly evident for the model size increased. The 
computers that hosted the SIMIO software for this project were at times unable to run 
more than 30 simulation replications. Regardless, a minimum of 30 replications of each 
simulation experiment were performed. This number of replications permitted Central 
Limit Theorem use to compute simulation results confidence intervals (Ross 2009). 
3. Parameter Research  
Prior to utilization of SIMIO, the values that established fuel burn rates, SSC fuel 
capacity, and the number of logistic ships required to support the flotilla were calculated. 
Transit speeds for BLUE forces in the model vehicles (T-AKEs, fuel ferries, and 
combatants) were modeled with a triangular distribution around estimated minimum 
transit, cruising, and sprint speeds. Triangular distributions were also used due to for 
product transfer rates. This distribution function increased model simplicity and provided 
sufficient fidelity (Brighton Webs Ltd 2013).  
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Fuel burn rates in the model depended on the ship’s speed, which in turn 
depended on whether the ship was in transit or engaged in combat. The endurance patrol 
speed is a constant 15 knots. Combat speeds are from a triangular probability distribution 
based on speeds of five, 15, and 35 knots. A probability density plot of the triangular 
distribution is shown in Figure 32. 
 
Figure 32.  Triangular PDF for combat speed. 
The number of T-AKEs and fuel ferries was established using fuel burn rates, a 
replenishment point of 50 percent total fuel capacity, and the combatant’s fuel capacity. 
The results show that one T-AKE and one fuel ferry prevented the need for significant 
numbers and/or tonnages of ships. This finding led to the decision that four of each would 
be used to supply the flotilla. 
a. Vessel Characteristics 
After evaluating current and projected ship classes for the logistics train, the focus 
was narrowed down to the Lewis and Clark class T-AKE and the Joint High Speed 
Vessel (JHSV) as components for the logistic ship primary design. The following data 
was used as input parameters for SIMIO (F. Papoulias 2014b). 
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• Supply ship data (T-AKE): 7,000 metric tons of dry cargo and ammunition 
and 23,500 barrels of marine diesel fuel (987,000 gal) (Saunders 2013). 
• Fuel ferry data (JHSV): Payload baseline: 635 metric tons (approximately 
210,000 gallons of fuel) (Saunders 2013). 
• Fuel (Diesel Marine): 7.2 lbs. per gal (.003 metric tons) and 42 gallons per 
barrel (Becker 2013). 
• Missiles (LRASM/JAMM-ER): 2200 lbs. (0.997 metric tons) (Oestergaard 
2014). 
• Food: 0.75 lbs. per person per day. 
These vessel values were used to determine the individual SSC’s required 
logistics capacity, and were applied to SIMIO as logistic transport ship values along with 
burn rates, transit and transfer speeds, and transport distances.  
b. Equation Definitions 
This section defines the variables that will be used in the following sections to 
determine fuel burn rates and ship fuel capacity. 1C  is the fuel burn efficiency. The 
choice of a diesel engine would equate to 1 0.4 .C lbs hr hp= ⋅  If gas turbine engines were 
chosen, the new fuel burn efficiency would be 1 0.35 .C lbs hr hp= ⋅  A second variable 
2C  is the constant of proportionality that one can get from similar ships which establishes 
the following (F. Papoulias 2014a): 
• power is force times speed, 
• force (resistance) is proportional to wetted surface and speed-squared, 
• wetted surface ( 2ft  ) is proportional to 2 3volume  ( 3ft ) to make the 
dimensions match, 
• volume is proportional to weight (displacement), and 
• ( )2 3 32C Horsepower Displacement Speed= × .  
The information used to generate Table 13 is from (Saunders 2013) and construct 
from (F. Papoulias 2014a). For the scenario, 2C  varies between 
3 2 30.008 0.018hp kts lbs− ⋅  for 100–1000 ton ships and 3 2 30.016 hp kts lbs⋅  for ships 
1000 ton and larger. Fuel specific weight (FSW) of marine diesel fuel is 7.2 lbs ga  
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(Becker 2013). From the visual data representations in Figure 33 and Figure 34, we can 
analyze the effect of speed and tonnage on various ships’ endurance. 
 








US WW2 U.S. MTB 3600 39 123424 56 0.00415 
Germany WW2 S-boat 3960 35 209380 95 0.00444 
Germany WW2 S-boat 6000 39.5 238032 108 0.00429 
Germany WW2 S-boat 6150 37 253460 115 0.00513 
US Island 12492 29 377000 171 0.01663 
Venezuela Constitución class 12000 31 381400 173 0.01297 
Iran Houding 24075 35 454024 206 0.01610 
US Asheville 12500 35 527000 239 0.00757 
Columbia PC145 5150 22 539980 245 0.01235 
Bangladesh Padma 6265 23 595080 270 0.01233 
India Rani Abbakka class 32526 34 615000 279 0.01938 
Cape Verde P511 5800 23 639160 290 0.01088 
S. Korea Sea Wolf 14640 25 694260 315 0.02024 
Angola Rei Ekuiki II 4732 20 709688 322 0.01259 
Sri Lanka Jayesagara Class 4360 15 738600 335 0.02678 
US Sentinel 11520 28 791400 359 0.01039 
US & 
Philippine Cyclone class 53600 35 848800 385 0.02362 
Malta Diciotti class 12670 23 879600 399 0.01921 
Nambia Oryx 4000 14 910252 413 0.02629 
S. Africa Warrior 15000 32 963148 437 0.00795 
Iran Hendijan 12200 21 985188 447 0.02253 
Latvia Valpas 2000 15 1221400 554 0.00878 
S. Korea Taichung 30940 30 1388520 630 0.01559 
S. Korea PC 501 19200 24 1432600 650 0.01851 
Faroe Island Tjaldrid 4800 15 1454640 660 0.01876 
Spain Rio Tajo 3800 12 1503128 682 0.02838 
Taiwan WPSO 39700 30 1567400 711 0.01846 
Morocco OPV 70 10730 22 1763200 800 0.01169 
Germany Bad Bramstedt 7000 22 1791852 813 0.00755 
Taiwan Shun Hu 2 2500 16 1877808 852 0.00679 
Trinidad Nelson 11280 17 2071760 940 0.02393 
Sweden KBV 181 7510 16 2219428 1007 0.01825 
Romania Damen OPV 13720 21 2265712 1028 0.01454 
Table 13.   Worldwide ship data used to calculate 2C  for 100–1000 ton displacements 
(after Saunders 2013). 
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After deriving the values of 1C  and 2C , they were applied to equations that were 
used to calculate the fuel burn rates from the endurance and combat patrols. 
c. Fuel Burn Rate 
With assistance from a SME (F. Papoulias 2014b), the following equations 
(Tupper 1997) were used to estimate fuel burn rates: 








 × × ×   (3) 
  
The results derived from Equations (2) and (3) provided baseline fuel burn rates 
for simulating the logistics requirements in Table 14. 
Tonnage Speed in Knots 
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 
100 2.29 18.32 61.82 146.54 286.21 494.56 785.35 
200 3.63 29.08 98.13 232.61 454.32 785.07 1246.66 
300 4.76 38.10 128.59 304.81 595.33 1028.73 1633.59 
400 5.77 46.16 155.78 369.25 721.19 1246.22 1978.96 
500 6.69 53.56 180.76 428.48 836.87 1446.11 2296.37 
600 7.56 60.48 204.13 483.86 945.03 1633.01 2593.17 
700 8.38 67.03 226.22 536.23 1047.31 1809.76 2873.83 
800 9.16 73.27 247.28 586.15 1144.82 1978.26 3141.40 
900 9.91 79.25 267.48 634.03 1238.34 2139.85 3398.01 
1000 10.63 85.02 286.95 680.17 1328.45 2295.56 3645.27 
1500 14.76 118.12 398.65 944.94 1845.59 3189.18 5064.31 
2000 17.89 143.09 482.93 1144.72 2235.78 3863.42 6134.97 
3000 23.44 187.50 632.81 1500.00 2929.70 5062.51 8039.08 
4000 28.39 227.14 766.60 1817.13 3549.07 6132.80 9738.66 
5000 32.95 263.57 889.56 2108.59 4118.33 7116.48 11300.71 
6000 37.20 297.64 1004.53 2381.11 4650.60 8036.24 12761.25 
Table 14.   Calculated fuel burn rates in gallons per hour. 
We used triangular distribution around five, 15, and 35 knot speeds to calculate 
the SIMIO input values for the combatant fuel burn rates.  
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Figure 33.  Graph of 100–1000 ton fuel burn rate in gallons. 
 






























These burn rates are conservative first-order approximations as they do not take 
into account the improved efficiency gained by reduction gears and transmissions, 
multiple engines online to achieve specified speeds, and different propulsion systems. 
The derived burn rates used for this model are based upon vessels with diesel engines as 
the prime mover. Higher ship speeds (generally greater than 25 knots) have an increase in 
fuel burn rate that closely follows an exponential curve. 
For logistics development, there may be a higher demand at sprint speeds than 
projected on Figure 33 and Figure 34. These values were used in conjunction with 
capacity levels to develop the patrol duration and for application to the SIMIO model. 
d. Fuel Weight as a Percentage of Total Tonnage 
Although the SSC type and design is not intended to be determined within the 
scope of this project, it was necessary to estimate the SSC fuel capacity and refueling 
requirements. One method to achieve this estimate was to calculate the ratio of total U.S. 
naval ship fuel weight to total tonnage and apply that same ratio to the SSC. The amount 
of fuel that would be available was calculated using analogous ship assessment from 
(Wasserbly 2013). Multiple platforms were assessed to ensure that a wide variety of ships 
were covered. These platforms included a range of ship displacements from small (500 
ton) to large (10,000 ton), as seen in Table 15. The 18 percent summary result from the 
different ship classes was rounded to 20 percent for ease of calculation. This estimate was 
considered sufficient after consultation with SME (F. Papoulias 2014b). 
 
Class/Type 
Tonnage with    




Fuel Load out 
Percent of Total Full 
Load out Tonnage 
Resulting from Fuel 
DDG-51 6800 9800 31% 
LCS 2300 3100 26% 
Tarantul Corvette 488 540 10% 
Sa’ar Corvette 1075 1227 12% 
Grisha 950 1200 21% 
Pauk 500 580 14% 
Nanucka 560 660 15% 
Percent of weight used for fuel 18% 
Table 15.   Percentage of tonnage dedicated to fuel for multiple ship classes. 
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The capacity calculations establish the amount of fuel that is available for the SSC 
to burn. This information is then used to derive the SSC duration of patrol without 
refueling. 
e. Results of Calculating Fuel Burn Rates 
The capacities of the vessels are based on 20% of the ship’s total tonnage. For the 
100–1000 ton ship operating at combat speeds, that requirement equates to less than a 
day underway before refueling is required. However, when operating at a nominal transit 
speed of 15 knots the time the ship can remain at sea without refueling greatly increased. 









  (4) 
There results of Equation (4) at 15 knots are displayed in Figure 35, while the 
results for a combat patrol as shown in Figure 36. 
As can be derived from Figure 35 and Figure 36, the duration of patrols depends 
on when doctrine requires the ship to refuel. Additionally, speed is also a significant 
factor regarding duration of patrol. At slower speeds the duration of patrol is three to four 
times longer than for a large variation in speeds between five and thirty-five knots.  
 99 
 
Figure 35.  Fuel endurance versus ship tonnage at 15 knots. 
 


































































The patrol durations are an important component for fleet commanders to 
understand. Figure 35 and Figure 36 not only give insight into the possibilities available 
to the logistics planners, but also show that setting a specific refueling doctrine at a 
specific fuel percentage could significantly restrict the ship patrol duration. The ability to 
remain at sea is important to a fleet, and the means with which to do so are described in 
the next section. 
f. Supportability 
To determine which size platforms are supportable, we assessed the most difficult 
logistics scenario for four fuel ferries and four T-AKEs. This scenario involved a 
situation with no casualties to the combatants and a constant demand for fuel from start to 
finish. The main supportability driver is then the combatant’s fuel capacity. The scenario 
takes place in and environment where the DF-21 and ASCM threat is significant to the 
large deck combatants and larger oilers. As of the writing of this report there were no in-
region locations. Should that change the possibility of refueling and resupplying through 
shore-based logistics would become feasible. 
 For Table 16 and Table 17, green represents ships that can be supported by four 
fuel ferries, each with a 210,000 gallons capacity. These fuel ferries would operate within 
ASBM range. The four fuel ferries would be supported by the four T-AKEs, which would 
operate outside the ASMB range. Yellow represents ships that can only be supported by 
four T-AKEs with a capacity of 900,000 gallons each. These T-AKEs would either be 
required to enter the A2AD envelope, or the fuel ferries would have to make multiple 
trips to support the combatants. Red represents a capacity that cannot be supported by 
four T-AKEs. An assumption of 50 percent of fuel burned is used as the capacity 
requirement for the calculations. 
We can derive the number of combatants ships the T-AKEs and fuel ferries can 
support based on appropriate combatant ship tonnage and information in the preceding 
paragraph. As the size of the ship or the number of ships increase, the likelihood 
decreases that the ships are supportable by the four T-AKEs and four fuel ferry 
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configuration. The decision when to refuel is an important factor in determining how 
effectively the logistics ships can support the armada. 
Tonnage Single Ship 2 Ships 4 Ships 6 Ships 8 Ships 10 Ships 12 Ships 14 Ships 16 Ships 
100                   
200                   
300                   
400                   
500                   
600                   
700                   
800                   
900                   
1000                   
1500                   
2000                   
3000                   
4000                   
5000                   
6000                   
Table 16.   Combatant ship supportability at 15 kt speeds. 
Tonnage Single Ship 2 Ships 4 Ships 6 Ships 8 Ships 10 Ships 12 Ships 14 Ships 16 Ships 
100                   
200                   
300                   
400                   
500                   
600                   
700                   
800                   
900                   
1000                   
1500                   
2000                   
3000                   
4000                   
5000                   
6000                   
Table 17.   Combatant ship supportability for combat patrol speeds. 
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Using data from Table 16, four T-AKEs and four fuel ferries can support up to 
sixteen 2000-ton ships and four 6000-ton ships. This concept is only true if these ships 
refueled at 80 percent capacity, or conversely when the ship uses 20 percent of its total 
fuel. If the refuel point is set at 50 percent, four fuel ferries and four T-AKEs can only 
support six 2000-ton ships and two 6000-ton ships. 
After completing the calculations for the requisite number of T-AKEs and fuel 
ferries, the information from Table 16 and Table 17 was used to populate the SIMIO 
model. The use of four T-AKEs and four JHSVs in SIMIO is to ensure the capacity for 
the required amount of fuel is available. 
4. SIMIO Scenario 
Upon completion of the initial calculation of fuel capacities, burn rates, and 
logistic ship numbers, the SIMIO model was programmed for the most difficult logistic 
scenario. As a result, the scenario allows for insight into the difficulties of re-supply in an 
A2AD environment. Additionally, there was no consideration of land-based refueling, as 
these small combatants may be called to operate near shore against hostile countries in 
areas such as regions around Iran, Taiwan, the Red Sea, the Baltic Sea, or any number of 
unanticipated operating environments. These hostile countries may not have the abundant 
amount of small islands as seen in the South China Sea (SCS) scenario. Another 
consideration is that the United States may not have facilities available within the area of 
conflict.  
The scenario takes place in the SCS where the DF-21 and ASCM threats are too 
great to risk the large deck combatants and oilers such as a Lewis and Clark class T-
AKE. The scenario begins with the onset of hostilities, and four T-AKEs depart Guam 
upon completion of loading. Guam was selected as the nearest regional U.S. controlled 
port facility outside DF-21 range (Google 2014). The T-AKEs will transit using a random 
triangular distribution around 12, 15, and 20 knots to a refueling box located outside of 
the DF-21 and ASCM ranges, which is an area where a fuel ferry will wait to refuel. The 
triangular distribution is used to take into account possible weather and shipping traffic. 
The fuel ferry will transit to a combat refueling box to transfer fuel to the combatants. 
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The transit speed will be a random triangular distribution around the speeds 17, 25, and 
40 knots. The combatants will then move to a combat location and expend their fuel 
based on the fuel burn rate found through the fuel burn calculations. The time in combat 
patrol will be five days assuming that the combatant will require refueling at 50 percent. 
Upon transferring fuel, each vessel (T-AKE, fuel ferry, combatant) will return to the 
supply side refueling locations outside the DF-21 range. 
5. SIMIO Parameters 
The geographical setup in SIMIO is shown in Figure 37. All distances are taken 
from Google Earth (Google 2014) to develop an estimated route. The routing method 
seeks to keep the T-AKE out of range of the anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) 
capabilities of China, namely the DF-21 and the ASCM threat from operations in the 
combat area. The assessed location where combat most likely will occur is approximately 
a  region located between Vietnam and the Philippines. The duration of the 
scenario is six months in order to allow for multiple “runs” by the logistic ships.  
 
Figure 37.  The layout of SIMIO logistics route (after Google 2014). 
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The simulation starts in Guam, which already handles the region’s logistics and is 
the closest U.S. controlled port to the SCS. Fuel arrives in Guam every six to eight days; 
this estimation of fuel arrival rate is based on a random normal distribution centered on 
eight days with a standard deviation of two days. Fuel is delivered to Guam at a capacity 
of 9,870,000 gallons to ensure there is no shortage of fuel for the T-AKEs. 
The T-AKEs then transfer fuel from the island. The fuel transfer duration is based 
on a random triangular distribution around eight, 10 and 14 hours. The T-AKE holds 
980,000 gallons of fuel. For SIMIO the total fuel the T-AKE holds is 900,000 gallons, 
which appears in SIMIO as the value of 90 individual 10,000 gallon increments. The ship 
then departs Guam transiting along a 1600nm transit leg leading to UNREP box one’s 
location outside of the expected DF-21 range. The transit speed is based on a random 
triangular distribution around 12, 15, and 20 knots. Upon reaching the UNREP box one, 
the T-AKE conducts fuel transfer onto the fuel ferry. 
The fuel transfer time for the fuel ferry is a random triangular distribution around 
three, five, and six hours. The fuel ferry holds 210,000 gallons, which is based on the 
635-ton storage capability of the JHSV. For the SIMIO software the value of the fuel 
ferry is 21 individual 10,000 gallon increments. The fuel ferry transits a 300 nautical mile 
leg to the second UNREP box two located within the DF-21 range, but outside the 
expected combat area by 100nm. The fuel ferry then conducts logistics transfer with the 
combatant. 
The combatant’s time to refuel is based on a random triangular distribution 
around two, three, and five hours. The quantity held is varied by tonnage within each 
simulation contained in the experiment. The combatant then transits to the combat area 
and discharges its fuel based on the designated fuel burn rate. The combat domain box is 
in the vicinity of the Spratly Islands, which is assumed to be the location with the highest 
conflict probability. This assumption is based on geographic location, a history of 
contention (British Broadcasting Company 2014), and reasons discussed in Chapter V 
Section A.2.a. 
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When each of these vehicles is idle (not in the act of refueling or transit) they 
return to the transfer point to await supply. The combatant remains at the combat UNREP 
box two, the Fuel ferry remains at UNREP box one, and the T-AKE waits at Guam if fuel 
is unavailable. The duration of the simulation is six months. 
Fuel burn rates were calculated and entered into SIMIO as either combat patrol or 
endurance burn rates. The combat patrol burn rates were generated using a triangular 
distribution. This distribution was used due to a limited number of data points pertaining 
to speeds and transfer rates that are available. Multiple runs using the triangular 
distribution were conducted, and the results can be seen in Table 18. Due to the volume 
of fuel required for the larger tonnage and larger quantity experiments, the total values 
were then reduced by 10,000 in order to allow for SIMIO to complete its simulation as 
derived from the data in Table 18. The values needed to be reduced because the student 
version of SIMIO is limited to 20,000 entities, which consist of vessels and the fuel they 
transport. 
 
Tonnage Single Ship Fuel Burn Rate per Hr.   SIMIO Value, Combatant Fuel Burn Rate per Hr. 
100 335.805 0.034 
200 533.057 0.053 
300 698.502 0.070 
400 914.363 0.091 
500 981.900 0.098 
600 1108.803 0.111 
700 1228.813 0.123 
800 1343.220 0.134 
900 1452.944 0.145 
1000 1558.668 0.156 
1500 1941.777 0.194 
2000 2014.475 0.201 
3000 2639.709 0.264 
4000 3197.780 0.320 
5000 3710.695 0.371 
6000 4190.277 0.419 
Table 18.   Combat fuel burn rates based on triangular distribution sample of speed. 
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Next, the fuel burn rate for endurance speed was calculated. The assumption of 15 
knots as the endurance speed was based off research on Jane’s fighting ships and other 
open sources (Global Security 2014b; Saunders 2013). Endurance is often explained 
based on speeds of 10 and 20 knots depending on the type/class of ship. The same 
equations were used and results shown Table 19, which are significantly different than 
the combat burn rates for SIMIO. 
 
Tonnage Single Ship Fuel Burn Rate per Hr.  SIMIO Values, Endurance Fuel Burn Rate per Hr. 
100 61.82 0.006 
200 98.13 0.010 
300 128.59 0.013 
400 155.78 0.016 
500 180.76 0.018 
600 204.13 0.020 
700 226.22 0.023 
800 247.28 0.025 
900 267.48 0.027 
1000 286.95 0.029 
1500 398.65 0.040 
2000 482.93 0.048 
3000 632.81 0.063 
4000 766.60 0.077 
5000 889.56 0.089 
6000 1004.53 0.100 
Table 19.   Endurance fuel burn rates based on triangular distribution sample. 
These values are what were used to build the SIMIO model. After the model was 
built and tested it then was set up as a SIMIO experiment. Again, the values in Table 18 




6. Design of Experiments 
The SIMIO software allows the user repeat the experiment a number of times and 
to vary different design aspects and parameters. The scenarios were based on number of 
ships in the action group (two, four, six, 10, 12, 14, and 16), and each will account for 
variations in the supply chain. These variations are:  
• four T-AKEs and four fuel ferries with 50 percent specified number of 
combatants, 
• four T-AKEs and eight fuel ferries 50 percent of specified number of 
combatants, and 
• eight T-AKEs and eight fuel ferries with specified number of combatants. 
These variations will be sorted by tonnage of the ships. Values held constant for 
each scenario are: 
• fuel capacity of the T-AKE, fuel ferry, and combatant. 
• fuel burn rates listed in Table 20 for combat speeds and Table 21, and 
• distance the T-AKE, fuel ferry, and combatant must travel to reach 
UNREP locations. 
The adjusted scenario experiment controls for combat and endurance speeds are 














Capacity in 10000 
Gal Increments 
Fuel Ferry Fuel 
Capacity in 10000 
Gal Increments 
T-AKE Fuel 
Capacity in 10000 
Gal Increments 
Combatant Fuel  
Burn Rate 
100 0.4451 21 90 0.03358 
200 1.1776 21 90 0.05331 
300 1.8517 21 90 0.049696 
400 2.6171 21 90 0.060203 
500 3.4707 21 90 0.069859 
600 3.9192 21 90 0.078889 
700 4.3434 21 90 0.122881 
800 5.3413 21 90 0.134322 
900 5.7776 21 90 0.145294 
1000 6.8867 21 90 0.155867 
1500 9.5676 21 90 0.194178 
2000 12.7493 21 90 0.201448 
3000 19.7438 21 90 0.263971 
4000 25.7578 21 90 0.319778 
5000 32.0242 21 90 0.371069 
6000 38.5739 21 90 0.419028 





Capacity in 10000 
Gal Increments 
Fuel Ferry Fuel 
Cap in 10000 Gal 
Increments 
T-AKE Fuel Cap in 
10000 Gal 
Increments 
Combatant Fuel  
Burn Rate 
100 0.4451 21 90 0.00618 
200 1.1776 21 90 0.00981 
300 1.8517 21 90 0.01286 
400 2.6171 21 90 0.01558 
500 3.4707 21 90 0.01808 
600 3.9192 21 90 0.02041 
700 4.3434 21 90 0.02262 
800 5.3413 21 90 0.02473 
900 5.7776 21 90 0.02675 
1000 6.8867 21 90 0.02869 
1500 9.5676 21 90 0.03986 
2000 12.7493 21 90 0.04829 
3000 19.7438 21 90 0.06328 
4000 25.7578 21 90 0.07666 
5000 32.0242 21 90 0.08896 
6000 38.5739 21 90 0.10045 
Table 21.   Adjusted SIMIO experiment controls for endurance speeds. 
An experiment consisted of each scenario executed 30 times to normalize the data 
(Ross 2009). After all scenarios were conducted, the SIMIO software provided an Excel 
spreadsheet with all data captured during the experiments. The value that was specifically 
targeted was idle time of the combatants for each experiment. Idle time begins after the 
combatant takes fuel for the first time, burns the fuel, and returns to the replenishment 
location where it would receive fuel from the fuel ferry. While no specific idle time was 
set to establish an acceptable standard, the highest number of the largest (tonnage) ships 
was selected as “the best.” 
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Figure 38.  Sample SIMIO experiment list. 
After successful completion of the various experiments, SIMIO provides results 
of all the data collected. With these results, the most ideal vessel tonnage can be selected. 
7. SIMIO Results 
The SIMIO software performed calculations for varying model inputs. SIMIO is 
capable of tracking the following parameters: fuel entering, transferring through, and 
exiting, vehicles transferring fuel, interactions at the servers (UNREP locations), and 
interactions between vehicles. The software model supplied average combatant idle time 
at the server. In addition, the SIMIO software will also output minimum, maximum, and 
average times. Combatant idle time at UNREP box two, which is located inside the DF-
21 range and outside the combat area, was used to track how well the logistics train 
functioned. The average and median idle times used for each combatant were recorded 
and placed into tables located in Appendix C. In order to discover the most likely tonnage 
range, stakeholder analysis was conducted. This involved establishment of the current 
JHSV and logistic ship capacity, and current USN patrol vessel tonnages focused the 
modeling on 500 to 4000 ton size vessels using flotilla sizes from one to sixteen. Initial 
analysis also included the amount of fuel burned during combat and endurance patrols 
along with assuming ship deployment for ten days with a single refueling. 
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The SIMIO output data in Appendix C show the simulated idle days for SSC 
tonnage variations, and multiple fuel ferry and T-AKE configurations. In general, the 
logistic force compositions with the least idle time were: 
• four fuel ferries and four T-AKEs, 
• eight fuel ferries and four T-AKEs, and 
• eight fuel ferries and eight T-AKEs.  
 The lowest idle time tonnage is shown in Table 22 and Table 23. 
a. Combat Patrol 
More than eight ships on combat patrol will have significant idle time, which in 
the scenario is 90 or more out of 182 days. This idle time accounts for approximately 50 
percent of the total simulation time. It appears there is not a specific tonnage that results 
in better performance in the combat patrol situation. There is no noticeable correlation to 
tonnage and endurance based on the calculations for 1C , 2C , or fuel burn rate. The lack 
of a clear dominant factor may be due to the variability in fuel ferry, T-AKE, and 
combatant speeds within SIMIO. The tonnage that appears the most often is the 800-ton 
combatant; however this ship would only be capable of operating for a few days at the 
combat speeds (as seen in Figure 36) dependent upon the acceptable replenishment level. 
The ship tonnage with the least idle time during combat patrol is provided in Table 22. 
Least Amount of Idle Days: Combat Patrol  
Ship Numbers 4 Fuel Ferry, 4 T-AKE 8 Fuel Ferry, 4 T-AKE 8 Fuel Ferry, 8 T-AKE 
1 Ship 4000 ton, 3% of time idle 4000 ton, 3% of time idle 4000 ton, 2% of time idle 
2 Ship 3000 ton, 1% of time idle 3000 ton, 1% of time idle 3000 ton, 1% of time idle 
3 Ship 500 ton, <1% of time idle 600 ton, <1% of time idle 900 ton, <1% of time idle 
4 Ship 500/600 ton, <1% of time idle 700-900 ton, 1% of time idle 900 ton, <1% of time idle 
5 Ship 500/600 ton, <1% of time idle 800/900 ton, <1% of time idle 800 ton, <1% of time idle 
6 Ship 600/1500 ton, 25% of time idle 700 ton, 25% of time idle 900/4000 ton, 18% of time 
 7 Ship 4000 ton, 42% of time idle 4000 ton, 42% of time idle 4000 ton, 31% of time idle 
8 Ship 4000 ton, 42% of time idle 4000 ton, 42% of time idle 4000 ton, 31% of time idle 
9 Ship Idle ~50% of time Idle ~50% of time Idle ~50% of time 
10 Ship Idle ~50% of time Idle ~50% of time Idle ~50% of time 
11 Ship Idle ~50% of time Idle ~50% of time Idle ~50% of time 
12 Ship Idle ~50% of time Idle ~50% of time Idle ~50% of time 
13 Ship Idle ~50% of time Idle ~50% of time Idle ~50% of time 
14 Ship Idle ~50% of time Idle ~50% of time Idle ~50% of time 
15 Ship Idle ~50% of time Idle ~50% of time Idle ~50% of time 
16 Ship Idle ~50% of time Idle ~50% of time Idle ~50% of time 
Table 22.   Ship tonnage with least amount of idle days during combat patrol. 
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It was observed that for combat patrol the smaller 500–900 ton ships have the 
lowest idle time in groups of three to six ships. For one to three ship groups as well as 
seven to eight ship groups, 1000–3000 ton ships are the better choice for less idle time. 
These ships have endurance time exceeding eight days, as observed from the data in 
Figure 36. The graph representing the percentage of time the flotilla is idle for combat 
patrols is provided in Appendix C. 
After completing the experiment for the combat patrol, new burn rates were used 
to conduct endurance patrol simulations. The endurance speeds were based on 15 knots. 
The same number of runs and controls that were applied in the combat speed experiments 
were used. 
b. Endurance Patrol 
An indication of which ship tonnage would have the smallest amount of idle time 
on an endurance patrol can be derived using Table 23. 
Least Amount of Idle Days: Endurance Patrol  
Number 
of Ships 4 Fuel Ferry, 4 T-AKE 8 Fuel Ferry, 4 T-AKE 8 Fuel Ferry, 8 T-AKE 
1 Ship 900 ton, 2% of time idle 900 ton, 2% of time idle 900 ton, 2% of time idle 
2 Ship 3000 ton, 1% of time idle 3000 ton, 1% of time idle 3000 ton, 1% of time idle 
3 Ship 500 ton, <1% of time idle 600 ton, <1% of time idle 600 ton, <1% of time idle 
4 Ship 500/600  ton, <1% of time 
idle 
500-900 ton, <1% of time 
idle 
700-900 ton, <1% of time 
idle 
5 Ship 500/600 ton, 25% of time idle 600-900 ton, 25% of time idle 
700-900 ton, <1% of time 
idle 
6 Ship 500/600 ton, 23% of time idle 1500 ton, 23% of time idle 1500 ton, 23% of time idle 
7 Ship 700 ton, 23% of time 700 ton, 23% of time 700 ton, 23% of time 
8 Ship Idle ~50% of time Idle ~50% of time Idle ~50% of time 
9 Ship Idle ~50% of time Idle ~50% of time Idle ~50% of time 
10 Ship Idle ~50% of time Idle ~50% of time Idle ~50% of time 
11 Ship Idle ~50% of time Idle ~50% of time Idle ~50% of time 
12 Ship Idle ~50% of time Idle ~50% of time Idle ~50% of time 
13 Ship Idle ~50% of time Idle ~50% of time Idle ~50% of time 
14 Ship Idle ~50% of time Idle ~50% of time Idle ~50% of time 
15 Ship Idle ~50% of time Idle ~50% of time Idle ~50% of time 
16 Ship Idle ~50% of time Idle ~50% of time Idle ~50% of time 
Table 23.   The tonnage with least amount of idle days during endurance patrol. 
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Additionally, as the numbers of ships increase the ship tonnage decreases. This 
result is expected as the ships would require less fuel per visit and the slower and more 
consistent combatants’ speed would allow time for the T-AKE and the fuel ferry to transit 
between stations. Again, any quantity over seven ships creates extensive idle days. 
However, the ships in the range of 500 to 600 tons result in the fewest idle days and the 
largest group sizes. These ships would provide six to eight days of endurance and 0.5 to 
1.5 days of combat patrol depending on which replenishment levels were acceptable 
based on data from Figure 35. The graph representing percentage of time the flotilla is 
idle for endurance patrol is provided in Appendix C. 
Finally, the data was compared between combat and endurance patrols from Table 
22, Table 23, and Appendix C. The ship tonnage that had the lowest idle time and closest 
matching idle time are listed in Table 25. 
In order to determine ideal tonnage, the idle time for cruising and combat speeds 
were compared. This comparison takes into account that ships will not only conduct 
combat operations, but also patrol and transit operations. An example of this comparison 





Scenario Average Average Scenario 
Double_JHSV_500 5.3365 1.1851 4.1514 Double_JHSV_500 
Double_JHSV_600 5.3312 1.1839 4.1473 Double_JHSV_600 
Double_JHSV_700 5.5926 2.9348 2.6578 Double_JHSV_700 
Double_JHSV_800 5.5497 1.0673 4.4824 Double_JHSV_800 
Double_JHSV_900 5.2749 3.1434 2.1315 Double_JHSV_900 
Double_JHSV_1000 2.8996 2.3556 5.2552 Double_JHSV_1000 
Double_JHSV_1500 2.1676 4.0198 6.1874 Double_JHSV_1500 
Double_JHSV_2000 2.6841 0.5523 3.2364 Double_JHSV_2000 
Double_JHSV_3000 2.5006 0.5882 3.0888 Double_JHSV_3000 
Double_JHSV_4000 3.1981 1.2336 1.9645 Double_JHSV_4000 
Table 24.   Sample table for estimating ideal tonnage. 
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As highlighted by the data, the fewest number of idle days for cruising speed was 
for the 1500 ton vessel. The lowest idle time for the combat speed was the 4000 ton 
vessel. However, by comparing the median of the average idle times, the 2000 ton has the 
smallest difference. A small difference in idle time provides insight into which ship is 
best-suited for both combat and patrol operations. Next, the comparison is made for the 
endurance patrol, and then the same process is used to find the “best overall.” 
The ideal tonnage for both the combat and endurance fuel burn rates appears to be 
approximately 2000 tons (1000-3000). A 2000 ton ship would provide a five to nine day 
patrol window at endurance speeds, and a 1.5 to 2.5 day patrol window at combat speeds; 
both which are replenishment-level dependent. However, any quantity over seven ships 
creates idle time with a median of 90 days, which is approximately 50 percent of the total 
experiment days. 
 
Tonnage With Closest Idle Days Comparing Combat and Cruise Speeds 
Number of 
Ships 4 Fuel Ferry, 4 T-AKE 8 Fuel Ferry, 4 T-AKE 8 Fuel Ferry, 8 T-AKE 
1 Ship 3000 ton, 7% of time idle 2000 ton, 7% of time idle 1500 ton, 9% of time idle 
2 Ship 3000 ton, <1% of time idle 2000 ton, <1% of time idle 300 ton, <1% of time idle 
3 Ship 500 ton, <1% of time idle 500 ton, <1% of time idle 600 ton, <1% of time idle 
4 Ship 600 ton, <1% of time idle 600 ton, <1% of time idle 800 ton, <1% of time idle 
5 Ship 600 ton, <1% of time idle 700 ton, <1% of time idle 700 ton, <1% of time idle 
6 Ship 1500 ton, 24% of time idle 1500 ton, 24% of time idle 3000 ton,25% of time idle 
7 Ship 1000 ton, 47% of time idle 2000 ton, 46% of time idle 900 ton, 47% of time idle 
8 Ship 1000 ton, 49% of time idle 2000 ton, 49% of time idle 2000 ton,48% of time idle 
9 Ship Idle ~50% of time Idle ~50% of time Idle ~50% of time 
10 Ship Idle ~50% of time Idle ~50% of time Idle ~50% of time 
11 Ship Idle ~50% of time Idle ~50% of time Idle ~50% of time 
12 Ship Idle ~50% of time Idle ~50% of time Idle ~50% of time 
13 Ship Idle ~50% of time Idle ~50% of time Idle ~50% of time 
14 Ship Idle ~50% of time Idle ~50% of time Idle ~50% of time 
15 Ship Idle ~50% of time Idle ~50% of time Idle ~50% of time 
16 Ship Idle ~50% of time Idle ~50% of time Idle ~50% of time 
Table 25.    Combat and endurance patrol tonnage with closest matching days. 
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It appears the ideal tonnage for both the combat and endurance fuel burn rates is 
near 2000 tons. However, any quantity over seven ships creates an idle time that is 50 
percent of the total simulations time. Due to significant idle time for a 15-ship flotilla, a 
single run simulation was conducted. For this simulation, a single variable was adjusted, 
while all other remained fixed values. The results from these simulations are located in 
Appendix C. The results signify that another method or a reduced distance to the T-AKE 
may be required. Another means to address the deficiency is to have a larger number of 
ships rotate into the combat area. Based on a simple SIMIO model, an improved fuel 
ferry is the most efficient means to reduce idle time. Simulation improvements tested 
were increased cruising speed and capacity, both of which reduced overall idle time. 
Another means to reduce idle time could be forward positioning of logistic assets within 
the region of conflict, which was not tested. 
8. Logistics Takeaways 
There are potential threats from ASCMs and ASBM in various locations 
throughout the world. Operating in these A2AD threat areas requires a new concept for 
the logistics train and equipment. Understanding the drivers for logistics in a specific area 
has been the focus of this section. The use of fuel was found to be the most significant 
resource to resupply, since combat evolutions and “peace time” steaming both demand 
fuel usage. While food and weaponry logistics were also considered, the impact on the 
total weight was comparably less significant than fuel.  
Calculations for fuel capacity and burn rates were necessary to further understand 
and apply the logistics concept. The rates and capacities were determined using basic 
formulas and calculations. The results provided could be improved with modifications to 
the propulsion systems, including gearing and hybrid drives, as well as changes in fuel 
source. Additionally, while some consideration was paid to hull design through the use of 
the 2C , future hull designs could improve efficiency as well. The analysis has shown that 
patrol times are not only affected by fuel burn rate, but by doctrine as well. The 
determination of when to refuel could add days to an endurance patrol and hours to a 
combat patrol. These days could determine the outcome of a battle.  
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The SSC concept has been narrowed from a 500 ton to 4000 ton to a 1000 ton to 
2000 ton ship concept. These ships could operate in groups up to five or six ships 
depending on which platforms are available, and more importantly developed for vessels 
such as the fuel ferry. However, changing the logistic platform types to vessels such as T-
AOs and T-AOEs allow for more available capacity (which comes at the expense of the 
ability to move food, parts, and weapons). These larger ships could provide a fuel 
resource to support a larger force size or larger ships. 
Future analysis is required to provide investigate the potential for land based 
replenishment in various regions throughout the world. Additionally, the effects on 
potential future propulsion systems such as diesel electric propulsion, turbine propulsion 
(as the analysis conducted pertains to diesel engines), improved transmission systems, 
and developing propellers or water jet designs could provide further avenues toward a 
successful ship design. 
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VI. COST ANALYSIS 
The cost estimation results play an important role in the major program 
acquisition decision making. Cost estimation provides the basis and quantitative 
benchmark for the program planning and budgeting of the new platform which includes 
the cost of new construction, maintenance and the operational cost of deploying the 
vessel. In this study, a cost estimate has been developed in order to establish a sound cost 
estimating relationship based on the displacement of the proposed small surface 
combatant (SSC). This evolution has been determined by analyzing the statistical data of 
the current fleet’s smaller surface combatant and their respective program acquisition 
costs. The finalized cost estimating model will be useful in predicting the total life cycle 
cost of building, owning and operating the proposed SSC for the U.S. fleet in the 2025–
2030 timeframe. All monetary values are in FY2014$ unless otherwise specified 
A. BACKGROUND 
The cost estimating effort objective is to provide a reliable life cycle cost estimate 
(LCCE) for the proposed SSC. These estimates are based on historical lead ship 
“theoretical first unit cost”  from several surface combatant platforms with similar 
characteristics. The purpose is to provide a detailed LCCE, which is an estimate of the 
total expected cost of a system or program. LCCE includes research, development, 
testing, and evaluation (RDT&E), procurement, operations and support (O&S), and 
disposal costs. The results from these methodical analysis tools, in conjunction with the 
results of the modeling and simulation (M&S) and logistic analysis, will provide the 
decision maker with appropriate data to establish trade-offs and evaluate the SSC cost 
effectiveness. The LCCE will serve as one set of decision factors to aid in trade space 
evaluation and feasibility analysis for a small surface missile delivery platform to 
augment U.S. Naval fleet in the 2025–2030 timeframe.  
Cost estimation is traditionally accomplished by utilizing one of three approved 
methods: build-up, analogy or parametric (Nussbaum 2014b). Care should be taken to 
 119 
analyze the model’s strengths and weaknesses with relation to a given application to 
ensure the model delivers optimal results. 
B. COST ESTIMATION METHOD SELECTION 
The engineering build-up method requires a more robust design consideration 
baseline. Information on every item such as maintenance, logistics, industrial facilities 
are critical in developing an accurate estimate. The SSC is still in the conceptual phase; 
no prototype currently exists to provide an initial assessment of operations and 
maintenance. Therefore, it is difficult to collect the needed detailed information that is 
required to use the engineering build-up method, and thus that method is not used in this 
study. 
Analogy is a second method that is available for cost estimators. It allows the 
estimator to use the robust cost and technical data compared to the most analogous 
existing systems. Using this method, one relationship of the two systems is leveraged to 
determine an estimate for the new system. For example, if a new platform is assessed as 
20% more technologically advanced than an existing system, the estimator can apply a 
20% increase in cost for the new system 1T  estimate. So if the “old” system is $100 
million, the new system can be expected to cost approximately $120 million. For this 
study, the analogy method is used to calculate the SSC O&S cost. The Littoral Combat 
Ship’s (LCS) annual O&S cost data is used as a model for the SSC O&S cost. The SSC 
will operate in similar environments to the LCS and will, therefore, presumably have 
similar O&S requirements. 
Finally, the parametric method looks at several similar systems through regression 
analysis and seeks costing relationships within the group. As with the analogy method, 
the various systems’ cost data used in the model must be sufficient to provide a credible 
new system estimate. The cost analysis team determined the SSC cost by using regression 
analysis utilizing similar surface combatants and displacement comparisons. With the 
benefits in mind, the parametric method was used in this study, and by varying the 
displacement of the SSC we were able to explore trade-space. Through stakeholder input 
and the efforts realized in other sections of this study, we have determined an optimal 
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SSC minimum displacement of 600 long tons and a maximum displacement of 1500 long 
tons. 
Using the LCCE process, a cost estimate and annual O&S cost per ship was 
determined taking into account the desired total number of ships and the anticipated years 
of service. In addition, the cost analysis priced possible SSC alternatives, to include the 
expected cost of modifying and integrating the LCS or national security cutter based 
“patrol frigate” with an equivalent surface-to-surface strike missile system. 
Costs are summed using a work breakdown structure (WBS). The WBS definition 
is “a product-oriented family tree composed of hardware, software, services, data, and 
facilities which results from systems engineering efforts during the development and 
production of a defense material item” (Nussbaum 2014d). A well-developed WBS 
provides a comprehensive system or program cost breakdown, and ultimately results in 
an accurate cost estimate. The build-up is the most valuable method when there is known 
cost data for every WBS item because the program manager (PM) is enabled to track and 
compare actual cost versus budgeted cost. An example of a WBS hierarchy is in 
Appendix B. 
C. ASSUMPTIONS 
The following assumptions were made for the duration of the cost estimating 
process in this study: 
• The SSC is envisioned to augment and interoperate with the expected fleet 
in 2025. To this end, for a cost effective design, the SSC has minimal self-
defense and sensor capabilities. The protective measures for the platform 
are provided by other force platforms (both surface and air assets) in the 
operational area. 
• The LCS and SSC will operate together and will require similar O&S 
budgets to perform their respective missions. 
• A correlated assumption is the LCS will be fitted with an ASW capability. 
• AAW will be provided by CRUDES ships and/or coalition air assets in the 
operational area. 
• The expected service life of the SSC is 20 years. 
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• The historical 1T  ship data, regardless of commissioning date, is expected 
to be accurate and provide the best information for conducting a LCCE on 
the SSC.  
• The shipbuilding learning curve for the SSC is 85 percent, based on the 
ship construction historical average (Mislick 2014). 
D. METHODOLOGY 
The parametric method was used to estimate the life cycle cost of the platform. 
This technique is iterative and comprised of six steps: definition and planning, data 
collection, estimate formation, review and presentation, risk and uncertainty analysis and 














Figure 39.  Cost estimating process (from Nussbaum 2014b). 
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We will now define each key step of the process, and illustrate the application of each 
step into the overall cost estimation of the proposed SSC. 
1. Definition and Planning 
The definition and planning phase is appropriate when utilizing any problem-
solving algorithm. Before any attempt to address this phase, the problem must be fully 
defined. To reiterate, this study analyzes the U.S. Navy’s lack of a modern, cost-effective 
surface-to-surface missile delivery platform. The delineation of capital shipping is 
important. For this study, capital shipping is a term referring to destroyer (or larger) ship 
classes. Therefore, platforms such as frigates, LCSs, and other small surface combatants 
are possible solutions for missile delivery. This distinction is important because 
retrofitting any capital shipping does not truly provide a cost effective solution since 
modern day surface combatants are multi-mission capable, and, therefore, this method is 
an uneconomical solution to address the capability gap. 
Through this iterative process, the model is designed to answer the following 
questions:  
• How many ships are necessary? 
• How big does the ship need to be?  
The definition and planning effort within the phase allows the freedom to consider 
all possible variables as equal contributors in providing a sufficient problem solution. 
As a result, the problem can be summarized into a single statement: The U.S. 
Navy requires a surface combatant that is small, fast, distributed, cost effective, and 
capable of augmenting the envisioned fleet of 2025 by delivering a surface-to-surface 
missile to the enemy in an environment that is navigationally constraining for capital 
shipping. 
2. Data Collection 
The data collection phase involves taking results developed in the definition and 
planning phase and establishing cost estimate similarities with existing systems or 
platforms in order to develop a cost estimating relationship (CER). The CER binds 
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applicable O&S categories to  cost for use in the cost estimating process. As described 
in the assumptions, several historical surface combatant platforms have similar 
characteristics to those desired in the SSC, and, therefore, can provide accurate cost data 
for the analysis of this new platform. Initial platforms considered included:  
• Oliver Hazard Perry class frigates (FFG-7), 
• Flight I (DDG-51), Flight II (DDG-72) and Flight IIA (DDG-79) Arleigh 
Burke class destroyers,  
• Freedom (LCS-1) and Independence (LCS-2) class Littoral Combat Ships 
and 
• Egyptian Ambassador MK III corvette (manufactured in the United States) 
(American Maritime International 2010). 
A breakdown of each ship class and its respective characteristics is in Table 26. 
 



















FFG 4100 29 5000 18 453 22 205 367  
DDG FLT I/II 6794 30 4400 20 505 31 281 2422  
DDG FLT IIA 9203 30 4400 20 509.5 31 350 2074  
LCS Freedom 




2771 45.5 4300 19 418 14 75 773  
Ambassador 
MK III 490 41 2000 15 199 6.6 36 326  
Table 26.   Surface combatant characteristics.3 
During the initial stakeholder interviews and in using an initial needs analysis, it 
was determined that the SSC should have a displacement around 600 long tons, a 
3 (After Destroyer History Foundation 2013; Global Security 2014a; United States Navy Fact File 
2013b; Labs 2008; United States Navy Fact File 2013c; Naval Sea Systems Command 2012; American 
Maritime International 2010). 
 124 
                                                 
nominal range of 2500nm, and must be capable of exceeding 40 knots. While researching 
several surface combatants within these respective ranges, additional data was 
determined to be useful. This data included ship’s length, cruising speed, navigational 
draft, crew size and displacement. We determined, through regression analysis, that the 
“best fit” relationship was displacement to cost. Using this information, the SSC cost is 
modeled as a function of its tonnage. The upper bound to maintain cost effectiveness in 
FY2014$ is $700 million (the 1T  cost of the LCS). 
3. Estimate Formation 
The initial stakeholder discussions involved a platform with a 600 long ton 
displacement for missile delivery. As performance and logistics analysis matured, it was 
determined that the top of the displacement range should be 1500 long tons. The initial 
results are illustrated in Figure 40. The best-fit equation for the initial cost estimating 
relationship was determined to be: 
 
 COST $41,104,775.47 $247,030.16* DISPLACEMENT= + .  (5) 
 
Figure 40.  Expected SSC 1T   cost versus displacement in FY2014$. 
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The regression data is provided in Appendix B (Model #1 regression). The 
numbers displayed in Figure 40 are reasonable for this study since they are relatively 
close to the  cost of the Freedom (LCS-1). The envisioned SSC 600–1500 ton 
displacement costs are a fraction of that of the first LCS. If these figures exceed the LCS 
 cost, the decision maker will be unable to consider Equation (5) as a viable cost 
effective solution because, in this case, it would be more cost effective to redesign the 
LCS platform for missile delivery. 
4. Review and Presentation 
The review and presentation phase permits the cost estimator to conduct his or her 
own review of the data as well as to perform an analysis to identify and correct any 
deficiencies and errors prior to presentation. Once the initial work is complete, the 
estimator will present the product to an independent viewer for improvement 
recommendations. 
An SME assessed the preliminary model and suggested implementing a 
shipbuilding learning curve (85%) (Mislick 2014), which helps illustrate how follow-on 
ships for each particular class will have a lower “sticker price” as the workforce becomes 
more efficient with the construction process. The learning curve provides a better method 
to determine  cost, and ultimately leads to a more accurate estimate for the entire 
program. The O&S costs of manpower, operations, maintenance, sustainment support, 
system improvement, and indirect support have historical ratios that are a function of the 
estimated  platform cost. The applicable LCS platform ratios from Chapter VI Section 
C determine the O&S costs. The benefits of using these ratios are twofold: first, the two 
platforms are similar, and second, the envisioned operations are similar. 
5. Risk and Uncertainty Analysis 
The risk and uncertainty analysis utilizes the  data from the following ships: the 
Spruance class destroyer (DD-963), the Oliver Hazard Perry class frigate (FFG-7), the 
Ticonderoga class cruiser (CG-47), the Arleigh Burke-class destroyer (DDG-51), and the 
Freedom (LCS-1) and Independence (LCS-2) classes of LCS. Costs per thousand tons of 
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lightship displacement (the weight of the vessel without its crew, weapons, fuel, and 
material) (Labs 2008) are the basis for the cost figures. Using this data in conjunction 
with the LCS’s selected acquisition report (SAR), the new regression model better 
reflects the expected  cost of the proposed SSC. The  data for the identified ships are 
listed in Table 27. 
Platform Displacement  (LT) 
Cost factor  








Spruance Class 7800 260 2028 2261 
Oliver Hazard Perry 
Class 4100 250 1025 1143 
Ticonderoga Class 10,700 410 4408 4914 
Arleigh Burke Class 8300-9800 390 3594 4008 
Freedom Class 3700 N/A 637 700 
Independence Class 3400 N/A 704 773 
Table 27.   Summary of 1T  Data for the Revised CER Model4 
Using the data in Table 27 and taking into account displacement as the key cost 
driver, a new CER function representing a better “apples-to-apples” comparison of each 
of the platforms was developed and, therefore, allows for a more accurate projection of 
the expected cost of the SSC. Figure 41 illustrates the initial results and Equation (6) 
represents the revised CER: 
 $ 616,522,049.92 $466,456.53 .COST DISPLACEMENT= − + ×  (6) 
A summary of 1T  data for the revised CER model is provided in Figure 41. 
4 (After Labs 2008; NavSource Naval History n.d.; United States Navy Fact File 2013a; United States 
Navy Fact File 2013b; United States Navy Fact File 2013c) . 
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Figure 41.  A summary graph of 1T  data for the revised CER model.5 
The regression data is provided in Appendix B (Model # 2 regression). The model 
results present a challenge in the evaluation of a cost-effective surface combatant. The 
Ticonderoga class cruiser and Arleigh Burke class destroyer are not similar to the 
proposed SSC; they are highly-capable, multi-platform ships and categorized as capital 
shipping. In order to conduct a credible cost estimate, the analysis was revised to look at 
more analogous ships having a similar design and capability to the SSC. As the graph in 
Figure 41 demonstrates, this model is not useful in determining small displacement ships. 
6. Final Document 
The final document must provide “a means for other analysts to reproduce our 
work” (Nussbaum 2014c) and must be understandable by non-engineers. The final 
document needs to make sense first and foremost, but like all estimates, it must be 
credible and reliable. The first two models discussed above failed to meet the reliability 
criteria. The first model used average cost (instead of ) and the second leveraged data 
5 (After Labs 2008; NavSource Naval History n.d.; United States Navy Fact File 2013a; United States 
Navy Fact File 2013b; United States Navy Fact File 2013c). 
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from platforms which did not have similar characteristics as the envisioned SSC (it used 
capital shipping data). In order to ensure the decision maker has credible and reliable 
data, model three utilizes combatant platforms that most closely resemble the concept of 
the SSC. The analogous ships for this revised study includes: the Oliver Hazard Perry 
class frigate, the Freedom and Independence class LCS, and the Egyptian Ambassador 
Mk III. The United States builds the MK III and is very close in specifications to the 
proposed SSC. As a result, the MK III will also serve as a benchmark in the evaluation of 
the final cost analysis. The revised characteristics are outlined in Table 28. 
 
Class Displacement T1 Cost  (in FY2014$) 
Oliver Hazard Perry Class Frigate 4100  $   1,142,600,000  
Freedom Class LCS 2617  $    699,800,000  
Independence Class LCS 2771  $    773,400,000  
Egyptian Ambassador MK III 490  $    322,500,000  
Table 28.   Further revised small surface combatant ship displacement versus cost in 
FY2014$.6 
With this new data outlined in Table 28 and Figure 42, we determine the best-fit 
cost using an estimating relationship with the following equation: 
 COST $179,667,412.14 $222,452.43* .DISPLACEMENT= +   (7) 
Initial results are shown in Figure 42. 
6(After Global Security 2014a; Naval Sea Systems Command 2012; American Maritime International 
2010; Labs 2008). 
 
 129 
                                                 
 
Figure 42.  Final SCC 1T  cost versus displacement FY2014$. 
The expected cost for a SSC with a displacement within the range of 600 to 1500 
long tons is shown in Figure 42. The possible displacement trade space is a narrowed 
down to this range because of information gathered in the initial stakeholder interviews 
and logistics analysis. The stakeholder analysis revealed a desired displacement of 600 
long tons (lower bound). The logistics analysis discovered a significant improvement in 
on-station time for 1500 long ton SSC versus a 600 long ton SSC and thus resulted in the 




Figure 43.  1T  cost versus displacement in FY2014$. 
The estimated trade space is between $183 million (600 LT vessel on the lower 
bound line) and $513 million (1500 LT vessel on the higher bound line). Figure 43 only 
includes models #1 and #3 because model #2 did not provide relevant cost data. 
Additionally, results from M&S help to determine that 15 is the desired number of 
small combatant ships needed to win the proposed scenario in the South China Sea 
(SCS). In addition to the 15 required, risk, presence and deterrence are significant in the 
AOR and must be considered as well. In accounting for externalities and other combatant 
commander requirements, we determined 30 to be a safe estimate of the requirement for 
these ships in the SCS.  
Also applicable in this final analysis is the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review 
(QDR) guidance, which states the following:  
If deterrence fails at any given time, U.S. forces will be capable of 
defeating a regional adversary in a large-scale multi-phased campaign, and 
denying the objectives of – or imposing unacceptable costs on – a second 
aggressor in another region (Hagel 2014). 
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As stated in the QDR, the proposed fleet must be able to win a conflict in the 
South China Sea while also maintaining a significant advantage with a second aggressor 
in another region. This number (45) is determined by assuming the required fleet size in 
the SCS is 30 (the number required to defeat a regional adversary in a large scale fight as 
discussed above in the QDR quote) and an additional 15 additional SSCs are required to 
deny a second aggressor elsewhere. The SSC construction learning curve is in Figure 44. 
 
Figure 44.  Expected learning curve for the construction of the SSC in 
FY2014$. 
Next, the model can estimate the total cost of a program by estimating the lot cost 
in Equations (8) and (9) (Nussbaum 2014a) as follows: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) 11 2 ,
Nb b b b
N x
CT A A A N A x
=
= + + = ∑   (8) 
where NCT  is the total cost of a lot size of N  units, A  is the cost of the initial unit 





































with values $513A =  million and ( ) ( )2 ln ln 2 0.23446b b= = . Using Equation (9) the 
proposed 45-ship program total acquisition cost is $18,821,844,898 or approximately 
$18.8 billion.  
The next step is to estimate the annual per ship O&S costs by category. Utilizing 
the same ratios of the  cost for the LCS, we determine using the model the expected 
cost of the SSC for each of the O&S categories. Figure 45 contains the associated 
percentage of each cost category as a function of total O&S cost. This information is 
outlined to create a further trade space for follow-on study.  
 
Figure 45.  Operating and support costs by category for the proposed SSC 
FY2014$. 
This study assumes a 20-year service life as outlined in Chapter VI Section C 
starting in 2014 and also an expedited shipbuilding plan of five craft per year (based on 
an average of four and one half per year to meet the 2025 deadline), the expected 10-year 
O&S cost for the program is estimated to be roughly $167 million per ship. The annual 
O&S breakdown for the SSC is contained in Table 29.  
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Small Surface Combatant  
O&S Cost by Category per year 
(in FY2014$) 
Operational Cost 
for a 10 year 
period 
(in FY2014$) 
Unit-Level Manpower $      5,501,708  $     55,017,082.51  
Unit Operations  $      6,088,557   $     60,885,571.31  
Maintenance  $      4,548,079   $     45,480,788.21  
Sustaining Support  $      3,887,874   $     38,878,738.31  
Continuing System Improvements  $      5,354,996   $     53,549,960.31  
Indirect Support  $      1,980,615   $     19,806,149.70  
Other  $                 -     $                      -    
Total Unitized Cost  $    27,361,829   $        273,618,290  
Table 29.   Ten-year per ship O&S calculations (after Naval Sea Systems Command 
2012). 
Finally, we aggregated these figures across the proposed 45-ship program the total 
cost of acquisition is $18,821,844,898 (approximately $18.8 billion for 45 ships) and the 
total O&S cost of a 45-ship program for 10 years of operation is $ $12,312,823,066. 
Additional considerations include an estimated disposal cost of $1,974,279 ($21.2 
million) per ship or $ $88,707,543.22 ($88 billion) for the 45-ship program. 
This total estimated cost for the entire 45-craft SSC program at $31,223,375,507 
(roughly $31 billion) in FY 2014$. 
E. WEAPON SYSTEM CONCEPT EXPLORATION 
The small surface combatant is just one (albeit major) puzzle piece to the solution 
of a needed surface-to-surface missile capability; the other being the missile system itself. 
Although several possibilities exist for the missile system used on the proposed SSC, the 
Navy has invested significantly in the RDT&E of LRASM. For this reason, the following 
cost estimating exercise provides a detailed assessment of the total expected LCCE for a 




• R&D: Research and Development. In this context R&D describes the 
funding of Navy Research and Development efforts. 
• LRASM: Long Range Anti-Ship Missile. Developed by the Lockheed 
Martin Corporation, the LRASM is a possible surface-to-surface missile 
system for the next generation fleet composition. 
2. Option Exploration and Analysis 
Several options exist to address this surface-to-surface missile capability gap. The 
current decision space must consider either an entirely new platform or retrofitting an 
existing platform such as a DDG or LCS. Extensive consideration to modifying the LCS 
with a surface-to-surface missile (SSM) has occurred. The LCS appears more fitting 
because the DDG is capital shipping and too valuable to risk in the SSM exchange. 
Performing a formal cost estimate designed to determine the LCCE for the next 
surface-to-surface missile is challenging because the specifics (missile system and 
associated ship load outs) have not been determined. Looking into the missile Navy R&D 
funding does not provide much additional insight due to several systems still in 
consideration. However, the U.S. Navy currently has a five-year funding stream for the 
long range anti-ship missile (LRASM) development which (currently) far exceeds other 
funding streams in this sector. The LRASM funding stream is displayed in Figure 46. 
 
 
Figure 46.  USN OASuW funding stream (from Defense Industry Daily 
2014a). 
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We can analyze Figure 46 and assume the classic weapon system life cycle cost 
percentages of RDT&E (11 percent), production and acquisition (77 percent), and O&S 
(12 percent) (Galorath 2009). Next we extrapolate a system LCCE, with the cost of the 
LRASM program for this study is $10.2 billion as demonstrates can be demonstrated 
from the data in Table 30. 
 
LRASM Life Cycle Cost Estimate 
LCCE Category Cost Percentage of  Total Program 
RDT&E  $           1,126,000,000  11% 
Procurement and 
Acquisition  $           7,882,000,000  77% 
O&S  $           1,228,363,636  12% 
Total  $         10,236,363,636    
Total missiles needed 3708 60% of current TLAM inventory  
Cost per missile 
(on average)  $                  2,760,616         
Table 30.   LRASM life cycle cost estimate. 
To determine the estimated total missiles in the LRASM program the analysis 
assumption of the current 4180 Tomahawk missiles in inventory (Federation of American 
Scientists 2014b) 60 percent (2508) will be retired to make room for the ship based 
LRASM. The air study (SEA-20B) estimates a LRASM need of approximately 840 
additional missiles. Additionally, the modeling and simulation efforts determined a need 
for 360 additional missiles (45 ships with 8 missiles each). The total LRASM program 
inventory requirement is then at 3708 missiles as shown in Figure 46. By dividing the 
$10.2 billion program cost across 3708 missiles, we get an average per missile cost of 
$2.7 million each. Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) estimate the additional cost of 
integrating a weapon system at “50 percent the cost of the actual weapon system” 
(Solitario 2014). Assuming eight missiles per ship plus a 50 percent markup for ship 
integration costs puts the LRASM price tag at $33,127,392 per ship. To demonstrate this 
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idea, assuming the original  cost of the Freedom (LCS-1) is $700 million (Naval Sea 
Systems Command 2012) and a LRASM system costs approximately $22.1 million 
(which includes the cost of the necessary canisters and eight missiles). Integration costs, 
again  are estimated at approximately $11 million, bringing the final cost of the 
Freedom with LRASM to $733 million. 
Another competing ship design option for the SSC is a new frigate design. With 
two variants for the Navy to ultimately choose between, the “patrol frigate” design 
utilizes the Coast Guard national security cutter as a baseline and modified for the Navy’s 
specific needs. Several advantages exist for the Navy to adopt this approach. First, it’s 
easier to meet a short deadline because the needed infrastructure is already in place since 
Ingalls has made six of the eight ships slated for U.S. Coast Guard use.  
Some issues do exist with using this platform to fill the surface-to-surface missile 
gap. The proposed designs, which are multi-mission platforms, include the patrol frigate 
4501 and the patrol frigate 4921. Therefore, investment in these designs will inevitably 
involve longer service lives and ultimately a much higher annual O&S cost per ship; both 
of which make the investment much higher. Even if the Navy chooses to invest in a new 
patrol frigate, the Navy will still have a surface-to-surface missile capability-gap. The 
patrol frigate seems to address the larger issue of cost effective presence around the world 
and self-defense, but lacks that missile punch the Navy needs in the very near future. In 
the end, the U.S. Navy and key military decision makers need to define their 
interpretation of the term “cost-effective.”   
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VII. RECOMMENDATIONS 
While the South China Sea (SCS) was a focus in this project, there are many other 
areas in the region, which may demand attention. Future research on the impact of the 
SSC in these regions will provide continued and refined insights into the capabilities and 
possible operations of these ships. Worldwide there are many regions to investigate such 
as the Baltic Sea, Black Sea, Mediterranean Sea, and the Red Sea. The investigation into 
the SSC’s capabilities against the dominant nations of these regions and the non-state 
entities that operate as well would yields new CONOPS and possibly new requirements 
for the future SSC.  
Combat operations future research could be focused on the proposed modified 
LCS or new frigate detailed design. The ability for the SSC to operate in conjunction with 
these vessels would improve the performance of each in a symbiotic way. With the 
potential improvement in air defense for the armada, the SSC would be capable of 
plunging deeper into A2AD environments. 
In addition to the new platforms, analysis on current platforms outfitted with 
newer weaponry and such as the NSM, LRASM, or a new unknown design. 
Understanding the capabilities these missiles bring to the ASUW arena, how they best 
integrate on new and future platforms could be applied to an upgraded SSC concept. 
Additionally, future research into improvements in sensor capabilities either on existing 
platforms, or building a new platform (manned or unmanned), could provide insight to 
future integration into the SSC, LCS, or existing platforms. 
Ship self-defense was not considered in the combat modeling, although there was 
some influence for the probability of hit by RED forces. Future analysis on the effects of 
various defense weapons such as the ESSM, Sea Sparrow, RAM, and CIWS on not only 
incoming missiles but possible adversary aircraft may provide insight into the need for 
larger ships such as LCS, DDGs, or a new frigate designs. 
The advent of new missiles would also require a change in the CONOPS for both 
current and future platforms. Analysis on the “old” CONOPS and generating and 
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modeling new CONOPS could provide insight into optimizing current operations and 
future operations on developing platforms such as LCS. 
Areas relating to this concept and how to integrate a surface fleet with current and 
future logistics platforms are well suited for additional study. SEA-20A made no attempt 
to optimize performance of the combatants themselves, as hull design, propulsion system, 
and other performance factors were not considered. Focus was specific to the SCS 
scenario, with other geographical areas representing various challenges and ease 
restrictions relative to the SCS. It may be valuable to adjust the type of logistic ships or 
the effect of submarine based logistics, and the effect it would have of idle time for the 
combatants. 
Another area that merits additional study is the political spectrum in allied and 
friendly locations for possible SSC support. The logistics portion of this study provides a 
general understanding of the challenges that are inherent to maritime security, focusing 
on the most difficult track and the most severe circumstances that allow for a baseline to 
be developed. This baseline is the worst-case scenario for force structure and size that 
would be capable of operating in this environment. 
In regions such as the SCS, small islands may provide the necessary acreage to 
build small logistics locations to refuel and refit combatants using shore based logistics in 
the form of an expeditionary basing concept (EBC). The EBC is a small base, which can 
be set up and removed within a short time frame. These EBCs would have parts, supplies, 
fuel, and ammunition for the small combatants and would be established on islands and 
in atolls where the water is deep enough to support the SSC. 
The HYDRA system is another concept that could be explored in regards to fix 
locations for resupply. For HYDRA, “Each payload module would plug into a 
standardized enclosure that would securely transport, house and launch various payloads, 
while sustaining payload functionality for weeks to month” (Defense Advanced Research 
Projects Agency 2013). Along the same lines as HYDRA submarine logistics may be a 
concept that deserves future investigation. Submarines could provide a protected, low 
detection platform to transport fuel and stores into an A2AD environment in the form of 
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submarine freight transportation system (SFTS) (Global Intelligent Transportation 
System 2011). 
Cost analysis was primarily focused on the ships, while accounting for the 
technology inherent on the comparison platforms. The cost to retrofit current platforms to 
utilize newer and possible more capable missiles and weaponry was not taken into 
account. Platforms that could be considered are LCS, CGs, and DDGs in the current U.S. 
fleet inventory. 
The cost of implementing unmanned systems as “organic” assets was not 
considered. Unmanned systems may provide a capability for ISR and targeting, which 
may affect the overall cost per platform. Unmanned vessels would negate the manning 
costs at sea, and the overall as the cost of building the ships themselves 
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VIII. CONCLUSION 
Designing the small surface combatant (SSC) to the demands of sea combat in the 
South China Sea, the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Malacca, where possible adversaries 
employ effective anti-access area denial (A2AD) weapon systems, is a challenging task. 
Tackling this task is made easier by utilizing the broad expertise of the integrated project 
team, which includes United States Naval officers with expertise in surface warfare, air 
warfare and undersea warfare combined with civilian and military officers from the 
country of Singapore. The team’s professional and cultural diversity allows for 
approaching the problem from an unbiased, open-minded perspective. The integrated 
project team exercised the systems engineering approach to problem solving to arrive at a 
potential solution. Using the systems engineering process we arrived at a solution for the 
small surface combatant with a displacement between 600 and 2000 tons, possessing 
eight effective ASUW missiles, employing manned and unmanned sensor platforms to 
increase detection and classification range and working as a system of systems in an 
armada of ships. 
The systems engineering process model utilized by the SEA-20A project team 
provided a methodical approach to solving the problem presented in the tasking 
statement. As the understanding of the problem continued to improve, the model was 
used to revisit previous work and through an iterative process, arrive at a possible 
solution. The first iteration of the modeling and analysis phase of the process model 
clearly revealed the single mission ASUW design is not capable of surviving in a multi-
threat environment operating independently or with other SSCs. With the multi-threat 
environment capability gap identified, the focus changed to component selection 
including external systems with the SSC and ultimately led to the system of systems 
solution of the armada. Using the system of systems approach allows for other systems to 
make up for undersea and air domain deficiencies inherently included in the single 
mission SSC.  
A2AD weapon systems threaten to hold at risk the U.S. Navy aircraft carrier 
which traditionally fills the role of power projection in the Navy surface force structure. 
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To augment a carrier’s ability to project power into littoral or coastal regions, a concept 
of operations (CONOPS) was successfully tested through modeling and simulation. With 
a focus on Phase II (Seize the initiative or combat) operations in a multi-threat A2AD 
environment, the armada advanced from theory to validated concept. The armada concept 
is easily able to be tailored to the specific threats in the area and can be scaled to meet 
combat demands. The CONOPS for the armada utilizes Arleigh Burke destroyers to 
provide air defense of the group. For anti-submarine warfare (ASW) operations, Littoral 
Combat Ships (LCSs) equipped with ASW modules combined with air platforms such as 
MH-60R’s and P-8 Poseidon’s. SSCs will provide control the surface domain. 
Additionally, organic sensors in the form of manned and unmanned platforms provide 
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) to all platforms within the armada. 
Utilizing manned and unmanned sensor platforms greatly expands the engagement range 
by allowing for long range detection and classification. 
To advantageously employ the benefits of the armada system of systems 
approach, a significant amount of time was devoted to determine the capabilities the SSC 
must possess to be a successful ASUW platform. Analysis indicates the SSC should be 
capable of sprint speeds greater than 25 knots. Although speeds in excess of 25 knots 
were not significant in the analysis and did not contribute to increases in effective combat 
power, a sprint speed of more than 25 knots allows the SSC to move to an advantageous 
missile launching location. Additionally, this speed characteristic allows the SSC to 
maneuver to safety after completion of all salvos. Each SSC should be capable of using 
organic assets to attain a detection and classification range of at least 60 nautical miles. 
The SSC missile magazine should be at least eight missiles fired in salvos of two missiles 
per engagement. Each missile should be capable of engaging an adversarial ship at least 
equal to maximum sensor range, but the analysis also demonstrates a 90 nautical mile 
range is advantageous if the ships are networked. However, networking was found to be 
marginally effective, mainly since the ships are constrained close together in a littoral or 
coastal region. Composition of the armada is scalable based on enemy threat levels, but 
as an example, fifteen SSCs, two LCSs, and two DDGs are a sufficient armada force to 
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defeat large multi-threat forces with marginal losses (assuming an enemy force composed 
of ten missiles boats, four destroyers, two frigates, five submarines and one aircraft).  
Another major component of the research is analyzing the logistical needs of 
sustaining the SSC at sea. Assuming A2AD threats have the ability to hold large, 
minimally armed replenishment ships at risk the study explored an alternative method of 
replenishing the SSC at sea. Initial exploration of the problem led to a discovery of the 
logistical item with the largest demand is fuel and not missiles or crew rations. To 
increase the time on station, the SSC must conduct at sea replenishment. A logistical 
simulation which uses a JHSV configured to ferry fuel within the A2AD zone to the SSC 
from a large replenishment ship (T-AKE) operating outside the A2AD zone. Analysis led 
to the discovery of a network of two T-AKEs operating with two fuel ferries (tanker 
variants of JHSV) can support up to sixteen 1500 ton SSCs operating in an A2AD 
environment. Although not as efficient as using traditional replenishment ships, this fuel 
ferry method does merit consideration if T-AKEs are unable to enter the region due to a 
high risk of detection and destruction by ASCMs and ASBMs. Additionally, an 
alternative method of artificially extending the patrol length of a small combatant by 
changing doctrinal triggers for requiring refueling can change add days to on station time 
of the SSC. For example, using an analysis of average fuel burn and capacity of a 1500 
ton surface combatant indicates an average five day patrol length before the vessel was at 
50 percent fuel capacity and required refueling. If the doctrine is shifted to allow for 
refueling at 20 percent fuel remaining, patrol length increases three days to a total of 
eight days. Changes in doctrine and new methods of sustaining small ships at sea 
combined with an efficient hull form and propulsion system are essential to the success of 
the SSC. 
A major component of the tasking statement is to design a cost effective SSC 
capable of delivering additional capability to augment existing force structure. Using the 
600 ton SSC as the lower bound and the 1500 ton SSC as the upper bound, analogous 
ships were selected and used to develop a linear regression based cost estimation model. 
Assuming the Navy would acquire 45 ships of the final desired tonnage, the model 
calculates the first unit cost ( 1T ) and implements an 85 percent learning curve into the 
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ship production calculation to determine approximate final unit cost. For example, the 
600 ton SSC was calculated to have a 1T  cost of $313 million and the cost of SSC unit 
number 45 was determined to be approximately $138 million. For the 1500 ton SSC, the 
1T  cost was estimated at $513 million and unit number 45 was estimated at $227 million. 
Both the 600 ton and 1500 ton SSC variants fall below current LCS acquisition cost and 
will effectively augment the ASUW capability of the fleet. 
After using a modified systems engineering process model to provide a structured 
approach throughout the duration of the project, the research determined an effective 
conclusion that meets all of the major requirements of the tasking statement. The 
seaworthiness and endurance of the 600 ton variant of the SSC leads to the final 
recommendation of further exploring the 1500 ton variant with the capabilities listed 
above. A single mission SSC can be a viable platform for the Navy to grow its force 
structure as long as CONOPS, capabilities, sustainment and cost remain balanced 
necessities of the detailed design effort. This ship has the potential to be a cost-effective 
force multiplier that can meet the needs of the U.S. Navy in 2025 through distribution 
and offensive ASUW power. 
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APPENDIX B. COST SECTION WORK BREAKDOWN 
STRUCTURE 
A. WORK BREAKDOWN STRUCTURE 
Work Breakdown Structure by 
Level 
     
WBS# Level 1 Level 2 Level 3     
1.0 Sea System       
1.1  Ship      
1.1.1   Hull Structure    
1.1.2   Propulsion Plant    
1.1.3   Electric Plant    
1.1.4   Command, Communications and Surveillance  
1.1.5   Auxiliary Systems    
1.1.6   Outfit and Furnishings    
1.1.7   Armament     
1.1.8   Total Ship Integration/Engineering  
1.1.9   Ship Assembly and Support Systems  
1.2  System Engineering     
1.3  Program 
Management 
    
1.4  System Test and Evaluation    
1.4.1   Development Test and Evaluation   
1.4.2   Operational Test and Evaluation   
1.4.3   Mock-ups/System Integration Labs (SILs)  
1.4.4   Test and Evaluation Support   
1.4.5   Test Facilities    
1.5  Training      
1.5.1   Equipment     
1.5.2   Services     
1.5.3   Facilities     
1.6  Data      
1.6.1   Technical Publications    
1.6.2   Engineering Data    
1.6.3   Management Data    
1.6.4   Support Data    
1.6.5   Data Depository    
1.7  Peculiar Support Equipment    
1.7.1   Test and Measurement Equipment   
1.7.2   Support and Handling Equipment   
1.8  Common Support Equipment    
1.8.1   Test and Measurement Equipment   
1.8.2   Support and Handling Equipment   
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1.9  Operational/Site Activation    
1.9.1   System Assembly, Installation and Checkout on Site 
1.9.2   Contractor Technical Support   
1.9.3   Site Construction    
1.9.4   Site/Ship/Vehicle Conversion   
1.9.5   Sustainment/Interim Contractor Support  
1.10  Industrial Facilities     
1.10.1   Construction/Conversion/Expansion  
1.10.2   Equipment Acquisition or Modernization  
1.10.3   Maintenance (industrial Facilities)   
1.11  Initial Spares and Repair Parts    
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B. REGRESSION MODELS 
1. Model #1 
 
  SUMMARY OUTPUT                 
  
       
  
Regression Statistics 
      
  
Multiple R 0.862173776 
      
  
R Square 0.74334362 
      
  
Adjusted R Square 0.679179525 
      
  
Standard Error 513100782.3 
      
  
Observations 6 
      
  
  
       
  
ANOVA 
       
  
  df SS MS F Significance F 
  
  
Regression 1 3.05002E+18 3.05E+18 11.58504 0.027185024 
  
  
Residual 4 1.05309E+18 2.633E+17 
    
  




       
  
  Coefficients 
Standard 
Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% 
Lower 
95.0% Upper 95.0% 
Intercept 
 $  
41,104,775.47  377624243.8 0.108851 0.9185626 -1007348208 1.09E+09 -1.007E+09 1089557759 
X Variable 1 
 $         
247,030.16  72577.36589 3.4036804 0.027185 45523.0847 448537.23 45523.085 448537.2292 
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2. Model #2 
SUMMARY OUTPUT                 
  
       
  
Regression Statistics 
      
  
Multiple R 0.987988968 
      
  
R Square 0.976122202 
      
  
Adjusted R Square 0.964183303 
      
  
Standard Error 63618936.05 
      
  
Observations 4 
      
  
  
       
  
ANOVA 
       
  





Regression 1 3.30912E+17 3.30912E+17 81.75981667 0.012011032 
  
  
Residual 2 8.09474E+15 4.04737E+15 
    
  




       
  
  Coefficients 
Standard 
Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0% 
Intercept  $  179,667,412.14  69123261.27 2.599232282 0.121600649 -117745976.7 477080801 -117745976.7 477080801 










3. Model #3 
SUMMARY OUTPUT                 
  
       
  
Regression Statistics 
      
  
Multiple R 0.987988968 
      
  
R Square 0.976122202 
      
  
Adjusted R Square 0.964183303 
      
  
Standard Error 63618936.05 
      
  
Observations 4 
      
  
  
       
  
ANOVA 
       
  
  df SS MS F Significance F 
  
  
Regression 1 3.30912E+17 3.309E+17 81.759817 0.012011032 
  
  
Residual 2 8.09474E+15 4.047E+15 
    
  




       
  
  Coefficients 
Standard 





179,667,412.14  69123261.27 2.5992323 0.1216006 -117745976.7 477080801 -117745976.7 477080801 
X Variable 1 
 $        
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APPENDIX C. DETAILED MODEL PARAMETER BREAKDOWN 
A. MANA 
1. Regression Analysis for Initial MANA Trial Runs 
SUMMARY OUTPUT Networking vs. Exchange Ratio     
              
Regression Statistics           
Multiple R 0.150866           
R Square 0.022760           
Adjusted R 
Square 0.021659           
Standard 
Error 1.174605           
Observations 24           
              
ANOVA             
  df SS MS F Significance F   
Regression 1 0.706953 0.706953 0.512396 0.481633   
Residual 22 30.353377 1.379699       
Total 23 31.060330         
              
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% 
Intercept 2.706569 0.339080 7.982106 0.000000 2.003361 3.409777 
X Variable 1 0.343257 0.479531 0.715819 0.481633 -0.651229 1.337743 
 
 Missile Range vs. Exchange Ratio      193 
                
Regression Statistics           
Multiple R 0.60864299           
R Square 0.37044628           
Adjusted R 
Square 0.34183021           
Standard 
Error 0.94277505           
Observations 24           
              
ANOVA             
  df SS MS F 
Significance 
F   
Regression 1 11.5061839 11.5061839 12.9453900 0.00159928   
Residual 22 19.5541458 0.88882481       
Total 23 31.0603297         
              
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% 
Intercept 
-
0.58382647 0.98127139 0.59496942 0.5579345 2.61885879 1.45120583 
X Variable 1 0.04616031 0.01282954 3.5979702 0.0015992 0.01955347 0.07276716 
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 SUMMARY OUTPUT Salvo Size vs. Exchange Ratio     
              
Regression Statistics           
Multiple R 0.21202170           
R Square 0.04495320           
Adjusted R Square 0.00154198           
Standard Error 1.16119195           
Observations 24           
              
ANOVA             
  df SS MS F Significance F   
Regression 1 1.39626132 1.39626132 1.0355204 0.31992665   
Residual 22 29.6640684 1.34836674       
Total 23 31.0603297         
              
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% 
Intercept 3.60179795 0.74954618 4.80530492 8.4505E-05 2.04733431 5.1562615 
X Variable 1 0.2412002 0.23702731 1.01760524 0.3199266 0.73276480 0.2503643 
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SUMMARY OUTPUT Detection Range vs. Exchange Ratio     
              
Regression Statistics           
Multiple R 0.1722000           
R Square 0.0296528           
Adjusted R Square 0.0144538           
Standard Error 1.1704564           
Observations 24           
              
ANOVA             
  df SS MS F Significance F   
Regression 1 0.92102751 0.92102751 0.6722984 0.42104649   
Residual 22 30.1393022 1.36996828       
Total 23 31.0603297         
              
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% 
Intercept 3.5979735 0.90977424 3.95479824 0.0006733 1.71121727 5.48472987 
X Variable 1 0.0159950 0.01950760 0.8199380 0.4210464 0.05645131 0.02446127 
2. Data Series for Revised MANA Runs 
  PARAMTERS Rounded Data 







1 10 No 60 2 30 15.00 6.00 
2 10 No 60 2 45 15.00 5.00 
3 10 No 60 2 60 1.00 13.00 
4 10 No 60 4 30 15.00 6.00 
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5 10 No 60 4 45 15.00 6.00 
6 10 No 60 4 60 1.00 13.00 
7 10 No 90 2 30 15.00 6.00 
8 10 No 90 2 45 15.00 6.00 
9 10 No 90 2 60 1.00 13.00 
10 10 No 90 4 30 15.00 5.00 
11 10 No 90 4 45 15.00 4.00 
12 10 No 90 4 60 1.00 13.00 
13 15 No 60 2 30 20.00 7.00 
14 15 No 60 2 45 20.00 6.00 
15 15 No 60 2 60 1.00 16.00 
16 15 No 60 4 30 20.00 6.00 
17 15 No 60 4 45 20.00 6.00 
18 15 No 60 4 60 1.00 16.00 
19 15 No 90 2 30 20.00 6.00 
20 15 No 90 2 45 20.00 6.00 
21 15 No 90 2 60 1.00 16.00 
22 15 No 90 4 30 20.00 6.00 
23 15 No 90 4 45 20.00 6.00 
24 15 No 90 4 60 1.00 16.00 
25 20 No 60 2 30 24.00 10.00 
26 20 No 60 2 45 24.00 10.00 
27 20 No 60 2 60 1.00 13.00 
28 20 No 60 4 30 25.00 9.00 
29 20 No 60 4 45 25.00 9.00 
30 20 No 60 4 60 1.00 13.00 
31 20 No 90 2 30 24.00 9.00 
32 20 No 90 2 45 25.00 9.00 
33 20 No 90 2 60 1.00 13.00 
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34 20 No 90 4 30 24.00 10.00 
35 20 No 90 4 45 25.00 10.00 
36 20 No 90 4 60 1.00 13.00 
37 25 No 60 2 30 29.00 9.00 
38 25 No 60 2 45 30.00 4.00 
39 25 No 60 2 60 1.00 13.00 
40 25 No 60 4 30 30.00 4.00 
41 25 No 60 4 45 30.00 4.00 
42 25 No 60 4 60 1.00 13.00 
43 25 No 90 2 30 30.00 4.00 
44 25 No 90 2 45 30.00 4.00 
45 25 No 90 2 60 1.00 13.00 
46 25 No 90 4 30 30.00 3.00 
47 25 No 90 4 45 30.00 5.00 
48 25 No 90 4 60 1.00 14.00 
49 10 Yes 60 2 30 15.00 5.00 
50 10 Yes 60 2 45 15.00 6.00 
51 10 Yes 60 2 60 1.00 16.00 
52 10 Yes 60 4 30 15.00 5.00 
53 10 Yes 60 4 45 15.00 6.00 
54 10 Yes 60 4 60 2.00 16.00 
55 10 Yes 90 2 30 15.00 5.00 
56 10 Yes 90 2 45 15.00 5.00 
57 10 Yes 90 2 60 1.00 16.00 
58 10 Yes 90 4 30 15.00 6.00 
59 10 Yes 90 4 45 15.00 6.00 
60 10 Yes 90 4 60 1.00 16.00 
61 15 Yes 60 2 30 20.00 6.00 
62 15 Yes 60 2 45 20.00 6.00 
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63 15 Yes 60 2 60 1.00 16.00 
64 15 Yes 60 4 30 18.00 6.00 
65 15 Yes 60 4 45 18.00 6.00 
66 15 Yes 60 4 60 1.00 16.00 
67 15 Yes 90 2 30 18.00 6.00 
68 15 Yes 90 2 45 18.00 6.00 
69 15 Yes 90 2 60 1.00 16.00 
70 15 Yes 90 4 30 19.00 6.00 
71 15 Yes 90 4 45 18.00 6.00 
72 15 Yes 90 4 60 1.00 16.00 
73 20 Yes 60 2 30 25.00 9.00 
74 20 Yes 60 2 45 25.00 8.00 
75 20 Yes 60 2 60 1.00 16.00 
76 20 Yes 60 4 30 25.00 9.00 
77 20 Yes 60 4 45 25.00 10.00 
78 20 Yes 60 4 60 1.00 16.00 
79 20 Yes 90 2 30 25.00 9.00 
80 20 Yes 90 2 45 25.00 9.00 
81 20 Yes 90 2 60 1.00 16.00 
82 20 Yes 90 4 30 25.00 7.00 
83 20 Yes 90 4 45 25.00 9.00 
84 20 Yes 90 4 60 1.00 16.00 
85 25 Yes 60 2 30 30.00 4.00 
86 25 Yes 60 2 45 30.00 3.00 
87 25 Yes 60 2 60 1.00 16.00 
88 25 Yes 60 4 30 30.00 4.00 
89 25 Yes 60 4 45 30.00 5.00 
90 25 Yes 60 4 60 1.00 16.00 
91 25 Yes 90 2 30 30.00 4.00 
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92 25 Yes 90 2 45 30.00 4.00 
93 25 Yes 90 2 60 1.00 16.00 
94 25 Yes 90 4 30 30.00 5.00 
95 25 Yes 90 4 45 30.00 4.00 
96 25 Yes 90 4 60 1.00 16.00 
 
3. Regression Analysis for MANA Revised Runs 
SUMMARY OUTPUT Number of Ships 
    
       Regression Statistics 
     Multiple R 0.003606 
     R Square 1.3E-05 
     Adjusted R Square -0.01063 
     Standard Error 6.924451 
     Observations 96 
     
       ANOVA 
        df SS MS F Significance F 
 Regression 1 0.0586 0.0586 0.001222 0.972186306 
 Residual 94 4507.114 47.94802 
   Total 95 4507.173       
 
         Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% 
Intercept 5.007529 2.322531 2.156065 0.033631 0.396088463 9.618969689 
X Variable 1 0.00442 0.126423 0.034959 0.972186 0.246595384 0.255434682 
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SUMMARY OUTPUT Networking 
    
       Regression Statistics 
     Multiple R 0.040566 
     R Square 0.001646 
     Adjusted R Square -0.00898 
     Standard Error 6.918796 
     Observations 96 
     
       ANOVA 
        df SS MS F Significance F 
 Regression 1 7.416917 7.416917 0.15494 0.694750356 
 Residual 94 4499.756 47.86974 
   Total 95 4507.173       
 
         Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% 
Intercept 4.806917 0.998642 4.813453 5.6E-06 2.824089396 6.789744416 
X Variable 1 0.555912 1.412293 0.393624 0.69475 2.248229515 3.360053598 
 
SUMMARY OUTPUT Missile Range 
    
       Regression Statistics 
     Multiple R 0.013136 
     R Square 0.000173 
     Adjusted R Square -0.01046 
     Standard Error 6.923899 
     Observations 96 
     
        201 
ANOVA 
        df SS MS F Significance F 
 Regression 1 0.77768 0.77768 0.016222 0.898923657 
 Residual 94 4506.395 47.94037 
   Total 95 4507.173       
 
         Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% 
Intercept 4.63485 3.603311 1.286275 0.201506 2.519608737 11.78930827 
X Variable 1 0.006 0.047111 0.127365 0.898924 0.087540008 0.099540626 
 
SUMMARY OUTPUT Salvo Size 
    
       Regression Statistics 
     Multiple R 0.010808 
     R Square 0.000117 
     Adjusted R Square -0.01052 
     Standard Error 6.924091 
     Observations 96 
     
       ANOVA 
        df SS MS F Significance F 
 Regression 1 0.526519 0.526519 0.010982 0.916761102 
 Residual 94 4506.646 47.94304 
   Total 95 4507.173       
 
         Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% 
Intercept 5.307047 2.234741 2.374793 0.01959 0.869916077 9.744176986 
X Variable 1 -0.07406 0.706687 -0.1048 0.916761 1.477201719 1.329085983 
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SUMMARY OUTPUT Sensor Range 
    
       Regression Statistics 
     Multiple R 0.85529 
     R Square 0.73152 
     Adjusted R Square 0.728664 
     Standard Error 3.58793 
     Observations 96 
     
       ANOVA 
        df SS MS F Significance F 
 Regression 1 3297.088 3297.088 256.1195 1.37818E-28 
 Residual 94 1210.085 12.87324 
   Total 95 4507.173       
 
         Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% 
Intercept -16.4477 1.394416 -11.7954 3.04E-20 19.21637553 13.67908478 
X Variable 1 0.478502 0.029899 16.00373 1.38E-28 0.419136302 0.537868279 
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4. Results of MANA Alternative Scenarios 
a. Strait of Malacca 

































1 3 16 No No 2 0 1 0 0 4 2 10 
2 0 16 No No 0 0 0 0 0 4 2 10 
3 1 16 No No 1 0 0 0 0 4 2 10 
4 0 15 No No 0 0 0 0 0 4 1 10 
5 2 16 No No 2 0 0 0 0 4 2 10 
6 1 16 No No 0 0 0 1 0 4 2 10 
7 1 16 No No 1 0 0 0 0 4 2 10 
8 0 16 No No 0 0 0 0 0 4 2 10 
9 1 16 No No 1 0 0 0 0 4 2 10 
10 0 16 No No 0 0 0 0 0 4 2 10 
11 0 16 No No 0 0 0 0 0 4 2 10 
12 0 16 No No 0 0 0 0 0 4 2 10 
13 0 16 No No 0 0 0 0 0 4 2 10 
14 0 16 No No 0 0 0 0 0 4 2 10 
15 0 16 No No 0 0 0 0 0 4 2 10 
16 1 16 No No 1 0 0 0 0 4 2 10 
17 3 15 No No 1 0 1 0 1 4 1 10 
18 0 16 No No 0 0 0 0 0 4 2 10 
19 0 16 No No 0 0 0 0 0 4 2 10 
20 0 16 No No 0 0 0 0 0 4 2 10 
21 3 16 No No 2 0 1 0 0 4 2 10 
22 1 16 No No 1 0 0 0 0 4 2 10 
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23 0 16 No No 0 0 0 0 0 4 2 10 
24 0 16 No No 0 0 0 0 0 4 2 10 
25 1 16 No No 1 0 0 0 0 4 2 10 
26 0 16 No No 0 0 0 0 0 4 2 10 
27 0 16 No No 0 0 0 0 0 4 2 10 
28 3 16 No No 2 0 0 1 0 4 2 10 
29 0 16 No No 0 0 0 0 0 4 2 10 
30 1 16 No No 1 0 0 0 0 4 2 10 









Time               
Mean 
0.733 15.9 0 0 
(  
 
              
StDev 0.048 0.031 0 0 0               
 
b. Persian Gulf 

















1 0 27 No No 0 0 0 9 18 
2 0 25 No No 0 0 0 10 15 
3 0 25 No No 0 0 0 10 15 
4 0 25 No No 0 0 0 10 15 
5 0 26 No No 0 0 0 10 16 
6 0 26 No No 0 0 0 10 16 
7 0 27 No No 0 0 0 10 17 
8 0 25 No No 0 0 0 9 16 
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9 0 25 No No 0 0 0 10 15 
10 0 26 No No 0 0 0 10 16 
11 0 25 No No 0 0 0 10 15 
12 0 25 No No 0 0 0 10 15 
13 0 25 No No 0 0 0 10 15 
14 0 26 No No 0 0 0 10 16 
15 0 25 No No 0 0 0 10 15 
16 0 26 No No 0 0 0 10 16 
17 0 25 No No 0 0 0 9 16 
18 0 25 No No 0 0 0 8 17 
19 0 25 No No 0 0 0 10 15 
20 0 25 No No 0 0 0 10 15 
21 0 25 No No 0 0 0 9 16 
22 0 26 No No 0 0 0 10 16 
23 0 25 No No 0 0 0 10 15 
24 0 25 No No 0 0 0 9 16 
25 0 25 No No 0 0 0 10 15 
26 0 25 No No 0 0 0 10 15 
B. SIMIO 
1. Endurance Patrol Simulation Results 
1 Ship Combat Patrol 
Scenario Average Minimum Maximum Half Width Standard Deviation 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_500 13.894 7.999 17.606 1.027 2.751 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_600 14.753 6.605 20.164 2.064 5.528 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_700 9.337 2.464 20.066 1.835 4.915 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_800 6.531 1.813 20.395 2.279 6.105 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_900 2.476 1.777 4.124 0.210 0.563 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_1000 19.054 10.190 20.164 0.897 2.401 
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Combatant_fuel_Cap_1500 19.052 9.736 20.164 0.919 2.462 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_2000 15.812 7.516 20.158 1.396 3.739 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_3000 15.954 7.018 20.158 1.354 3.627 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_4000 15.911 8.061 20.158 1.355 3.630 
            
1 Ship Combat Patrol 
Scenario Average Minimum Maximum Half Width Standard Deviation 
Double_JHSV_500 9.770 5.952 14.265 0.845 2.264 
Double_JHSV_600 12.405 5.031 20.164 1.892 5.066 
Double_JHSV_700 8.353 2.443 17.622 1.388 3.719 
Double_JHSV_800 4.809 1.892 20.434 1.940 5.197 
Double_JHSV_900 2.433 1.882 4.694 0.249 0.668 
Double_JHSV_1000 19.695 19.084 20.164 0.112 0.301 
Double_JHSV_1500 19.695 19.084 20.164 0.112 0.301 
Double_JHSV_2000 16.558 10.018 20.164 1.597 4.279 
Double_JHSV_3000 16.872 10.252 20.164 1.539 4.122 
Double_JHSV_4000 16.538 10.055 20.164 1.604 4.295 
            
1 Ship Combat Patrol 
Scenario Average Minimum Maximum Half Width Standard Deviation 
Double_Logistics_500 13.156 5.108 19.420 1.793 4.803 
Double_Logistics_600 13.943 5.589 19.456 1.587 4.251 
Double_Logistics_700 6.574 1.800 17.408 1.338 3.583 
Double_Logistics_800 3.619 1.097 10.434 0.899 2.407 
Double_Logistics_900 2.162 1.180 5.981 0.427 1.142 
Double_Logistics_1000 17.575 15.555 19.730 0.563 1.507 
Double_Logistics_1500 17.575 15.555 19.730 0.563 1.507 
Double_Logistics_2000 17.282 10.921 19.725 0.703 1.884 
Double_Logistics_3000 17.268 10.517 19.725 0.721 1.931 
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2 Ship Combat Patrol 
Scenario Average Minimum Maximum Half Width Standard Deviation 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_500 7.703 0.205 20.119 3.091 8.278 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_600 7.703 0.205 20.119 3.091 8.278 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_700 4.985 0.309 11.852 1.830 4.901 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_800 4.877 0.309 11.852 1.826 4.892 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_900 4.926 0.309 11.792 1.829 4.899 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_1000 5.618 0.456 17.030 2.235 5.878 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_1500 3.429 0.320 10.696 1.275 3.414 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_2000 2.054 0.653 6.915 0.594 1.591 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_3000 1.383 0.774 1.946 0.172 0.461 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_4000 1.496 1.257 2.008 0.074 0.199 
            
2 Ship Combat Patrol 
Scenario Average Minimum Maximum Half Width Standard Deviation 
Double_JHSV_500 9.968 0.200 20.133 3.484 9.332 
Double_JHSV_600 9.968 0.200 20.133 3.484 9.332 
Double_JHSV_700 4.477 0.242 19.685 1.736 4.650 
Double_JHSV_800 4.492 0.241 19.685 1.737 4.652 
Double_JHSV_900 4.473 0.240 19.685 1.736 4.650 
Double_JHSV_1000 5.034 0.398 15.363 1.796 4.810 
Double_JHSV_1500 3.401 0.323 9.234 1.139 3.050 
Double_JHSV_2000 2.153 0.605 7.704 0.669 1.791 
Double_JHSV_3000 1.391 0.806 1.906 0.165 0.441 
Double_JHSV_4000 1.488 1.290 1.939 0.066 0.176 
            
2 Ship Combat Patrol 
Scenario Average Minimum Maximum Half Width Standard Deviation 
Double_Logistics_500 9.131 0.184 19.704 3.399 9.105 
Double_Logistics_600 9.131 0.184 19.704 3.399 9.105 
Double_Logistics_700 7.507 0.186 19.705 3.036 8.132 
Double_Logistics_800 7.304 0.186 19.705 2.986 7.998 
Double_Logistics_900 7.509 0.186 19.705 3.036 8.133 
Double_Logistics_1000 3.995 0.204 12.404 1.615 4.324 
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Double_Logistics_1500 2.314 0.227 7.682 0.921 2.467 
Double_Logistics_2000 1.882 0.278 8.305 0.816 2.186 
Double_Logistics_3000 0.757 0.522 1.481 0.078 0.209 
Double_Logistics_4000 0.878 0.670 1.097 0.046 0.123 
      
      3 Ship Combat Patrol 
Scenario Average Minimum Maximum Half Width Standard Deviation 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_500 0.627 0.536 0.729 0.020 0.053 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_600 0.628 0.533 0.710 0.018 0.049 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_700 0.679 0.482 0.984 0.042 0.112 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_800 0.815 0.569 1.118 0.059 0.157 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_900 0.822 0.544 1.122 0.065 0.173 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_1000 1.129 0.767 1.693 0.072 0.192 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_1500 1.751 1.480 1.976 0.071 0.190 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_2000 1.940 1.702 2.462 0.075 0.200 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_3000 2.547 2.024 2.825 0.114 0.304 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_4000 3.360 2.519 3.619 0.104 0.280 
            
3 Ship Combat Patrol 
Scenario Average Minimum Maximum Half Width Standard Deviation 
Double_JHSV_500 0.509 0.437 0.591 0.016 0.042 
Double_JHSV_600 0.507 0.422 0.591 0.016 0.044 
Double_JHSV_700 0.633 0.411 0.843 0.025 0.068 
Double_JHSV_800 0.684 0.523 0.939 0.043 0.115 
Double_JHSV_900 0.688 0.509 0.952 0.048 0.128 
Double_JHSV_1000 1.080 0.713 1.458 0.056 0.151 
Double_JHSV_1500 1.740 1.385 1.900 0.055 0.148 
Double_JHSV_2000 1.906 1.419 2.289 0.076 0.202 
Double_JHSV_3000 2.588 1.711 3.212 0.147 0.392 
Double_JHSV_4000 3.312 2.551 3.578 0.116 0.311 
            
3 Ship Combat Patrol 
Scenario Average Minimum Maximum Half Width Standard Deviation 
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Double_Logistics_500 0.324 0.256 0.413 0.013 0.035 
Double_Logistics_600 0.323 0.263 0.412 0.013 0.036 
Double_Logistics_700 0.355 0.270 0.464 0.018 0.049 
Double_Logistics_800 0.389 0.283 0.529 0.021 0.057 
Double_Logistics_900 0.385 0.293 0.568 0.022 0.060 
Double_Logistics_1000 0.528 0.374 0.658 0.029 0.077 
Double_Logistics_1500 0.804 0.632 1.062 0.042 0.114 
Double_Logistics_2000 0.917 0.784 1.257 0.047 0.126 
Double_Logistics_3000 1.294 0.903 1.722 0.093 0.249 
Double_Logistics_4000 1.717 1.236 2.459 0.133 0.356 
      
      4 Ship Combat Patrol 
Scenario Average Minimum Maximum Half Width Standard Deviation 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_500 0.331 0.251 0.410 0.017 0.046 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_600 0.331 0.251 0.410 0.017 0.046 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_700 0.453 0.380 0.543 0.017 0.046 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_800 0.452 0.380 0.543 0.017 0.045 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_900 0.451 0.376 0.543 0.017 0.044 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_1000 0.646 0.567 0.723 0.013 0.035 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_1500 0.743 0.555 0.933 0.036 0.098 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_2000 1.182 0.876 1.633 0.054 0.145 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_3000 3.087 1.640 3.649 0.056 0.149 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_4000 27.207 4.636 42.964 0.097 0.261 
            
4 Ship Combat Patrol 
Scenario Average Minimum Maximum Half Width Standard Deviation 
Double_JHSV_500 0.335 0.275 0.417 0.015 0.041 
Double_JHSV_600 0.335 0.275 0.417 0.015 0.041 
Double_JHSV_700 0.335 0.276 0.416 0.014 0.038 
Double_JHSV_800 0.335 0.276 0.416 0.014 0.037 
Double_JHSV_900 0.334 0.276 0.416 0.014 0.038 
Double_JHSV_1000 0.520 0.455 0.608 0.016 0.043 
Double_JHSV_1500 0.674 0.495 0.801 0.032 0.086 
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Double_JHSV_2000 1.151 0.876 1.806 0.057 0.153 
Double_JHSV_3000 3.049 1.980 3.591 0.053 0.143 
Double_JHSV_4000 27.811 5.168 42.901 0.065 0.173 
            
4 Ship Combat Patrol 
Scenario Average Minimum Maximum Half Width Standard Deviation 
Double_Logistics_500 0.321 0.243 0.406 0.016 0.042 
Double_Logistics_600 0.321 0.243 0.406 0.016 0.042 
Double_Logistics_700 0.318 0.232 0.404 0.016 0.042 
Double_Logistics_800 0.318 0.231 0.404 0.016 0.042 
Double_Logistics_900 0.318 0.231 0.404 0.016 0.042 
Double_Logistics_1000 0.327 0.256 0.413 0.015 0.039 
Double_Logistics_1500 0.361 0.260 0.485 0.020 0.055 
Double_Logistics_2000 0.529 0.364 0.644 0.030 0.079 
Double_Logistics_3000 1.194 0.615 2.005 0.042 0.112 
Double_Logistics_4000 3.527 1.643 9.619 0.045 0.122 
      
      5 Ship Endurance Patrol 
Scenario Average Minimum Maximum Half Width Standard Deviation 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_500 0.335 0.256 0.411 0.017 0.046 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_600 0.335 0.252 0.411 0.017 0.046 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_700 0.465 0.403 0.560 0.020 0.054 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_800 0.465 0.392 0.546 0.020 0.054 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_900 0.465 0.393 0.546 0.020 0.054 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_1000 0.651 0.560 0.744 0.017 0.044 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_1500 0.830 0.630 0.981 0.033 0.088 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_2000 1.334 0.828 1.815 0.051 0.137 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_3000 4.470 2.766 5.306 0.028 0.075 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_4000 51.617 8.542 83.544 0.076 0.203 
            
5 Ship Endurance Patrol 
Scenario Average Minimum Maximum Half Width Standard Deviation 
Double_JHSV_500 0.340 0.280 0.419 0.015 0.041 
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Double_JHSV_600 0.339 0.280 0.419 0.015 0.041 
Double_JHSV_700 0.338 0.281 0.418 0.014 0.039 
Double_JHSV_800 0.338 0.284 0.418 0.014 0.038 
Double_JHSV_900 0.338 0.280 0.418 0.014 0.038 
Double_JHSV_1000 0.539 0.467 0.629 0.017 0.046 
Double_JHSV_1500 0.728 0.567 0.889 0.035 0.093 
Double_JHSV_2000 1.278 0.964 1.746 0.056 0.150 
Double_JHSV_3000 4.354 2.700 5.260 0.050 0.135 
Double_JHSV_4000 52.413 7.322 83.527 0.057 0.154 
            
5 Ship Endurance Patrol 
Scenario Average Minimum Maximum Half Width Standard Deviation 
Double_Logistics_500 0.327 0.246 0.435 0.017 0.046 
Double_Logistics_600 0.327 0.246 0.435 0.017 0.046 
Double_Logistics_700 0.323 0.248 0.431 0.016 0.044 
Double_Logistics_800 0.323 0.248 0.431 0.016 0.044 
Double_Logistics_900 0.323 0.248 0.431 0.016 0.044 
Double_Logistics_1000 0.329 0.266 0.428 0.016 0.042 
Double_Logistics_1500 0.354 0.270 0.493 0.023 0.061 
Double_Logistics_2000 0.544 0.402 0.684 0.026 0.071 
Double_Logistics_3000 1.660 0.648 3.151 0.047 0.127 
Double_Logistics_4000 6.953 2.313 27.545 0.041 0.109 
      
      6 Ship Endurance Patrol 
Scenario Average Minimum Maximum Half Width Standard Deviation 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_500 42.095 41.932 42.169 0.024 0.064 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_600 42.095 41.932 42.169 0.024 0.064 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_700 42.175 42.009 42.247 0.025 0.066 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_800 42.174 42.009 42.247 0.024 0.065 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_900 42.175 42.014 42.248 0.024 0.065 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_1000 42.266 42.145 42.338 0.018 0.047 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_1500 42.114 41.960 42.252 0.028 0.076 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_2000 42.363 42.192 42.668 0.037 0.100 
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Combatant_fuel_Cap_3000 43.906 42.681 44.401 0.031 0.084 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_4000 67.499 45.315 83.512 0.048 0.129 
            
 6 Ship Endurance Patrol 
Scenario Average Minimum Maximum Half Width Standard Deviation 
Double_JHSV_500 42.098 41.941 42.173 0.024 0.065 
Double_JHSV_600 42.098 41.941 42.173 0.024 0.065 
Double_JHSV_700 42.100 41.943 42.171 0.022 0.060 
Double_JHSV_800 42.100 41.943 42.171 0.022 0.060 
Double_JHSV_900 42.100 41.943 42.171 0.022 0.060 
Double_JHSV_1000 42.198 42.079 42.275 0.017 0.046 
Double_JHSV_1500 42.083 41.936 42.215 0.021 0.055 
Double_JHSV_2000 42.343 42.138 42.686 0.033 0.090 
Double_JHSV_3000 43.915 43.006 44.394 0.042 0.113 
Double_JHSV_4000 67.055 46.171 83.559 0.044 0.119 
            
6 Ship Endurance Patrol 
Scenario Average Minimum Maximum Half Width Standard Deviation 
Double_Logistics_500 42.091 41.936 42.177 0.019 0.051 
Double_Logistics_600 42.091 41.936 42.177 0.019 0.051 
Double_Logistics_700 42.101 41.941 42.177 0.019 0.052 
Double_Logistics_800 42.101 41.941 42.177 0.019 0.052 
Double_Logistics_900 42.101 41.941 42.177 0.019 0.052 
Double_Logistics_1000 42.106 41.994 42.176 0.015 0.040 
Double_Logistics_1500 41.721 41.422 42.084 0.017 0.044 
Double_Logistics_2000 41.801 41.495 42.167 0.029 0.078 
Double_Logistics_3000 42.529 42.102 43.294 0.031 0.084 
Double_Logistics_4000 44.912 43.126 51.930 0.030 0.081 
      
      7 Ship Endurance Patrol 
Scenario Average Minimum Maximum Half Width Standard Deviation 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_500 83.855 83.612 83.927 0.024 0.064 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_600 83.855 83.612 83.927 0.024 0.064 
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Combatant_fuel_Cap_700 42.095 41.933 42.169 0.022 0.058 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_800 83.863 83.610 83.925 0.019 0.050 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_900 83.863 83.610 83.925 0.019 0.050 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_1000 83.900 83.863 83.927 0.006 0.016 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_1500 83.408 83.329 83.551 0.022 0.059 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_2000 83.402 83.324 83.544 0.020 0.055 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_3000 83.409 83.255 83.546 0.028 0.076 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_4000 83.396 83.246 83.547 0.026 0.070 
            
7 Ship Endurance Patrol 
Scenario Average Minimum Maximum Half Width Standard Deviation 
Double_JHSV_500 83.857 83.600 83.926 0.017 0.045 
Double_JHSV_600 83.856 83.600 83.926 0.017 0.045 
Double_JHSV_700 42.098 41.940 42.173 0.024 0.065 
Double_JHSV_800 83.855 83.595 83.925 0.013 0.036 
Double_JHSV_900 83.854 83.595 83.924 0.013 0.035 
Double_JHSV_1000 83.902 83.862 83.929 0.007 0.017 
Double_JHSV_1500 83.419 83.317 83.543 0.020 0.053 
Double_JHSV_2000 83.416 83.337 83.515 0.015 0.041 
Double_JHSV_3000 83.406 83.269 83.535 0.029 0.079 
Double_JHSV_4000 83.400 83.237 83.585 0.027 0.072 
            
7 Ship Endurance Patrol 
Scenario Average Minimum Maximum Half Width Standard Deviation 
Double_Logistics_500 83.857 83.620 83.925 0.020 0.055 
Double_Logistics_600 83.857 83.620 83.925 0.020 0.055 
Double_Logistics_700 42.091 41.942 42.176 0.019 0.052 
Double_Logistics_800 83.875 83.617 83.926 0.019 0.050 
Double_Logistics_900 83.874 83.617 83.926 0.019 0.050 
Double_Logistics_1000 83.901 83.863 83.929 0.007 0.019 
Double_Logistics_1500 83.110 82.306 83.730 0.015 0.039 
Double_Logistics_2000 83.111 82.341 83.725 0.027 0.072 
Double_Logistics_3000 83.525 83.413 83.627 0.020 0.053 
Double_Logistics_4000 83.511 83.432 83.641 0.022 0.058 
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      8 Ship Endurance Patrol 
Scenario Average Minimum Maximum Half Width Standard Deviation 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_500 90.864 90.613 90.927 0.021 0.056 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_600 90.864 90.613 90.927 0.021 0.056 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_700 90.872 90.611 90.925 0.019 0.050 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_800 90.872 90.611 90.925 0.019 0.051 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_900 90.872 90.610 90.925 0.019 0.050 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_1000 90.901 90.868 90.930 0.006 0.016 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_1500 90.662 90.601 90.737 0.014 0.039 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_2000 90.657 90.600 90.739 0.013 0.035 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_3000 90.650 90.559 90.723 0.016 0.044 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_4000 90.401 90.272 90.729 0.026 0.068 
            
8 Ship Endurance Patrol 
Scenario Average Minimum Maximum Half Width Standard Deviation 
Double_JHSV_500 90.859 90.609 90.926 0.019 0.051 
Double_JHSV_600 90.859 90.609 90.926 0.019 0.051 
Double_JHSV_700 90.860 90.605 90.924 0.016 0.042 
Double_JHSV_800 90.860 90.605 90.924 0.016 0.042 
Double_JHSV_900 90.860 90.605 90.924 0.016 0.042 
Double_JHSV_1000 90.902 90.863 90.931 0.006 0.017 
Double_JHSV_1500 90.661 90.598 90.753 0.014 0.037 
Double_JHSV_2000 90.659 90.581 90.749 0.014 0.037 
Double_JHSV_3000 90.653 90.563 90.729 0.018 0.048 
Double_JHSV_4000 90.413 90.275 90.759 0.026 0.070 
            
8 Ship Endurance Patrol 
Scenario Average Minimum Maximum Half Width Standard Deviation 
Double_Logistics_500 90.877 90.625 90.926 0.020 0.053 
Double_Logistics_600 90.877 90.625 90.926 0.020 0.053 
Double_Logistics_700 90.880 90.624 90.928 0.018 0.048 
Double_Logistics_800 90.880 90.624 90.927 0.018 0.048 
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Double_Logistics_900 90.880 90.624 90.927 0.018 0.048 
Double_Logistics_1000 90.902 90.864 90.929 0.007 0.019 
Double_Logistics_1500 90.586 90.203 90.822 0.013 0.035 
Double_Logistics_2000 90.581 90.224 90.820 0.017 0.046 
Double_Logistics_3000 90.721 90.629 90.794 0.015 0.040 
Double_Logistics_4000 90.551 90.429 90.686 0.022 0.059 
 
9 Ship Endurance Patrol 
Scenario Average Minimum Maximum Half Width Standard Deviation 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_500 90.864 90.624 90.927 0.018 0.049 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_600 90.873 90.634 90.927 0.019 0.050 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_700 90.892 90.635 90.926 0.018 0.048 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_800 90.892 90.635 90.926 0.018 0.048 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_900 90.892 90.635 90.926 0.018 0.048 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_1000 90.901 90.871 90.931 0.006 0.016 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_1500 90.899 90.869 90.929 0.006 0.016 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_2000 90.896 90.858 90.923 0.006 0.016 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_3000 90.890 90.854 90.918 0.006 0.016 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_4000 90.405 90.273 90.803 0.025 0.067 
            
9 Ship Endurance Patrol 
Scenario Average Minimum Maximum Half Width Standard Deviation 
Double_JHSV_500 90.861 90.606 90.926 0.021 0.056 
Double_JHSV_600 90.868 90.630 90.926 0.023 0.061 
Double_JHSV_700 90.876 90.626 90.931 0.015 0.039 
Double_JHSV_800 90.876 90.626 90.931 0.015 0.039 
Double_JHSV_900 90.876 90.626 90.931 0.015 0.039 
Double_JHSV_1000 90.902 90.863 90.932 0.007 0.018 
Double_JHSV_1500 90.900 90.862 90.930 0.007 0.020 
Double_JHSV_2000 90.897 90.858 90.924 0.007 0.020 
Double_JHSV_3000 90.892 90.853 90.919 0.007 0.019 
Double_JHSV_4000 90.409 90.272 90.588 0.023 0.061 
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9 Ship Endurance Patrol 
Scenario Average Minimum Maximum Half Width Standard Deviation 
Double_Logistics_500 90.879 90.624 90.927 0.019 0.050 
Double_Logistics_600 90.884 90.629 90.930 0.019 0.052 
Double_Logistics_700 90.885 90.620 90.929 0.019 0.050 
Double_Logistics_800 90.885 90.620 90.929 0.019 0.050 
Double_Logistics_900 90.885 90.620 90.929 0.019 0.050 
Double_Logistics_1000 90.901 90.863 90.930 0.007 0.018 
Double_Logistics_1500 90.896 90.858 90.926 0.007 0.019 
Double_Logistics_2000 90.893 90.855 90.923 0.007 0.020 
Double_Logistics_3000 90.887 90.849 90.918 0.007 0.018 
Double_Logistics_4000 90.550 90.442 90.669 0.021 0.056 
      
      10 Ship  Endurance Patrol 
Scenario Average Minimum Maximum Half Width Standard Deviation 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_500 90.875 90.624 90.927 0.018 0.048 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_600 90.873 90.632 90.927 0.018 0.049 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_700 90.885 90.411 90.926 0.028 0.074 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_800 90.885 90.411 90.926 0.028 0.074 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_900 90.885 90.412 90.926 0.028 0.074 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_1000 90.901 90.864 90.930 0.006 0.016 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_1500 90.899 90.862 90.929 0.006 0.017 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_2000 90.897 90.858 90.923 0.006 0.017 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_3000 90.421 90.238 90.553 0.030 0.081 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_4000 90.890 90.847 90.914 0.006 0.017 
            
10 Ship  Endurance Patrol 
Scenario Average Minimum Maximum Half Width Standard Deviation 
Double_JHSV_500 90.861 90.605 90.926 0.017 0.045 
Double_JHSV_600 90.868 90.629 90.926 0.019 0.050 
Double_JHSV_700 90.858 90.383 90.930 0.013 0.035 
Double_JHSV_800 90.858 90.383 90.931 0.013 0.034 
Double_JHSV_900 90.858 90.383 90.930 0.013 0.035 
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Double_JHSV_1000 90.902 90.864 90.930 0.007 0.017 
Double_JHSV_1500 90.900 90.863 90.928 0.007 0.019 
Double_JHSV_2000 90.896 90.858 90.924 0.007 0.020 
Double_JHSV_3000 90.405 90.283 90.582 0.025 0.068 
Double_JHSV_4000 90.885 90.852 90.913 0.007 0.019 
            
10 Ship Endurance Patrol 
Scenario Average Minimum Maximum Half Width Standard Deviation 
Double_Logistics_500 90.879 90.620 90.927 0.019 0.051 
Double_Logistics_600 90.890 90.629 90.930 0.017 0.045 
Double_Logistics_700 90.858 89.933 90.929 0.017 0.046 
Double_Logistics_800 90.863 89.937 90.929 0.016 0.044 
Double_Logistics_900 90.858 89.933 90.929 0.017 0.046 
Double_Logistics_1000 90.902 90.864 90.929 0.007 0.018 
Double_Logistics_1500 90.898 90.860 90.930 0.007 0.019 
Double_Logistics_2000 90.896 90.858 90.924 0.007 0.019 
Double_Logistics_3000 90.599 90.455 90.700 0.022 0.058 
Double_Logistics_4000 90.888 90.850 90.917 0.007 0.018 
      
      11 Ship Endurance Patrol 
Scenario Average Minimum Maximum Half Width Standard Deviation 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_500 90.885 90.634 90.927 0.019 0.050 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_600 90.885 90.633 90.927 0.019 0.050 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_700 90.903 90.865 90.931 0.006 0.016 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_800 90.903 90.865 90.931 0.006 0.016 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_900 90.902 90.864 90.931 0.006 0.016 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_1000 90.902 90.867 90.931 0.006 0.016 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_1500 90.899 90.861 90.928 0.006 0.017 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_2000 90.896 90.858 90.923 0.006 0.017 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_3000 90.890 90.854 90.918 0.007 0.017 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_4000 90.407 90.286 90.804 0.028 0.074 
            
11 Ship Endurance Patrol 
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Scenario Average Minimum Maximum Half Width Standard Deviation 
Double_JHSV_500 90.872 90.635 90.928 0.021 0.055 
Double_JHSV_600 90.872 90.635 90.928 0.021 0.055 
Double_JHSV_700 90.903 90.864 90.931 0.007 0.018 
Double_JHSV_800 90.903 90.864 90.931 0.007 0.018 
Double_JHSV_900 90.903 90.864 90.931 0.007 0.018 
Double_JHSV_1000 90.902 90.864 90.932 0.007 0.017 
Double_JHSV_1500 90.900 90.861 90.928 0.007 0.019 
Double_JHSV_2000 90.896 90.858 90.924 0.007 0.019 
Double_JHSV_3000 90.892 90.853 90.919 0.007 0.019 
Double_JHSV_4000 90.413 90.319 90.580 0.020 0.055 
            
11 Ship Endurance Patrol 
Scenario Average Minimum Maximum Half Width Standard Deviation 
Double_Logistics_500 90.884 90.647 90.930 0.017 0.045 
Double_Logistics_600 90.884 90.647 90.930 0.017 0.045 
Double_Logistics_700 90.903 90.864 90.931 0.007 0.018 
Double_Logistics_800 90.902 90.864 90.931 0.007 0.018 
Double_Logistics_900 90.902 90.864 90.930 0.007 0.018 
Double_Logistics_1000 90.902 90.864 90.930 0.007 0.017 
Double_Logistics_1500 90.896 90.858 90.926 0.007 0.019 
Double_Logistics_2000 90.893 90.854 90.922 0.007 0.020 
Double_Logistics_3000 90.888 90.849 90.917 0.007 0.018 
Double_Logistics_4000 90.558 90.420 90.702 0.022 0.060 
      
      12 Ship Endurance Patrol 
Scenario Average Minimum Maximum Half Width Standard Deviation 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_500 90.886 90.634 90.928 0.018 0.049 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_600 90.886 90.634 90.928 0.018 0.049 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_700 90.903 90.865 90.932 0.006 0.017 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_800 90.903 90.865 90.932 0.006 0.017 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_900 90.903 90.865 90.932 0.006 0.017 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_1000 90.902 90.865 90.931 0.006 0.017 
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Combatant_fuel_Cap_1500 90.899 90.862 90.929 0.006 0.017 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_2000 90.896 90.858 90.924 0.006 0.017 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_3000 90.654 90.566 90.846 0.018 0.048 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_4000 90.421 90.292 90.868 0.026 0.069 
            
12 Ship Endurance Patrol 
Scenario Average Minimum Maximum Half Width Standard Deviation 
Double_JHSV_500 90.880 90.639 90.929 0.020 0.053 
Double_JHSV_600 90.880 90.639 90.929 0.020 0.053 
Double_JHSV_700 90.903 90.864 90.931 0.007 0.018 
Double_JHSV_800 90.903 90.864 90.931 0.007 0.018 
Double_JHSV_900 90.903 90.864 90.930 0.007 0.018 
Double_JHSV_1000 90.902 90.865 90.931 0.007 0.017 
Double_JHSV_1500 90.900 90.861 90.926 0.007 0.019 
Double_JHSV_2000 90.896 90.858 90.923 0.007 0.019 
Double_JHSV_3000 90.653 90.576 90.738 0.015 0.041 
Double_JHSV_4000 90.412 90.305 90.752 0.022 0.059 
            
12 Ship Endurance Patrol 
Scenario Average Minimum Maximum Half Width Standard Deviation 
Double_Logistics_500 90.891 90.648 90.930 0.017 0.046 
Double_Logistics_600 90.891 90.648 90.930 0.017 0.046 
Double_Logistics_700 90.903 90.865 90.930 0.007 0.018 
Double_Logistics_800 90.903 90.865 90.930 0.007 0.018 
Double_Logistics_900 90.903 90.865 90.930 0.007 0.018 
Double_Logistics_1000 90.902 90.866 90.929 0.006 0.017 
Double_Logistics_1500 90.898 90.860 90.925 0.007 0.018 
Double_Logistics_2000 90.895 90.856 90.922 0.007 0.019 
Double_Logistics_3000 90.742 90.657 90.820 0.015 0.039 
Double_Logistics_4000 90.561 90.440 90.741 0.023 0.061 
      
      13 Ship Endurance Patrol 
Scenario Average Minimum Maximum Half Width Standard Deviation 
 220 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_500 90.889 90.618 90.928 0.018 0.047 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_600 90.891 90.635 90.929 0.018 0.049 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_700 90.903 90.865 90.931 0.006 0.017 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_800 90.903 90.864 90.931 0.006 0.017 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_900 90.903 90.864 90.931 0.006 0.017 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_1000 90.902 90.864 90.931 0.006 0.017 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_1500 90.899 90.861 90.929 0.007 0.018 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_2000 90.896 90.858 90.924 0.007 0.018 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_3000 90.657 90.529 90.852 0.018 0.049 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_4000 90.418 90.258 90.891 0.025 0.066 
            
13 Ship Endurance Patrol 
Scenario Average Minimum Maximum Half Width Standard Deviation 
Double_JHSV_500 90.881 90.632 90.930 0.016 0.042 
Double_JHSV_600 90.890 90.652 90.930 0.016 0.043 
Double_JHSV_700 90.903 90.865 90.931 0.006 0.017 
Double_JHSV_800 90.903 90.865 90.931 0.006 0.017 
Double_JHSV_900 90.903 90.865 90.931 0.006 0.017 
Double_JHSV_1000 90.902 90.865 90.931 0.006 0.017 
Double_JHSV_1500 90.898 90.860 90.926 0.007 0.018 
Double_JHSV_2000 90.895 90.857 90.923 0.007 0.018 
Double_JHSV_3000 90.653 90.563 90.734 0.014 0.039 
Double_JHSV_4000 90.413 90.310 90.759 0.021 0.056 
            
13 Ship Endurance Patrol 
Scenario Average Minimum Maximum Half Width Standard Deviation 
Double_Logistics_500 90.892 90.639 90.930 0.017 0.046 
Double_Logistics_600 90.892 90.648 90.930 0.018 0.049 
Double_Logistics_700 90.903 90.865 90.930 0.007 0.018 
Double_Logistics_800 90.903 90.865 90.930 0.007 0.018 
Double_Logistics_900 90.903 90.865 90.930 0.007 0.018 
Double_Logistics_1000 90.902 90.866 90.929 0.006 0.017 
Double_Logistics_1500 90.900 90.860 90.924 0.007 0.018 
Double_Logistics_2000 90.897 90.856 90.922 0.007 0.019 
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Double_Logistics_3000 90.742 90.653 90.817 0.013 0.035 
Double_Logistics_4000 90.568 90.468 90.748 0.019 0.051 
      
      14 Ship  Endurance Patrol 
Scenario Average Minimum Maximum Half Width Standard Deviation 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_500 90.891 90.635 90.929 0.018 0.047 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_600 90.891 90.635 90.929 0.018 0.047 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_700 90.903 90.865 90.932 0.006 0.017 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_800 90.903 90.865 90.931 0.006 0.017 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_900 90.903 90.865 90.931 0.007 0.018 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_1000 90.901 90.864 90.930 0.006 0.017 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_1500 90.898 90.860 90.927 0.007 0.018 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_2000 90.893 90.855 90.921 0.007 0.018 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_3000 90.883 90.846 90.911 0.007 0.019 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_4000 90.397 90.285 90.900 0.024 0.063 
            
14 Ship  Endurance Patrol 
Scenario Average Minimum Maximum Half Width Standard Deviation 
Double_JHSV_500 90.890 90.653 90.930 0.016 0.044 
Double_JHSV_600 90.890 90.652 90.930 0.016 0.044 
Double_JHSV_700 90.903 90.865 90.932 0.006 0.017 
Double_JHSV_800 90.903 90.865 90.932 0.006 0.017 
Double_JHSV_900 90.903 90.866 90.931 0.006 0.017 
Double_JHSV_1000 90.902 90.864 90.931 0.006 0.017 
Double_JHSV_1500 90.898 90.860 90.927 0.007 0.018 
Double_JHSV_2000 90.893 90.855 90.921 0.007 0.018 
Double_JHSV_3000 90.882 90.844 90.913 0.007 0.018 
Double_JHSV_4000 90.400 90.293 90.750 0.020 0.054 
            
14 Ship Endurance Patrol 
Scenario Average Minimum Maximum Half Width Standard Deviation 
Double_Logistics_500 90.892 90.641 90.931 0.016 0.043 
Double_Logistics_600 90.892 90.641 90.931 0.016 0.043 
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Double_Logistics_700 90.903 90.865 90.931 0.007 0.018 
Double_Logistics_800 90.903 90.865 90.931 0.007 0.018 
Double_Logistics_900 90.903 90.865 90.931 0.007 0.018 
Double_Logistics_1000 90.902 90.864 90.930 0.006 0.017 
Double_Logistics_1500 90.899 90.858 90.926 0.007 0.018 
Double_Logistics_2000 90.893 90.853 90.921 0.007 0.018 
Double_Logistics_3000 90.882 90.841 90.909 0.007 0.018 
Double_Logistics_4000 90.550 90.429 90.767 0.023 0.060 
      
      15 Ship Endurance Patrol 
Scenario Average Minimum Maximum Half Width Standard Deviation 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_500 90.885 90.634 90.927 0.019 0.050 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_600 90.885 90.633 90.927 0.019 0.050 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_700 90.903 90.865 90.931 0.006 0.016 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_800 90.903 90.865 90.931 0.006 0.016 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_900 90.902 90.864 90.931 0.006 0.016 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_1000 90.902 90.867 90.931 0.006 0.016 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_1500 90.899 90.861 90.928 0.006 0.017 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_2000 90.896 90.858 90.923 0.006 0.017 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_3000 90.890 90.854 90.918 0.007 0.017 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_4000 90.407 90.286 90.804 0.028 0.074 
            
15 Ship Endurance Patrol 
Scenario Average Minimum Maximum Half Width Standard Deviation 
Double_JHSV_500 90.872 90.635 90.928 0.021 0.055 
Double_JHSV_600 90.872 90.635 90.928 0.021 0.055 
Double_JHSV_700 90.903 90.864 90.931 0.007 0.018 
Double_JHSV_800 90.903 90.864 90.931 0.007 0.018 
Double_JHSV_900 90.903 90.864 90.931 0.007 0.018 
Double_JHSV_1000 90.902 90.864 90.932 0.007 0.017 
Double_JHSV_1500 90.900 90.861 90.928 0.007 0.019 
Double_JHSV_2000 90.896 90.858 90.924 0.007 0.019 
Double_JHSV_3000 90.892 90.853 90.919 0.007 0.019 
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Double_JHSV_4000 90.413 90.319 90.580 0.020 0.055 
            
15  Ship Endurance Patrol 
Scenario Average Minimum Maximum Half Width Standard Deviation 
Double_Logistics_500 90.884 90.647 90.930 0.017 0.045 
Double_Logistics_600 90.884 90.647 90.930 0.017 0.045 
Double_Logistics_700 90.903 90.864 90.931 0.007 0.018 
Double_Logistics_800 90.902 90.864 90.931 0.007 0.018 
Double_Logistics_900 90.902 90.864 90.930 0.007 0.018 
Double_Logistics_1000 90.902 90.864 90.930 0.007 0.017 
Double_Logistics_1500 90.896 90.858 90.926 0.007 0.019 
Double_Logistics_2000 90.893 90.854 90.922 0.007 0.020 
Double_Logistics_3000 90.888 90.849 90.917 0.007 0.018 
Double_Logistics_4000 90.558 90.420 90.702 0.022 0.060 
      
      16 Ship Endurance Patrol 
Scenario Average Minimum Maximum Half Width Standard Deviation 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_500 90.895 90.636 90.929 0.017 0.046 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_600 90.895 90.636 90.929 0.017 0.046 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_700 90.891 90.635 90.929 0.017 0.046 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_800 90.903 90.865 90.931 0.006 0.017 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_900 90.903 90.865 90.931 0.007 0.018 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_1000 90.901 90.864 90.930 0.006 0.017 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_1500 90.898 90.860 90.927 0.007 0.018 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_2000 90.893 90.855 90.921 0.007 0.018 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_3000 90.883 90.846 90.911 0.007 0.019 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_4000 90.639 90.568 90.899 0.014 0.039 
            
16 Ship Endurance Patrol 
Scenario Average Minimum Maximum Half Width Standard Deviation 
Double_JHSV_500 90.894 90.652 90.931 0.016 0.042 
Double_JHSV_600 90.894 90.652 90.931 0.016 0.042 
Double_JHSV_700 90.892 90.672 90.929 0.013 0.034 
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Double_JHSV_800 90.904 90.866 90.931 0.006 0.017 
Double_JHSV_900 90.903 90.866 90.930 0.006 0.017 
Double_JHSV_1000 90.902 90.867 90.930 0.006 0.017 
Double_JHSV_1500 90.898 90.862 90.925 0.006 0.017 
Double_JHSV_2000 90.893 90.855 90.920 0.007 0.018 
Double_JHSV_3000 90.882 90.844 90.911 0.007 0.017 
Double_JHSV_4000 90.637 90.571 90.898 0.014 0.037 
            
16 Ship Endurance Patrol 
Scenario Average Minimum Maximum Half Width Standard Deviation 
Double_Logistics_500 90.895 90.641 90.931 0.016 0.044 
Double_Logistics_600 90.895 90.641 90.931 0.016 0.044 
Double_Logistics_700 90.895 90.664 90.931 0.016 0.043 
Double_Logistics_800 90.904 90.866 90.931 0.007 0.018 
Double_Logistics_900 90.903 90.865 90.931 0.007 0.018 
Double_Logistics_1000 90.902 90.866 90.929 0.006 0.017 
Double_Logistics_1500 90.899 90.861 90.925 0.007 0.018 
Double_Logistics_2000 90.894 90.856 90.920 0.007 0.019 
Double_Logistics_3000 90.884 90.843 90.911 0.007 0.018 
Double_Logistics_4000 90.716 90.654 90.822 0.014 0.038 
2. Combat Patrol Simulation Results 
      1 Ship Combat Patrol 
Scenario Average Minimum Maximum Half Width 
Standard 
Deviation 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_500 19.375 10.388 20.164 0.643 1.723 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_600 19.374 10.360 20.164 0.645 1.728 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_700 16.020 9.897 20.158 1.316 3.526 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_800 15.168 10.268 20.158 1.257 3.366 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_900 15.231 7.087 20.158 1.415 3.790 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_1000 12.278 6.306 18.597 1.299 3.480 
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Combatant_fuel_Cap_1500 13.749 6.822 20.158 1.871 5.011 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_2000 10.398 4.794 20.171 1.439 3.854 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_3000 9.501 1.741 20.363 2.290 6.134 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_4000 5.206 2.261 13.747 1.091 2.922 
            
1 Ship Combat Patrol 
Scenario Average Minimum Maximum Half Width 
Standard 
Deviation 
Double_JHSV_500 19.695 19.084 20.164 0.112 0.301 
Double_JHSV_600 19.695 19.084 20.164 0.112 0.301 
Double_JHSV_700 16.599 8.474 20.164 1.683 4.509 
Double_JHSV_800 17.358 9.759 20.164 1.500 4.016 
Double_JHSV_900 17.299 7.471 20.164 1.692 4.533 
Double_JHSV_1000 9.902 4.807 19.383 1.046 2.801 
Double_JHSV_1500 12.842 6.910 20.164 1.888 5.058 
Double_JHSV_2000 9.614 4.681 16.814 1.253 3.295 
Double_JHSV_3000 7.339 1.904 19.671 1.582 4.236 
Double_JHSV_4000 4.549 2.200 14.900 1.020 2.733 
            
1 Ship Combat Patrol 
Scenario Average Minimum Maximum Half Width 
Standard 
Deviation 
Double_Logistics_500 17.575 15.555 19.730 0.563 1.507 
Double_Logistics_600 17.575 15.555 19.730 0.563 1.507 
Double_Logistics_700 17.273 10.666 19.725 0.715 1.914 
Double_Logistics_800 17.273 10.647 19.725 0.715 1.916 
Double_Logistics_900 17.262 10.331 19.725 0.730 1.954 
Double_Logistics_1000 13.550 4.518 19.648 1.937 5.187 
Double_Logistics_1500 14.626 6.745 19.725 1.605 4.300 
Double_Logistics_2000 7.512 1.279 17.408 1.591 4.261 
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Double_Logistics_3000 5.462 1.372 15.109 1.330 3.562 
Double_Logistics_4000 3.875 1.265 11.391 1.046 2.801 




    2 Ship Combat Patrol 
Scenario Average Minimum Maximum Half Width 
Standard 
Deviation 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_500 7.621 0.194 20.116 3.078 8.243 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_600 7.390 0.194 20.116 2.979 7.979 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_700 4.725 0.299 11.671 1.762 4.720 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_800 4.580 0.289 11.963 1.713 4.587 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_900 4.683 0.283 11.390 1.746 4.677 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_1000 5.797 0.414 18.236 2.349 6.290 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_1500 3.459 0.305 9.677 1.243 3.329 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_2000 2.326 0.668 7.228 0.699 1.872 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_3000 1.392 0.727 2.044 0.190 0.509 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_4000 1.802 1.297 2.890 0.195 0.522 
            
2 Ship Combat Patrol 
Scenario Average Minimum Maximum Half Width 
Standard 
Deviation 
Double_JHSV_500 9.110 0.182 19.741 3.196 8.559 
Double_JHSV_600 9.109 0.182 19.741 3.196 8.560 
Double_JHSV_700 5.772 0.192 16.966 2.239 5.997 
Double_JHSV_800 5.424 0.191 15.829 2.071 5.548 
Double_JHSV_900 5.637 0.188 16.966 2.209 5.916 
Double_JHSV_1000 3.707 0.213 13.795 1.455 3.898 
Double_JHSV_1500 2.294 0.231 8.243 0.847 2.270 
Double_JHSV_2000 1.781 0.303 7.326 0.660 1.769 
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Double_JHSV_3000 0.726 0.467 1.711 0.100 0.269 
Double_JHSV_4000 0.935 0.546 2.058 0.118 0.315 
            
2 Ship Combat Patrol 
Scenario Average Minimum Maximum Half Width 
Standard 
Deviation 
Double_Logistics_500 9.126 0.177 19.704 3.401 9.109 
Double_Logistics_600 9.126 0.176 19.704 3.401 9.110 
Double_Logistics_700 7.678 0.174 19.705 3.089 8.274 
Double_Logistics_800 7.690 0.173 19.705 3.092 8.282 
Double_Logistics_900 7.475 0.173 19.705 3.035 8.129 
Double_Logistics_1000 3.777 0.186 15.468 1.620 4.338 
Double_Logistics_1500 2.314 0.187 9.693 0.987 2.645 
Double_Logistics_2000 1.612 0.244 5.653 0.612 1.639 
Double_Logistics_3000 0.682 0.448 1.505 0.078 0.208 
Double_Logistics_4000 0.882 0.598 1.382 0.078 0.206 
      
      3 Ship Combat Patrol 
Scenario Average Minimum Maximum Half Width 
Standard 
Deviation 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_500 0.308 0.237 0.395 0.016 0.042 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_600 0.307 0.236 0.394 0.016 0.042 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_700 0.403 0.304 0.529 0.023 0.059 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_800 0.399 0.316 0.491 0.021 0.056 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_900 0.396 0.308 0.506 0.022 0.058 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_1000 0.611 0.520 0.709 0.018 0.048 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_1500 0.643 0.461 0.767 0.032 0.086 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_2000 1.158 0.788 1.497 0.064 0.171 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_3000 1.769 1.483 1.922 0.070 0.188 
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Combatant_fuel_Cap_4000 1.960 1.535 3.345 0.280 0.751 
            
3 Ship Combat Patrol 
Scenario Average Minimum Maximum Half Width 
Standard 
Deviation 
Double_JHSV_500 0.306 0.245 0.390 0.014 0.039 
Double_JHSV_600 0.301 0.239 0.383 0.015 0.039 
Double_JHSV_700 1.290 1.027 1.481 0.047 0.126 
Double_JHSV_800 0.328 0.265 0.397 0.014 0.037 
Double_JHSV_900 0.325 0.269 0.390 0.013 0.034 
Double_JHSV_1000 0.657 0.558 0.764 0.019 0.051 
Double_JHSV_1500 0.310 0.256 0.402 0.014 0.037 
Double_JHSV_2000 0.307 0.249 0.396 0.014 0.036 
Double_JHSV_3000 0.486 0.340 0.582 0.017 0.046 
Double_JHSV_4000 1.348 0.988 1.747 0.072 0.192 
            
3 Ship Combat Patrol 
Scenario Average Minimum Maximum Half Width 
Standard 
Deviation 
Double_Logistics_500 0.299 0.230 0.391 0.014 0.036 
Double_Logistics_600 0.299 0.229 0.390 0.014 0.036 
Double_Logistics_700 0.291 0.224 0.385 0.014 0.038 
Double_Logistics_800 0.290 0.223 0.384 0.014 0.038 
Double_Logistics_900 0.289 0.222 0.383 0.014 0.038 
Double_Logistics_1000 0.298 0.241 0.384 0.013 0.034 
Double_Logistics_1500 0.330 0.229 0.435 0.022 0.058 
Double_Logistics_2000 0.485 0.306 0.602 0.029 0.077 
Double_Logistics_3000 0.712 0.531 0.950 0.041 0.111 
Double_Logistics_4000 0.988 0.617 1.804 0.145 0.388 
      
       229 
4 Ship Combat Patrol 
Scenario Average Minimum Maximum Half Width 
Standard 
Deviation 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_500 0.315 0.239 0.395 0.017 0.045 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_600 0.315 0.238 0.394 0.017 0.045 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_700 0.430 0.348 0.513 0.016 0.043 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_800 0.429 0.343 0.524 0.017 0.047 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_900 0.430 0.337 0.527 0.017 0.044 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_1000 0.614 0.524 0.722 0.020 0.055 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_1500 0.690 0.520 0.869 0.033 0.089 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_2000 1.243 0.889 1.671 0.053 0.141 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_3000 3.075 1.991 3.780 0.063 0.167 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_4000 14.815 3.140 46.711 3.997 10.705 
            
4 Ship Combat Patrol 
Scenario Average Minimum Maximum Half Width 
Standard 
Deviation 
Double_JHSV_500 0.319 0.260 0.399 0.015 0.040 
Double_JHSV_600 0.318 0.260 0.398 0.015 0.040 
Double_JHSV_700 0.312 0.262 0.392 0.013 0.035 
Double_JHSV_800 0.312 0.258 0.391 0.014 0.037 
Double_JHSV_900 0.312 0.252 0.390 0.014 0.037 
Double_JHSV_1000 0.509 0.430 0.602 0.017 0.046 
Double_JHSV_1500 0.610 0.452 0.727 0.027 0.072 
Double_JHSV_2000 1.192 0.871 1.615 0.047 0.125 
Double_JHSV_3000 3.114 2.146 3.822 0.059 0.157 
Double_JHSV_4000 12.927 3.142 46.683 4.100 10.980 
            
4 Ship Combat Patrol 
Scenario Average Minimum Maximum Half Standard 
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Width Deviation 
Double_Logistics_500 0.307 0.232 0.391 0.015 0.041 
Double_Logistics_600 0.306 0.231 0.390 0.015 0.041 
Double_Logistics_700 0.299 0.214 0.385 0.016 0.042 
Double_Logistics_800 0.298 0.214 0.384 0.016 0.042 
Double_Logistics_900 0.297 0.213 0.383 0.016 0.042 
Double_Logistics_1000 0.300 0.224 0.385 0.015 0.039 
Double_Logistics_1500 0.319 0.224 0.439 0.019 0.052 
Double_Logistics_2000 0.488 0.310 0.618 0.029 0.079 
Double_Logistics_3000 1.066 0.532 2.031 0.041 0.107 
Double_Logistics_4000 2.690 1.313 9.598 0.788 2.110 
            5 Ship Combat Patrol 
Scenario Average Minimum Maximum Half Width 
Standard 
Deviation 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_500 0.319 0.240 0.395 0.017 0.045 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_600 0.319 0.239 0.395 0.017 0.045 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_700 0.439 0.374 0.515 0.019 0.052 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_800 0.435 0.373 0.521 0.021 0.055 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_900 0.437 0.378 0.519 0.020 0.053 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_1000 0.626 0.543 0.729 0.020 0.055 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_1500 0.740 0.457 0.928 0.039 0.105 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_2000 1.376 1.067 1.832 0.062 0.165 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_3000 4.463 2.775 5.652 0.041 0.110 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_4000 29.342 4.128 90.449 0.274 0.733 
            
5 Ship Combat Patrol 
Scenario Average Minimum Maximum Half Width 
Standard 
Deviation 
Double_JHSV_500 0.323 0.266 0.399 0.015 0.041 
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Double_JHSV_600 0.323 0.265 0.396 0.015 0.041 
Double_JHSV_700 0.317 0.263 0.393 0.014 0.038 
Double_JHSV_800 0.316 0.262 0.392 0.014 0.038 
Double_JHSV_900 0.316 0.262 0.389 0.014 0.038 
Double_JHSV_1000 0.667 0.560 0.784 0.023 0.061 
Double_JHSV_1500 0.995 0.746 1.241 0.040 0.107 
Double_JHSV_2000 1.777 1.486 2.022 0.041 0.109 
Double_JHSV_3000 4.474 2.843 5.646 0.069 0.186 
Double_JHSV_4000 24.625 4.513 90.477 0.271 0.727 
            
5 Ship Combat Patrol 
Scenario Average Minimum Maximum Half Width 
Standard 
Deviation 
Double_Logistics_500 0.313 0.235 0.417 0.017 0.045 
Double_Logistics_600 0.312 0.234 0.416 0.016 0.042 
Double_Logistics_700 0.301 0.229 0.408 0.016 0.042 
Double_Logistics_800 0.300 0.228 0.407 0.016 0.042 
Double_Logistics_900 45.580 45.420 45.663 0.019 0.052 
Double_Logistics_1000 0.311 0.243 0.404 0.017 0.046 
Double_Logistics_1500 0.409 0.304 0.569 0.026 0.070 
Double_Logistics_2000 0.733 0.548 0.970 0.031 0.082 
Double_Logistics_3000 1.524 0.604 2.891 0.041 0.110 
Double_Logistics_4000 5.021 1.648 19.514 0.134 0.358 
            6 Ship Combat Patrol 
Scenario Average Minimum Maximum Half Width 
Standard 
Deviation 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_500 55.960 10.224 90.442 0.191 0.513 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_600 45.586 45.425 45.660 0.024 0.064 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_700 45.661 45.476 45.728 0.025 0.067 
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Combatant_fuel_Cap_800 45.663 45.483 45.727 0.024 0.065 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_900 45.662 45.475 45.725 0.024 0.064 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_1000 45.751 45.624 45.829 0.017 0.046 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_1500 45.594 45.465 45.757 0.027 0.071 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_2000 45.898 45.628 46.173 0.041 0.109 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_3000 47.405 46.374 48.105 0.034 0.092 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_4000 55.960 10.224 90.442 0.191 0.513 
            
6Ship Combat Patrol 
Scenario Average Minimum Maximum Half Width 
Standard 
Deviation 
Double_JHSV_500 55.283 11.320 90.496 0.162 0.435 
Double_JHSV_600 45.589 45.433 45.660 0.024 0.064 
Double_JHSV_700 45.587 45.431 45.658 0.022 0.059 
Double_JHSV_800 45.588 45.430 45.656 0.022 0.059 
Double_JHSV_900 45.586 45.429 45.659 0.022 0.059 
Double_JHSV_1000 45.762 45.632 45.848 0.018 0.049 
Double_JHSV_1500 45.706 45.437 45.909 0.024 0.063 
Double_JHSV_2000 46.092 45.842 46.282 0.036 0.096 
Double_JHSV_3000 47.404 46.459 48.055 0.047 0.127 
Double_JHSV_4000 55.283 11.320 90.496 0.162 0.435 
            
6 Ship Combat Patrol 
Scenario Average Minimum Maximum Half Width 
Standard 
Deviation 
Double_Logistics_500 32.112 4.372 56.207 0.077 0.207 
Double_Logistics_600 45.583 45.429 45.663 0.019 0.051 
Double_Logistics_700 45.590 45.430 45.662 0.019 0.051 
Double_Logistics_800 45.589 45.429 45.661 0.019 0.051 
Double_Logistics_900 90.870 90.624 90.921 0.020 0.053 
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Double_Logistics_1000 45.594 45.483 45.668 0.015 0.040 
Double_Logistics_1500 45.229 44.904 45.631 0.017 0.046 
Double_Logistics_2000 45.385 45.062 45.775 0.034 0.091 
Double_Logistics_3000 45.971 45.531 46.854 0.032 0.085 
Double_Logistics_4000 32.112 4.372 56.207 0.077 0.207 
            7 Ship Combat Patrol 
Scenario Average Minimum Maximum Half Width 
Standard 
Deviation 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_500 83.853 83.610 83.925 0.024 0.064 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_600 83.853 83.610 83.925 0.024 0.064 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_700 83.859 83.606 83.921 0.019 0.050 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_800 83.858 83.605 83.920 0.019 0.050 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_900 83.858 83.605 83.920 0.019 0.050 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_1000 83.892 83.855 83.920 0.006 0.016 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_1500 83.395 83.316 83.537 0.021 0.057 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_2000 83.382 83.305 83.536 0.021 0.055 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_3000 83.371 83.236 83.512 0.028 0.074 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_4000 76.480 12.624 83.456 0.112 0.300 
            
7 Ship Combat Patrol 
Scenario Average Minimum Maximum Half Width 
Standard 
Deviation 
Double_JHSV_500 83.855 83.599 83.924 0.017 0.045 
Double_JHSV_600 83.855 83.598 83.924 0.017 0.045 
Double_JHSV_700 83.850 83.591 83.920 0.013 0.034 
Double_JHSV_800 83.850 83.590 83.920 0.013 0.034 
Double_JHSV_900 83.849 83.590 83.919 0.014 0.036 
Double_JHSV_1000 83.894 83.854 83.921 0.007 0.017 
Double_JHSV_1500 83.406 83.319 83.527 0.019 0.050 
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Double_JHSV_2000 83.398 83.326 83.508 0.016 0.043 
Double_JHSV_3000 83.365 83.237 83.503 0.028 0.076 
Double_JHSV_4000 76.833 15.655 83.515 0.074 0.198 
            
7 Ship Combat Patrol 
Scenario Average Minimum Maximum Half Width 
Standard 
Deviation 
Double_Logistics_500 83.856 83.618 83.923 0.020 0.055 
Double_Logistics_600 83.856 83.618 83.923 0.020 0.055 
Double_Logistics_700 83.870 83.613 83.922 0.019 0.050 
Double_Logistics_800 83.870 83.612 83.922 0.019 0.050 
Double_Logistics_900 83.869 83.612 83.921 0.019 0.050 
Double_Logistics_1000 83.893 83.855 83.921 0.007 0.019 
Double_Logistics_1500 83.095 82.295 83.717 0.014 0.038 
Double_Logistics_2000 83.093 82.322 83.706 0.025 0.067 
Double_Logistics_3000 83.490 83.382 83.604 0.020 0.053 
Double_Logistics_4000 56.522 10.946 83.589 0.047 0.126 
            8 Ship Combat Patrol 
Scenario Average Minimum Maximum Half Width 
Standard 
Deviation 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_500 83.853 83.610 83.925 0.024 0.064 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_600 83.853 83.610 83.925 0.024 0.064 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_700 83.859 83.606 83.921 0.019 0.050 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_800 83.858 83.605 83.920 0.019 0.050 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_900 83.858 83.605 83.920 0.019 0.050 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_1000 83.892 83.855 83.920 0.006 0.016 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_1500 83.395 83.316 83.537 0.021 0.057 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_2000 83.382 83.305 83.536 0.021 0.055 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_3000 83.371 83.236 83.512 0.028 0.074 
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Combatant_fuel_Cap_4000 76.480 12.624 83.456 0.112 0.300 
            
8 Ship Combat Patrol 
Scenario Average Minimum Maximum Half Width 
Standard 
Deviation 
Double_JHSV_500 83.855 83.599 83.924 0.017 0.045 
Double_JHSV_600 83.855 83.598 83.924 0.017 0.045 
Double_JHSV_700 83.850 83.591 83.920 0.013 0.034 
Double_JHSV_800 83.850 83.590 83.920 0.013 0.034 
Double_JHSV_900 83.849 83.590 83.919 0.014 0.036 
Double_JHSV_1000 83.894 83.854 83.921 0.007 0.017 
Double_JHSV_1500 83.406 83.319 83.527 0.019 0.050 
Double_JHSV_2000 83.398 83.326 83.508 0.016 0.043 
Double_JHSV_3000 83.365 83.237 83.503 0.028 0.076 
Double_JHSV_4000 76.833 15.655 83.515 0.074 0.198 
            
8 Ship Combat Patrol 
Scenario Average Minimum Maximum Half Width 
Standard 
Deviation 
Double_Logistics_500 83.856 83.618 83.923 0.020 0.055 
Double_Logistics_600 83.856 83.618 83.923 0.020 0.055 
Double_Logistics_700 83.870 83.613 83.922 0.019 0.050 
Double_Logistics_800 83.870 83.612 83.922 0.019 0.050 
Double_Logistics_900 83.869 83.612 83.921 0.019 0.050 
Double_Logistics_1000 83.893 83.855 83.921 0.007 0.019 
Double_Logistics_1500 83.095 82.295 83.717 0.014 0.038 
Double_Logistics_2000 83.093 82.322 83.706 0.025 0.067 
Double_Logistics_3000 83.490 83.382 83.604 0.020 0.053 
Double_Logistics_4000 56.522 10.946 83.589 0.047 0.126 
      9 Ship Combat Patrol 
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Scenario Average Minimum Maximum Half Width 
Standard 
Deviation 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_500 90.896 90.863 90.925 0.006 0.016 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_600 90.895 90.862 90.924 0.006 0.016 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_700 90.655 90.596 90.737 0.014 0.038 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_800 90.651 90.589 90.734 0.013 0.035 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_900 90.650 90.583 90.732 0.013 0.036 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_1000 90.640 90.581 90.722 0.013 0.035 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_1500 90.619 90.531 90.688 0.015 0.041 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_2000 90.359 90.234 90.682 0.026 0.069 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_3000 90.260 89.835 90.425 0.083 0.223 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_4000 89.954 89.690 90.337 0.079 0.210 
            
9 Ship Combat Patrol 
Scenario Average Minimum Maximum Half Width 
Standard 
Deviation 
Double_JHSV_500 90.897 90.858 90.926 0.006 0.017 
Double_JHSV_600 90.896 90.858 90.925 0.006 0.017 
Double_JHSV_700 90.654 90.589 90.745 0.014 0.038 
Double_JHSV_800 90.646 90.577 90.750 0.015 0.041 
Double_JHSV_900 90.645 90.575 90.748 0.015 0.040 
Double_JHSV_1000 90.642 90.564 90.733 0.014 0.037 
Double_JHSV_1500 90.620 90.538 90.701 0.018 0.049 
Double_JHSV_2000 90.369 90.253 90.698 0.025 0.066 
Double_JHSV_3000 89.272 74.827 90.405 0.124 0.332 
Double_JHSV_4000 89.945 89.701 90.329 0.062 0.167 
            
9 Ship Combat Patrol 




Double_Logistics_500 90.897 90.859 90.924 0.007 0.019 
Double_Logistics_600 90.896 90.858 90.923 0.007 0.019 
Double_Logistics_700 90.576 90.188 90.814 0.012 0.032 
Double_Logistics_800 90.572 90.203 90.801 0.009 0.025 
Double_Logistics_900 90.571 90.212 90.800 0.009 0.024 
Double_Logistics_1000 90.564 90.201 90.803 0.018 0.047 
Double_Logistics_1500 90.687 90.599 90.765 0.015 0.040 
Double_Logistics_2000 90.510 90.390 90.651 0.023 0.061 
Double_Logistics_3000 89.435 75.000 90.601 0.050 0.134 
Double_Logistics_4000 90.063 89.875 90.266 0.050 0.135 
      
      10 Ship Combat Patrol 
Scenario Average Minimum Maximum Half Width 
Standard 
Deviation 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_500 90.877 90.631 90.926 0.019 0.050 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_600 90.871 90.630 90.925 0.018 0.049 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_700 90.882 90.424 90.923 0.028 0.074 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_800 90.882 90.430 90.923 0.028 0.074 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_900 90.881 90.430 90.922 0.028 0.074 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_1000 90.893 90.859 90.922 0.006 0.016 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_1500 90.885 90.851 90.914 0.006 0.017 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_2000 90.874 90.836 90.902 0.006 0.017 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_3000 90.609 90.501 90.691 0.019 0.050 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_4000 90.325 90.076 90.790 0.051 0.136 
            
10 Ship Combat Patrol 
Scenario Average Minimum Maximum Half Width 
Standard 
Deviation 
Double_JHSV_500 90.868 90.630 90.925 0.021 0.056 
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Double_JHSV_600 90.866 90.627 90.924 0.019 0.050 
Double_JHSV_700 90.854 90.385 90.927 0.013 0.034 
Double_JHSV_800 90.853 90.386 90.926 0.013 0.034 
Double_JHSV_900 90.853 90.386 90.926 0.013 0.034 
Double_JHSV_1000 90.894 90.855 90.923 0.007 0.018 
Double_JHSV_1500 90.886 90.847 90.915 0.007 0.019 
Double_JHSV_2000 90.874 90.836 90.902 0.007 0.019 
Double_JHSV_3000 90.605 90.519 90.699 0.016 0.043 
Double_JHSV_4000 90.338 90.201 90.651 0.020 0.053 
            
10 Ship Combat Patrol 
Scenario Average Minimum Maximum Half Width 
Standard 
Deviation 
Double_Logistics_500 90.885 90.638 90.929 0.019 0.051 
Double_Logistics_600 90.882 90.627 90.928 0.017 0.045 
Double_Logistics_700 90.857 89.932 90.925 0.017 0.045 
Double_Logistics_800 90.856 89.931 90.925 0.017 0.045 
Double_Logistics_900 90.856 89.931 90.924 0.017 0.045 
Double_Logistics_1000 90.893 90.855 90.922 0.007 0.018 
Double_Logistics_1500 90.884 90.845 90.914 0.007 0.018 
Double_Logistics_2000 90.872 90.834 90.901 0.007 0.019 
Double_Logistics_3000 90.698 90.621 90.761 0.014 0.038 
Double_Logistics_4000 90.487 90.353 90.636 0.022 0.059 
            11 Ship Combat Patrol 
Scenario Average Minimum Maximum Half Width 
Standard 
Deviation 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_500 90.880 90.628 90.922 0.019 0.050 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_600 90.878 90.627 90.921 0.019 0.050 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_700 90.900 90.862 90.928 0.006 0.016 
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Combatant_fuel_Cap_800 90.899 90.861 90.928 0.006 0.016 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_900 90.899 90.861 90.927 0.006 0.016 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_1000 90.893 90.857 90.922 0.006 0.016 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_1500 90.884 90.847 90.913 0.006 0.017 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_2000 90.879 90.841 90.907 0.006 0.017 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_3000 90.619 90.521 90.699 0.018 0.048 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_4000 90.362 90.215 90.760 0.026 0.070 
            
11 Ship Combat Patrol 
Scenario Average Minimum Maximum Half Width 
Standard 
Deviation 
Double_JHSV_500 90.870 90.634 90.926 0.021 0.055 
Double_JHSV_600 90.870 90.634 90.926 0.021 0.055 
Double_JHSV_700 90.899 90.860 90.927 0.007 0.018 
Double_JHSV_800 90.899 90.860 90.926 0.007 0.018 
Double_JHSV_900 90.898 90.859 90.926 0.007 0.018 
Double_JHSV_1000 90.894 90.857 90.923 0.006 0.017 
Double_JHSV_1500 90.885 90.846 90.913 0.007 0.019 
Double_JHSV_2000 90.874 90.836 90.901 0.007 0.019 
Double_JHSV_3000 90.607 90.533 90.689 0.016 0.042 
Double_JHSV_4000 90.340 90.225 90.514 0.020 0.053 
            
11 Ship Combat Patrol 
Scenario Average Minimum Maximum Half Width 
Standard 
Deviation 
Double_Logistics_500 90.883 90.645 90.929 0.017 0.045 
Double_Logistics_600 90.882 90.645 90.928 0.017 0.045 
Double_Logistics_700 90.899 90.860 90.927 0.007 0.018 
Double_Logistics_800 90.898 90.859 90.926 0.007 0.018 
Double_Logistics_900 90.898 90.859 90.926 0.007 0.018 
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Double_Logistics_1000 90.894 90.857 90.920 0.007 0.018 
Double_Logistics_1500 90.882 90.844 90.911 0.007 0.019 
Double_Logistics_2000 90.870 90.832 90.899 0.007 0.020 
Double_Logistics_3000 90.701 90.629 90.772 0.015 0.039 
Double_Logistics_4000 90.490 90.380 90.654 0.023 0.061 
            12 Ship Combat Patrol 
Scenario Average Minimum Maximum Half Width 
Standard 
Deviation 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_500 90.884 90.633 90.926 0.018 0.049 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_600 90.884 90.633 90.926 0.018 0.049 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_700 90.899 90.861 90.928 0.006 0.017 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_800 90.898 90.860 90.927 0.006 0.017 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_900 90.898 90.860 90.927 0.006 0.017 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_1000 90.894 90.857 90.922 0.006 0.017 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_1500 90.885 90.847 90.914 0.006 0.017 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_2000 90.874 90.836 90.902 0.006 0.017 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_3000 90.610 90.522 90.801 0.018 0.047 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_4000 90.336 90.077 90.791 0.050 0.133 
            
12 Ship Combat Patrol 
Scenario Average Minimum Maximum Half Width 
Standard 
Deviation 
Double_JHSV_500 90.878 90.638 90.927 0.020 0.053 
Double_JHSV_600 90.878 90.637 90.927 0.020 0.053 
Double_JHSV_700 90.899 90.860 90.927 0.007 0.018 
Double_JHSV_800 90.899 90.860 90.926 0.007 0.018 
Double_JHSV_900 90.898 90.859 90.926 0.007 0.018 
Double_JHSV_1000 90.894 90.857 90.922 0.007 0.017 
Double_JHSV_1500 90.886 90.847 90.912 0.007 0.019 
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Double_JHSV_2000 90.874 90.836 90.901 0.007 0.019 
Double_JHSV_3000 90.611 90.541 90.697 0.014 0.038 
Double_JHSV_4000 90.333 90.199 90.668 0.021 0.057 
            
12 Ship Combat Patrol 
Scenario Average Minimum Maximum Half Width 
Standard 
Deviation 
Double_Logistics_500 90.889 90.646 90.928 0.017 0.046 
Double_Logistics_600 90.889 90.646 90.928 0.017 0.046 
Double_Logistics_700 90.899 90.861 90.926 0.007 0.018 
Double_Logistics_800 90.898 90.860 90.925 0.007 0.018 
Double_Logistics_900 90.898 90.860 90.925 0.007 0.018 
Double_Logistics_1000 90.893 90.857 90.920 0.006 0.017 
Double_Logistics_1500 90.884 90.845 90.910 0.007 0.018 
Double_Logistics_2000 90.872 90.834 90.899 0.007 0.019 
Double_Logistics_3000 90.696 90.614 90.775 0.015 0.041 
Double_Logistics_4000 90.491 90.380 90.669 0.021 0.057 
            13 Ship Combat Patrol 
Scenario Average Minimum Maximum Half Width 
Standard 
Deviation 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_500 90.886 90.619 90.927 0.018 0.048 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_600 90.886 90.619 90.926 0.018 0.048 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_700 90.899 90.861 90.927 0.006 0.017 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_800 90.898 90.860 90.927 0.006 0.017 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_900 90.898 90.860 90.926 0.006 0.017 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_1000 90.894 90.855 90.922 0.006 0.017 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_1500 90.885 90.847 90.915 0.006 0.017 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_2000 90.875 90.836 90.902 0.006 0.017 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_3000 90.609 90.483 90.808 0.018 0.050 
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Combatant_fuel_Cap_4000 90.331 89.930 90.829 0.077 0.205 
            
13 Ship Combat Patrol 
Scenario Average Minimum Maximum Half Width 
Standard 
Deviation 
Double_JHSV_500 90.886 90.640 90.928 0.016 0.043 
Double_JHSV_600 90.886 90.639 90.928 0.016 0.043 
Double_JHSV_700 90.899 90.861 90.927 0.006 0.017 
Double_JHSV_800 90.898 90.860 90.926 0.006 0.017 
Double_JHSV_900 90.898 90.860 90.926 0.007 0.017 
Double_JHSV_1000 90.894 90.855 90.923 0.006 0.017 
Double_JHSV_1500 90.885 90.847 90.912 0.007 0.018 
Double_JHSV_2000 90.874 90.836 90.901 0.007 0.018 
Double_JHSV_3000 90.609 90.531 90.694 0.015 0.041 
Double_JHSV_4000 90.332 90.202 90.537 0.021 0.055 
            
13 Ship Combat Patrol 
Scenario Average Minimum Maximum Half Width 
Standard 
Deviation 
Double_Logistics_500 90.890 90.645 90.929 0.017 0.047 
Double_Logistics_600 90.889 90.645 90.928 0.017 0.047 
Double_Logistics_700 90.899 90.861 90.926 0.007 0.018 
Double_Logistics_800 90.899 90.860 90.925 0.007 0.018 
Double_Logistics_900 90.898 90.859 90.926 0.007 0.017 
Double_Logistics_1000 90.894 90.856 90.921 0.006 0.017 
Double_Logistics_1500 90.886 90.844 90.911 0.006 0.017 
Double_Logistics_2000 90.874 90.832 90.901 0.007 0.018 
Double_Logistics_3000 90.699 90.610 90.774 0.014 0.038 
Double_Logistics_4000 90.492 90.325 90.679 0.024 0.064 
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14 Ship Combat Patrol 
Scenario Average Minimum Maximum Half Width 
Standard 
Deviation 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_500 90.818 90.674 90.842 0.014 0.038 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_600 90.892 90.647 90.928 0.018 0.048 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_700 90.884 90.616 90.926 0.019 0.052 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_800 90.899 90.861 90.927 0.006 0.017 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_900 90.898 90.860 90.926 0.006 0.017 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_1000 90.894 90.857 90.922 0.006 0.017 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_1500 90.885 90.847 90.914 0.007 0.018 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_2000 90.875 90.836 90.902 0.007 0.018 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_3000 90.847 90.811 90.877 0.007 0.018 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_4000 90.813 90.774 90.841 0.007 0.018 
            
14 Ship Combat Patrol 
Scenario Average Minimum Maximum Half Width 
Standard 
Deviation 
Double_JHSV_500 90.346 90.260 90.822 0.019 0.052 
Double_JHSV_600 90.865 90.621 90.924 0.016 0.043 
Double_JHSV_700 90.893 90.665 90.929 0.016 0.042 
Double_JHSV_800 90.890 90.670 90.927 0.013 0.034 
Double_JHSV_900 90.899 90.860 90.927 0.007 0.017 
Double_JHSV_1000 90.898 90.864 90.925 0.007 0.017 
Double_JHSV_1500 90.894 90.855 90.923 0.006 0.017 
Double_JHSV_2000 90.886 90.846 90.916 0.007 0.018 
Double_JHSV_3000 90.872 90.837 90.900 0.007 0.019 
Double_JHSV_4000 90.842 90.804 90.874 0.007 0.017 
            
14 Ship Combat Patrol 
Scenario Average Minimum Maximum Half Standard 
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Width Deviation 
Double_Logistics_500 90.843 90.803 90.872 0.007 0.018 
Double_Logistics_600 90.487 90.313 90.699 0.022 0.059 
Double_Logistics_700 90.893 90.639 90.929 0.016 0.043 
Double_Logistics_800 90.890 90.633 90.928 0.016 0.043 
Double_Logistics_900 90.899 90.860 90.928 0.007 0.019 
Double_Logistics_1000 90.899 90.861 90.928 0.006 0.017 
Double_Logistics_1500 90.898 90.860 90.925 0.006 0.017 
Double_Logistics_2000 90.889 90.855 90.917 0.006 0.017 
Double_Logistics_3000 90.886 90.845 90.913 0.007 0.018 
Double_Logistics_4000 90.870 90.832 90.901 0.007 0.019 
            15 Ship Combat Patrol 
Scenario Average Minimum Maximum Half Width 
Standard 
Deviation 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_500 90.892 90.647 90.928 0.017 0.047 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_600 90.892 90.647 90.927 0.017 0.047 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_700 90.894 90.650 90.929 0.017 0.046 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_800 90.899 90.861 90.927 0.006 0.017 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_900 90.898 90.860 90.926 0.006 0.017 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_1000 90.893 90.858 90.923 0.006 0.017 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_1500 90.885 90.848 90.915 0.006 0.017 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_2000 90.875 90.836 90.902 0.007 0.017 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_3000 90.846 90.810 90.875 0.007 0.018 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_4000 90.339 90.190 90.829 0.023 0.063 
            
15 Ship Combat Patrol 
Scenario Average Minimum Maximum Half Width 
Standard 
Deviation 
Double_JHSV_500 90.891 90.662 90.929 0.016 0.044 
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Double_JHSV_600 90.890 90.662 90.928 0.016 0.044 
Double_JHSV_700 90.894 90.650 90.929 0.016 0.042 
Double_JHSV_800 90.899 90.860 90.926 0.006 0.017 
Double_JHSV_900 90.898 90.860 90.926 0.006 0.017 
Double_JHSV_1000 90.894 90.858 90.923 0.006 0.017 
Double_JHSV_1500 90.886 90.848 90.913 0.007 0.017 
Double_JHSV_2000 90.874 90.836 90.901 0.007 0.018 
Double_JHSV_3000 90.847 90.808 90.875 0.007 0.017 
Double_JHSV_4000 90.341 90.233 90.824 0.019 0.050 
            
15 Ship Combat Patrol 
Scenario Average Minimum Maximum Half Width 
Standard 
Deviation 
Double_Logistics_500 90.892 90.642 90.929 0.017 0.045 
Double_Logistics_600 90.891 90.642 90.929 0.017 0.045 
Double_Logistics_700 90.893 90.640 90.929 0.016 0.044 
Double_Logistics_800 90.899 90.861 90.926 0.007 0.017 
Double_Logistics_900 90.898 90.860 90.926 0.007 0.017 
Double_Logistics_1000 90.894 90.857 90.921 0.006 0.017 
Double_Logistics_1500 90.886 90.847 90.914 0.007 0.017 
Double_Logistics_2000 90.875 90.836 90.902 0.007 0.018 
Double_Logistics_3000 90.846 90.806 90.874 0.007 0.018 
Double_Logistics_4000 90.492 90.417 90.702 0.021 0.055 
            16 Ship Combat Patrol 
Scenario Average Minimum Maximum Half Width 
Standard 
Deviation 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_500 90.819 90.782 90.844 0.007 0.019 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_600 90.895 90.649 90.928 0.017 0.046 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_700 90.895 90.650 90.929 0.017 0.047 
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Combatant_fuel_Cap_800 90.899 90.861 90.928 0.006 0.017 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_900 90.898 90.860 90.926 0.006 0.017 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_1000 90.893 90.858 90.921 0.006 0.017 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_1500 90.885 90.847 90.914 0.007 0.018 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_2000 90.875 90.836 90.902 0.007 0.017 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_3000 90.846 90.809 90.874 0.007 0.019 
Combatant_fuel_Cap_4000 90.812 90.774 90.842 0.007 0.018 
            
16 Ship Combat Patrol 
Scenario Average Minimum Maximum Half Width 
Standard 
Deviation 
Double_JHSV_500 90.814 90.674 90.845 0.013 0.035 
Double_JHSV_600 90.895 90.669 90.928 0.016 0.044 
Double_JHSV_700 90.896 90.672 90.929 0.016 0.044 
Double_JHSV_800 90.899 90.861 90.927 0.006 0.017 
Double_JHSV_900 90.899 90.861 90.927 0.006 0.017 
Double_JHSV_1000 90.894 90.859 90.921 0.006 0.017 
Double_JHSV_1500 90.885 90.851 90.911 0.007 0.018 
Double_JHSV_2000 90.876 90.841 90.900 0.006 0.017 
Double_JHSV_3000 90.845 90.809 90.871 0.007 0.018 
Double_JHSV_4000 90.812 90.777 90.836 0.007 0.019 
            
16 Ship Combat Patrol 
Scenario Average Minimum Maximum Half Width 
Standard 
Deviation 
Double_Logistics_500 90.818 90.785 90.844 0.007 0.019 
Double_Logistics_600 90.895 90.672 90.929 0.017 0.045 
Double_Logistics_700 90.893 90.662 90.929 0.017 0.046 
Double_Logistics_800 90.899 90.861 90.928 0.007 0.018 
Double_Logistics_900 90.899 90.860 90.926 0.007 0.017 
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Double_Logistics_1000 90.894 90.857 90.922 0.007 0.018 
Double_Logistics_1500 90.886 90.847 90.914 0.007 0.019 
Double_Logistics_2000 90.878 90.837 90.903 0.007 0.019 
Double_Logistics_3000 90.847 90.808 90.875 0.007 0.018 
Double_Logistics_4000 90.816 90.776 90.840 0.007 0.019 
3. Logistic Improvement Analysis 
Values such as speeds and transfer times were fixed, removing any variability to the simulation. The following values 
were adjusted: 
• T-AKE speed from 12 kts. to 24 kts. 
• JHSV speed from 20 kts. to 40 kts. 
• T-AKE capacity to 1,800,000 gallons 
• Fuel ferry capacity to 420,000 
• Guam to first transfer point reduced to 800 miles 
• Guam to first transfer point reduced to 400 mile 
• Ship numbers to: eight T-AKE and four fuel ferry 
• Ship numbers to: eight fuel ferry and four T-AKE 






a. Baseline of Eight T-AKE and Eight Fuel Ferries 
1500 ton 
Scenario Days Idle Percent 
Baseline: 4 T-AKE, 4 Fuel Ferry, 15 SSC 91 50% 
   
Increase Speed of T-AKE to 24 kts. 91 50% 
   
Increase Speed of JHSV to 40 kts. 19 10% 
   
Increase Capacity of T-AKE to 1,800,000 91 50% 
   
Increase Capacity of Fuel Ferry to 420,000 60 33% 
   
T-AKE Leg Reduced to 800 miles 91 50% 
   
T-AKE Leg Reduced to 400 mile 91 50% 
   
8 T-AKE, 4 Fuel Ferry 91 50% 
   
8 Fuel Ferry, 4 T-AKE 91 50% 
   
8 T-AKE, 8 Fuel Ferry 90 50% 
   
Scenario Days Idle Percent 
Baseline: 8 T-AKE, 8 Fuel Ferry, 15 SSC 91 50% 
   
Increase Speed of T-AKE to 24 kts. 91 50% 
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Increase Speed of JHSV to 40 kts. 12 6% 
   
Increase Capacity of T-AKE to 1,800,000 91 50% 
   
Increase Capacity of Fuel Ferry to 420,000 29 16% 
   
T-AKE Leg Reduced to 800 miles 91 50% 
   
T-AKE Leg Reduced to 400 mile 91 50% 
   
16 T-AKE, 8 Fuel Ferry 91 50% 
   
16 Fuel Ferry, 8 T-AKE 44 25% 
   
16 T-AKE, 16 Fuel Ferry 44 25% 
b. Baseline of 4 T-AKE and 4 Fuel Ferries 
600 ton 
Scenario Days Idle Percent 
Baseline: 4 T-AKE, 4 Fuel Ferry, 15 SSC 2 1% 
   
Increase Speed of T-AKE to 24kts 2 1% 
   
Increase Speed of JHSV to 40 kts. 6 3% 
   
Increase Capacity of T-AKE to 1,800,000 2 1% 
   
Increase Capacity of Fuel Ferry to 420,000 5 3% 
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T-AKE Leg Reduced to 800 miles 2 1% 
   
T-AKE Leg Reduced to 400 mile 3 2% 
   
8 T-AKE, 4 Fuel Ferry 2 1% 
   
8 Fuel Ferry, 4 T-AKE 2 1% 
   
8 Both 1 1% 
   
Scenario Days Idle Percent 
Baseline: 8 T-AKE, 8 Fuel Ferry, 15 SSC 1 1% 
   
Increase Speed of T-AKE to 24 kts. 2 1% 
   
Increase Speed of JHSV to 40 kts. 4 2% 
   
Increase Capacity of T-AKE to 1,800,000 7 4% 
   
Increase Capacity of Fuel Ferry to 420,000 3 2% 
   
T-AKE Leg Reduced to 800 miles 2 1% 
   
T-AKE Leg Reduced to 400 mile 2 1% 
   
16 T-AKE, 8 Fuel Ferry 3 2% 
   
16 Fuel Ferry, 8 T-AKE 2 1% 
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16 Both 3 2% 
4. Percent Idle Time for Flotilla 
These graphs represent the idle time derived from SIMIO based on the ships operating to a 50% capacity and returning 
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C. COMBAT XXI 
This work was performed in an educational/research setting using representative 
performance data and is not endorsed by either the U.S. Army TAADOC Analysis Center 
(TRAC) or Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC). COMBAT XXI 
was modified to model naval engagements. 
Red Casualties   BLUE Casualties   
Mean 16 Mean 1.45 
Standard Error 0 Standard Error 0.226691 
Median 16 Median 0 
Mode 16 Mode 0 
Standard Deviation 0 Standard Deviation 2.266912 
Sample Variance 0 Sample Variance 5.138889 
Range 0 Range 9 
Minimum 16 Minimum 0 
Maximum 16 Maximum 9 
Sum 1600 Sum 145 












1 16 0 
2 16 0 
3 16 0 
4 16 0 
5 16 0 
6 16 0 
7 16 0 
8 16 0 
9 16 6 
10 16 0 
11 16 4 
12 16 0 
13 16 7 
14 16 0 
15 16 1 
16 16 2 
17 16 0 
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18 16 6 
19 16 0 
20 16 0 
21 16 3 
22 16 0 
23 16 1 
24 16 2 
25 16 0 
26 16 1 
27 16 0 
28 16 0 
29 16 0 
30 16 0 
31 16 0 
32 16 0 
33 16 0 
34 16 0 
35 16 0 
36 16 2 
37 16 2 
38 16 0 
39 16 0 
40 16 5 
41 16 5 
42 16 0 
43 16 0 
44 16 0 
45 16 3 
46 16 0 
47 16 0 
48 16 2 
49 16 2 
50 16 0 
51 16 0 
52 16 6 
53 16 2 
54 16 3 
55 16 0 
56 16 0 
57 16 3 
58 16 0 
59 16 0 
60 16 0 
 256 
61 16 7 
62 16 0 
63 16 1 
64 16 0 
65 16 0 
66 16 1 
67 16 0 
68 16 0 
69 16 5 
70 16 1 
71 16 3 
72 16 0 
73 16 0 
74 16 0 
75 16 0 
76 16 0 
77 16 0 
78 16 5 
79 16 0 
80 16 2 
81 16 0 
82 16 4 
83 16 0 
84 16 6 
85 16 0 
86 16 7 
87 16 0 
88 16 9 
89 16 5 
90 16 4 
91 16 0 
92 16 4 
93 16 5 
94 16 0 
95 16 1 
96 16 0 
97 16 0 
98 16 0 
99 16 0 
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SUPPLEMENTALS 
All supplemental appendices are available upon request through the Dudley Knox 
Library located at the Naval Postgraduate School upon request. 
A. SEA-20A INITIAL PROGRESS REVIEW BRIEF #1 
This is the initial presentation outlining SEA-20A’s tasking statement, mission, 
vision, goals, project team organization, systems engineering process, capability analysis, 
modeling tools, project timeline and milestones, and the way ahead. Each slide contains 
notes and description of the slides for future use. 
B. SEA-20A INITIAL PROGRESS REVIEW BRIEF #2 
The second presentation refined SEA-20A’s first IPR, and furthered the systems 
engineering process, design concept, combat modeling, logistical support, and cost 
estimates. Each slide contains notes and description of the slides for future use. 
C. SEA-20A FINAL PROGRESS REVIEW BRIEF 
This is the final Powerpoint presentation given to stakeholders and faculty 
members regarding the distributed force concept. Each slide contains notes and 
description of the slides for future use. 
D. TRADE SPACE DISCUSSION 
These Powerpoint slides contain the various weapons and platforms used to 
determine threat capabilities and force structure as well as the weapons and platforms 
used to derive the capabilities for the distributed force platforms. Additionally, there are 
slides for discussions on the definitions of littoral waters and A2AD environments, 
possible areas of conflict, and possible adversary nations, and scenario development. 
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